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Résumé
Cette thèse se propose de montrer l’intérêt de considérer simultanément l’équité intra et in-
tergénérationnelle pour des questions liées à la gestion des ressources environnementales. Plus
spécifiquement, la thèse examine les arbitrages entre ces deux dimensions de l’équité pour définir
une distribution juste des ressources au cours du temps et au sein des générations. Les inégal-
ités sont considérées à travers deux régions hétérogènes. Le premier chapitre se focalise sur le
maintien du niveau maximal de bien-être au cours du temps, à travers le critère maximin, lorsque
l’économie a une aversion aux inégalités intragénérationnelles. De manière contre-intuitive, la
région la moins dotée en ressources paye un plus lourd tribut pour la durabilité globale. Le
second chapitre étudie la croissance vers le niveau maximal soutenable de bien-être, la règle
d’or. De la même manière, la région la moins dotée en ressources doit contribuer davantage à
cette croissance, en limitant relativement plus sa consommation. Le troisième chapitre étudie
les transferts qui doivent être opérés de la région relativement mieux lotie vers celle moins bien
lotie. Le transfert doit être soit forfaitaire soit proportionnel à la consommation de la région
contributrice, selon que l’objectif est de favoriser ou de limiter sa consommation. Dans tous les
cas, la région la plus défavorisée reçoit un transfert compensatoire pour la contrainte qui lui est
imposée.
Mots-clés : équité intragénérationnelle, équité intergénérationnelle, ressource naturelle,
développement durable
Abstract
This dissertation proposes to show the interest of considering simultaneously intra and inter-
generational equity for environmental resources management issues. More specifically, the dis-
sertation examines the trade-offs between these two dimensions of equity to define an equitable
allocation of resources over time and within generations. Inequalities between two heterogeneous
regions are considered. The first chapter focuses on sustaining the highest level of welfare over
time, through the maximin criterion, when the economy has an intragenerational inequality aver-
sion. Counter-intuitively, the region with the lower resource stock pays a higher price for overall
sustainability. The second chapter examines growth toward the maximum sustainable level of
welfare, the golden rule. Similarly, the region with the lower resource stock shall contribute
more to the growth, by limiting relatively more its consumption. The third chapter examines the
transfers that shall be made from the well-off to the worse-off region. The transfer shall either be
a lump-sum or proportional to the consumption of the contributing region, depending on whether
the objective is to promote or to limit its consumption. In any case, the worst-off region receives
a compensatory transfer for the constraint imposed on it.
Keywords: intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity, natural resource, sustainable
development
v

Contents
Remerciements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Résumé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
General introduction 1
0.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0.2 Intragenerational equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
0.2.1 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
0.2.2 Axiomatic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
0.2.3 Selected approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
0.3 Intergenerational equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
0.3.1 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
0.3.2 Axiomatic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
0.3.3 Intertemporal criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
0.3.4 Selected approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
0.4 Linking the two dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
0.5 Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
0.6 Outline and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1 Sustaining welfare when intratemporal inequalities matter 29
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2 Two regions, two reproducible assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.2.1 A neoclassical benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2.2 Single-peakedness: A source of stock redundancy . . . . 46
vii
CONTENTS
1.3 Inequality aversion and sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.4 Accounting for changes in sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.1 Illustrations for the limiting cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.1.1 Illustration: Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.1.2 Illustration: Intragenerational maximin . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2 Sustainability improvement: Graphical illustrations for the lim-
iting cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.3 Stability of the steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.4 Utilitarianism: Mathematical details and proofs . . . . . . . . . 68
A.5 An example: Utilitarianism with AK-technology and a renew-
able resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.5.1 Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A.5.2 Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2 Distributional considerations during growth toward the golden rule 75
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 Maximizing intergenerational welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.2.1 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.2.2 Two regions considered separately . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.2.3 Two regions considered collectively . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.2.4 Graphical representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.3 Accounting considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.4 Intra and intergenerational inequity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.5 Discussion: Equity, inequality aversion and discount rate . . . . 96
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.1 Stability of the steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3 Transfers of resources for a sustainable development 101
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2 Two regions, one harvestable resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.2.1 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.2.2 Utility possibility frontier with lump-sum transfer . . . . 109
3.2.3 Utility possibility frontier with tax . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
CONTENTS
3.2.4 Comparison of the two frontiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.2.5 Welfare analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.3 Intra and intergenerational considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3.1 Inequality aversion and the current consumption . . . . 124
3.3.2 Evolution of the resource and the possibilities for futures
welfares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3.3 Interactions between the two dimensions . . . . . . . . 126
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A.1 Special cases of CES functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2 Illustration: Sensitivity to the utility of the South . . . . . . . . 131
General conclusion 133
3.2.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.2.2 Limits and prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Bibliography 157
ix

General introduction
Natural resources have always been useful for mankind. And we cannot con-
ceive a world without them. In all likelihood, our descendants will also need
them. Then a natural balance between present and potential future claims arises.
But balancing claims between contemporaries may also be important, even nec-
essary. For example, individualistic water management from Israel, Jordan and
Palestine led to a shrinking of the level of the Dead Sea in the last decades. In
this region, thinking to a bequest of a good quality of water for posterity may be
pointless if the countries do not reach an agreement. That being said, depending
on the solution found (reducing extraction, conveying water from the Red Sea,
etc.), consequences for future generations may be very different. In the light of
this example, one can argue that a sustainability objective shall not overshadow
the importance, or the requirement, of inter-individual issues. As aptly stated
by the American philosopher John Rawls (1971, p. 137): “questions of social
justice arise between generations as well as within them, for example, the ques-
tion of the appropriate rate of capital savings and of the conservation of natural
resources and the environment of nature”.
0.1 Context
In economics, while one is first of all interested in efficiency – reaching goals
relatively to means used, – one may also be interested in equity. But most of the
time, compromises have to be made between these two dimensions. An example
of this ancient literature is the book by Okun (1975), Equality and Efficiency:
The Big Tradeoff. An opposition is usually made between equity and equality,
but they have a common origin. The former comes from Latin aequitatem, and
1
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the latter from Latin aequalitatem, both formed from aequus, equal.1 An eq-
uity definition has therefore to encompass a certain dimension of equality. But
as would say Amartya Sen (1980), “Equality of What?”. This is maybe why so
much theories of equity, fairness and justice exist. It is maybe useful here to re-
sort to a dictionary definition: “equity is the quality of being fair and reasonable
in a way that gives equal treatment to everyone”.2 As a requirement, I will trans-
late this definition in public decision making as treating equally every individual.
Indeed, d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977, p. 202) argued that “equity would seem
to require that collective choice be unchanged when individuals exchange po-
sition”. More justifications will be given in the Section 0.2.3. Whatever, this
still leaves the door open for many theories of justice. When equity is imple-
mented, one expects a situation to be ‘fair’ or ‘just’. For some authors, fairness
would refer to procedures, while justice would refer to outcomes (Barry, 1989,
p. 145). I will follow this distinction here. The idea of justice can be traced
back to philosophers of the Greek Antiquity. But for Barry (1989), two mod-
ern philosophers are particularly notable in this domain: David Hume and John
Rawls. For Hume (1738/1978, cited in Barry, 1989, pp. 148-9), in A Treatise of
Human Nature, justice comes from a desire of ‘mutual advantages’ (a condition
for property). And in his second theory, justice can be adopted if there is an
impartial sympathy with all individuals (a condition to be a virtue). For Rawls
(1971, cited in Barry, 1989, p. 152), in A Theory of Justice, mutual advantages
are the circumstances of justice. And according to him, impartiality has not to
be ascribed to an observer, but to the situation in which choices are made. Hume
can be regarded as a descendant of Hobbes and a proto-utilitarian, while Rawls
proclaimed himself to follow Kant’s tradition (Barry, 1989, p. 148). While for-
mer are more interested in consequences of justice (consequentialism), latter are
more interested in procedures of justice (deontology).3 Whatever, one can eas-
ily agree that distributive justice – sharing goods and services between different
individuals, living or not at the same time – is of interest only if we are in a
world of competition for scarce resources. It is interesting to note that land was
1Source: www.etymonline.com, visited on May 2018.
2Source: www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/equity, visited on May
2018.
3This distinction is frequently used in theories of justice (Van Parijs, 1991, p. 257).
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at the core of one of the first schools of thought in economics in the second half
of the Eighteenth century: Physiocracy. Leaded by François Quesnay, they con-
sidered that only agricultural lands are productive since they ‘create’ something,
contrary to industry and trade (see e.g. Abraham-Frois, 2001, pp. 4-10). But
natural assets being not produced, they were not considered as being valuable by
economists of this period. For example, the classical economist Jean-Baptiste
Say (1803, p. 8) qualified natural wealths in his Traité d’économie politique
as being “goods that nature gives us freely and without measure”4. He went
even further in subsequent editions saying that “everyone can enjoy [them] at
his pleasure, without being obliged to acquire them, without fear of exhausting
them, such as air, water, sunlight”5. He was indeed right about some of them,
nonetheless we know very well that some resources are, or may become, scarce
(e.g. fish, fresh water, clean air). A clarification is therefore needed. Environ-
mental resources may be defined as natural materials or components which have
a current worth and are technologically and economically available (now or in a
foreseeable future).6 Those inexhaustible, like solar radiation, water, wind en-
ergy, are indeed in themselves of little interest from an economic perspective.7
And among exhaustible ones, an important distinction has to be made between
renewable and non-renewable resources. That said, to avoid any confusion, I will
take exhaustible and non-renewable resources as synonyms. Renewable ones re-
plenish themselves indefinitely, like timber, as long as consumption does not
always overtake its renewal. Non-renewable ones do not replenish themselves,
either due to their nature, like uranium, or because this process is not in the same
time-frame than its consumption, like petroleum. Due to the importance of re-
newable and non-renewable resources in the production of goods and services of
modern societies and their finiteness or threat of collapsing, their sustainability is
4Personal translation from: “[les richesses naturelles sont] des biens que la nature nous
accorde gratuitement et sans mesure”.
5Personal translation from: “chacun peut [en] jouir à sa volonté, sans être obligé de les
acquérir, sans crainte de les épuiser, tels que l’air, l’eau, la lumière du soleil” (transcribed in
Mouchot, 2006, p. 1155).
6Environmental resources have a broader meaning than natural resources, they include all
natural assets such as clean air.
7As indicates the classic Lionel Robbins’s (1932, p. 15) definition: “Economics is the science
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have
alternative uses”.
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now a major issue. For example, the second section of the Agenda 21 is entitled:
Conservation and Management of Resources for Development. More recently,
resources issues are at the heart of the Sustainable Developments Goals of the
United Nations.8 Indeed, for a few decades there seems to have been a consen-
sus on having an evolution of our societies – sustainable development – toward
a state that can be sustained – sustainability (Dovers and Handmer, 1993). But
while everyone agrees on the target, means are still to be defined. One of the
recent bases of this reasoning is the well-known definition of sustainable devel-
opment given by the World Commission on Environment and Development (the
“Brundtland report”, 1987, p. 8): “[it] is development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs”. But its vagueness spawned to multiple divergent interpretations, es-
pecially in economics (for a survey of recent developments see Martinet, 2012).
Nevertheless, if one adopts a “welfarist” view (Sen, 1977, 1979) – only util-
ity matters – and therefore anthropocentric, it is hard to be against the Solow’s
(1991, p. 181) definition: “[sustainability] is an obligation to conduct ourselves
so that we leave to the future the option or the capacity to be as well off as we
are”. This puts the emphasis on the well-being of the current generations in re-
lation to that of the future ones, and therefore on equity between generations in
sustainability issues. But why maintaining or increasing stocks of natural assets,
if fewer and fewer individuals have access to them? Let us study the intragener-
ational dimension of equity before turning to its intergenerational counterpart.
0.2 Intragenerational equity
0.2.1 Historical background
Equity is an old concept. Philosophers and economists have for a long time
tried to give their definition through their vision. Obviously, an exhaustive re-
view of developments, even recent, is both impossible and unnecessary for the
8They include for example: water (6), energy (7), marine (14) and land resources
(15). They include also inequalities (10) and justice (16) issues. Source: https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs, visited on September 2018.
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present purpose. I shall rather focus on main theories of distributive justice. In-
terested reader is advised to refer to classic reviews. They include: Barry (1989);
Van Parijs (1991); Young (1994); Fleurbaey (1996); Roemer (1996); Arnsperger
and Van Parijs (2003); Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). For the sake of the pre-
sentation, I follow the useful distinction between macro and micro justice. The
former may be seen as defining a just society as a whole, while the latter is more
concerned with equity in particular economic environments.
Macro Justice
The oldest found theory is the Aristotle’s equity principle. According to him,
goods shall be divided proportionally to individual differences (e.g. depending
on contributions) (Young, 1994, pp. 64-5).
OUTCOME JUSTICE
Utilitarianism. For Barry (1989, pp. 173-8) the Hume’s basic idea, that mod-
ification of property should be done without any conflict, leaded to two different
traditions. The first one, following his theory of the origin of justice, was pur-
sued by the philosopher David Gauthier and the economist James Buchanan, for
whom changes in property require unanimity. The second tradition tried to find
an impartial criterion. Indeed, Hume refrained himself to apply a case-by-case
approach for a distribution. The notion of public utility was only used later on
by Jeremy Bentham for such issues. But still, Bentham does not advocate any
modification on the basis that an equal distribution of income maximizes overall
utility. The full potential of this utilitarian criterion was showed by John Stu-
art Mill (1848/1965, cited in Barry, 1989, p. 175) in his Principles of Political
Economy, for whom while production is a matter of natural laws, distribution
of production is a matter of social decision. Bentham and J. S. Mill gave birth
to the utilitarian tradition, which peaked with Pigou (1920/1932, cited in Barry,
1989, p. 176) in The Economics of Welfare. For him, the amount received by
individuals shall be done according to their capacity for turning it into utility and
not according to their contribution. Broadly speaking, utilitarianism is concerned
with the maximization of total welfare.
Social Welfare Function. Different developments of welfare economics were
5
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interestingly synthesized into a single social welfare function (SWF) – mapping
individuals and global welfare – by Abram Bergson (1938). This work was fur-
ther developed and popularized by Samuelson (1947, sec. VIII), to become af-
terward so-called Bergson-Samuelson functions. Taking utilities as elements of
such functions, this approach generalizes in a sense the utilitarian one. Indeed,
the sum of utilities may be seen as a special case of SWF.
Social Choice. Social choice theory was born in 1951 with the Arrow’s pi-
oneering work (reprinted and commented in Arrow, 1963). Arrow asked the
question whether a social decision could be based upon aggregated individual
preferences. He showed that if one imposes some natural “conditions” – among
which ordinal orderings, the irrelevance of independent alternatives,9 at least
three alternatives are considered and non-dictatorship – a social welfare function
cannot be obtained (Arrow, 1963, p. 2). Further notable developments were
made by Sen (1970). The historical origins of this theory can be tracked down
in the Eighteenth century with works on voting by Borda and Condorcet (Arrow,
1963, pp. 93-4). For a review of this extensive literature, see Arrow et al. (2002,
2011).
Marxism. Marx was interested in explaining why wealth concentrate in the
hands of owners of means of production. In a sense, there is exploitation when
a certain ratio between income and work is not respected (Van Parijs, 1991, p.
106). More broadly, his vision gave birth to theories of economic exploitation,
where there is a sharp distinction between labor-hiring class (exploiters) and
labor-selling class (exploited). This holds true according to Marx until commu-
nism is reached, a society characterized by “from each according to his ability,
to each according to his need” (cited in Roemer, 1982, pp. 265-6). For develop-
ments on the Marxist tradition, see e.g. Cohen (1978/2000), Roemer (1982) and
Van Parijs (1993).
Equality of Rights.10 Libertarianism advocates that justice shall be solely de-
voted to an equality of rights. State has no role to play except in defining property
rights. An interesting insight for environmental resources was given by Nozick
9Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, p. 10) prefer to use the less normative expression “indepen-
dence requirement”.
10This theory could be put in the next subsection, but I follow here Fleurbaey (1996, p. 20)
emphasizing that what is equalized is a result.
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(1974). Based on a Locke’s theory of appropriation, Nozick (1974, pp. 174-82)
argued toward an appropriation of unowned objects by mixture with one’s labor,
as long as this does not worsen the well-being other individuals. Nozick called it
the Lockean proviso. Arnsperger and Van Parijs (2003, pp. 33-6) classified these
theories of appropriation between “right-libertarians” – who advocate the first-
come first-served principle – and “left-libertarians” – equalizing shares of rent.
But for some authors, justice should not be based on results but on possibilities
given to individuals.
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Equality of Means. In one of the most noteworthy works of the field, Rawls
(1971) detailed his vision of justice, providing an alternative to utilitarianism.
In the tradition of the social contract theory, he supposed an original position of
equality. In such a position individuals are supposed to ignore their identity, their
preference, their abilities, etc., even their conception of the good. “The principles
of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance” (p. 12). He argued that in such a
situation two principles would emerge. (1) Equality of rights. (2) Social and eco-
nomic inequalities have to (a) be to the benefit of the least advantaged members
(the “difference principle”) and (b) exist under an equality of opportunity (esp.
pp. 60-7, 83). Rawls dealt with what he called “primary social goods”,11 but
his criterion (2a) was also applied to utilities (e.g. Arrow, 1973b) and leaded to
the well-known maximin criterion (Rawls, 1971, 1974; Arrow, 1973a,b; Solow,
1974).12 In the same vein, Dworkin (1981a,b) supposed that individuals know
their talents (including handicaps), but ignore their “economic rent”. He argued
that an imaginary insurance market would lead at an equality of resources (in a
no-envy sense, explained hereinafter). But some authors prefer focus, rather than
means given to individuals, on actual opportunities they have. The underlying
idea is that, for some authors, individuals shall not be held responsible for dif-
ference in turning resources into actual opportunities (on this see Roemer, 1996,
sec. 8.1-8.2, and Fleurbaey, 2008).
11They include rights, liberties, opportunities, powers, income and wealth (p. 92).
12This criterion was already present in economics for choice under uncertainty. For analogy
between the Rawls’ theory of justice and uncertainty, see Rawls (1971, pp. 152-61, 1974) and
Dasgupta (1974).
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Equality of Opportunity. An important contribution in this domain was made
by Sen (1980). For him, neither utilities nor primary goods are fully satisfactory
for elements of a theory of justice. He rather argued in favor of an equality of
“basic capabilities”, which may be understood as the ability to achieve combina-
tions of “functionings”. Such as nutritional requirement, clothes, participation in
social life, etc. In a word, this approach focuses on overall personal opportunity
of achievements (see Sen, 2009, pp. 231-5).
Micro Justice
Some rather different approaches, based on microeconomic theory, were fol-
lowed by some authors to study more precisely equity of some resource alloca-
tions. They either resorted to bargaining or to general equilibrium theory.
Bargaining. Here agents bargain in order to reach an agreement on sharing
a given bundle. If they fail they receive a predefined bundle, possibly empty
(threat point). Classic solutions include those by Nash (1950) and by Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975). For a survey see Thomson (2001) and the references
therein. But many authors disprove bargaining theory as being appropriate to ad-
dress distributive justice issues. Both for an impartiality concern (Barry, 1989;
Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1970) and for an informational basis concern (Roemer, 1986,
1990). See Fleurbaey (1996, pp. 195-202) for more details.
Competitive Equilibrium. Theories in here study the so-called equity in eco-
nomic environment. Individuals begin with, for instance, an equal share of the
total endowment and exchange freely. The final allocation is said to be equitable
according to different criteria, without referring to comparisons of utilities. Two
important criteria exist. The first one is the no-envy criterion (Tinbergen, 1953,
cited in Thomson, 2011; Foley, 1967; Kolm, 1972): no agent strictly prefers any
other agent’s bundle to his/her own. The second one is the egalitarian-equivalent
criterion (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978): each agent is indifferent between a
benchmark bundle and his/her own. These approaches are called fair allocation
theory. A survey may be found in Thomson (2011).
These different theories are opposing each other concerning values to which
they refer. Economists are used to transform these values into axioms, which
8
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
may be understood as simple mathematical properties. Studying the axioms be-
ing satisfied is generally a convenient way to elect a social criterion.
0.2.2 Axiomatic approach
I voluntarily omit here mechanisms of bargaining since they do not corre-
spond to the view of distributive justice standing in here. Reader interested by
the axiomatic bargaining literature may refer to Thomson (2001).
General equilibrium from equal incomes. An axiomatization of free ex-
change from an equal bundle was proposed by Jaskold-Gabszewicz (1975). He
resorted to coalitions, supposing that a large number of individuals are split into
two coalitions of equal size. A coalition is said to be fair if individuals in there
do not envy those from the other coalition. It can be shown that it is the unique
mechanism characterized by the envy-free between coalitions. See also the ref-
erences in Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984, p. 4).
Utilitarianism. It advocates an allocation of resources in such a way that
the sum of individuals utilities is the highest possible, whatever the distribution.
In other words, a change is permitted if gains overtake losses. Of course, such
variations of welfare need to be expressed in the same unit. It has been axiom-
atized with help of the theory of decision making under risk. Indeed, Vickrey
(1945) coined an original justification of his theory linking justice and uncer-
tainty, which was also developed by Harsanyi (1953) and Rawls (1971)13 in a
similar way.14 Let us imagine that an individual has to choose between dif-
ferent states in which s/he has an equal probability to be anyone. Rationally,
argued Vickrey (1945), s/he would maximize the sum of utilities.15 Indepen-
dently, Harsanyi (1953, 1955) used the same reasoning to justify utilitarianism.
13These contributions do not mention his work. A possible explanation is given by Arrow
(1973a, p. 250n): “Vickrey’s 1945 statement has been overlooked by all subsequent writers, not
surprisingly, since it received relatively little emphasis in a paper overtly devoted to a seemingly
different subject. I read the paper before I was concerned with the theory of social choice; the
implications for that theory were so easy to overlook that they did not occur to me at all when
they would have been relevant”.
14A notable difference is that Vickrey-Harsanyi’s observer does know the preferences of the
population, while individuals in Rawls’ original position ignore both their identity and their
preferences.
15Obviously, with a given population, sum and arithmetical mean give the same information.
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In particular, he showed that under the axiom of Bayesian rationality – maximiz-
ing the expected utility – strong Pareto16 and symmetry, the SWF is utilitarian
(Harsanyi, 1977). A classic and natural criticism is that it is insensitive to in-
equality: some may starve while some live in opulence.
Maximin and leximin. To meet this objection, another criterion of distribu-
tive justice emerged to concentrate on the worst-off individual. Society is assume
here to maximize his/her situation to the extend possible. It is based on the vision
of justice by Rawls (1971). Understood that utilities are of interest here rather
than “primary goods” as in its original version. The potential indeterminacy of
maximin for states giving the same result leaded Sen (1970, p. 138n)17,18 to coin
the lexicographic version – applying maximin at the upper rank if the one being
concerned does not allow to decide between two states (it compares the worst-off,
if equal, the second worst-off, and so on) – named thereafter leximin (Sen, 1980).
Axiomatization of these criteria relies on a modification of traditional axioms of
social choice, that allows in particular interpersonal comparisons of utility. It was
proposed independently by Strasnick (1976) and Hammond (1976). Strasnick
(1976) considered the following axioms. The “priority principle” – individual
claims over primary goods are of equal importance, – binariness – two states are
evaluated only on basis of preferences over these two states, – anonymity and
neutrality – independence (respectively) to individual and alternative permuta-
tions, – unanimity – if a state is preferred to another in every partitions of the
problem it is also preferred in the whole problem. Under these axioms, the so-
cial welfare satisfies the difference principle, i.e. is maximin. Hammond (1976)
stated a similar theorem. He considered the following axioms. Unrestricted do-
main, independence of irrelevant alternatives, strong Pareto, an axiom of “weak
equity” – based on Sen (1973, p. 18, 1974), this axiom tells basically that if two
individuals have contradictory preferences but one is worse-off in every configu-
rations, then the social choice must follow (or being indifferent to) the interest of
16An allocation of resources satisfies the strong Pareto property if no individual can be made
better-off at the expense of any other one. The weak version: if from the initial situation every
individual cannot be made better-off.
17This concept was based on previous Rawls’ works and was mentioned in Rawls (1971, p.
83n).
18A similar concept was independently coined by Kolm (1972, pp. 18,115-6).
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the latter – and an axiom of anonymity – independence of permutations in indi-
vidual positions, inspired by the Suppes-Sen grading principles (Suppes, 1969;
Sen, 1970, pp. 153-4). If these axioms are satisfied, he showed that the SWF is
leximin. These results were restated in more general terms by Arrow (1977). But
Arrow (1977) provided two reservations, apart from the necessary assumption on
interpersonal comparisons of utilities. Only “extreme” individuals count in the
decision process, those intermediate are ignored. And, more fundamentally, a
change is not advocated if the worst-off loses a little while all others win a lot.
Besides, d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) pointed out that leximin can be seen as
a come back of Arrow’s dictator applied to rank.
Informational content of utility. d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977, 2002) pro-
vided an interesting synthesis of main results of social choice (Arrow, 1963; Sen,
1970) based on the informational content of utility. Indeed, two dimensions are
crucial in this literature: to what extend utility is measurable (are the orderings,
the levels or the variations meaningful)? And are utilities of individuals compa-
rable? If we assume ordinality and non-comparability, a social welfare ordering
of alternatives based upon individual indicators cannot be obtained in general,
as showed by Arrow (1951/1963) in his pioneering work. At the opposite, the
cardinal-comparable case leads directly to the result: in this case the “constitu-
tion” is given by the sum of utilities (Arrow, 1977, p. 227). Intermediary cases
allow to distinguish, between others, utilitarianism and leximin.19 Interestingly,
they showed that we can separate these two criteria only upon their informational
basis. Basically, if utilities are assumed to be cardinal and only welfare variations
are meaningful, we should favor utilitarianism. While, if we assume ordinality
and that only welfare levels are meaningful, we should favor leximin. Depending
on the assumptions retained, drastically different theory of social welfare judg-
ment may therefore emerge. One may also notice that the latter “asks less of
our judgments of welfare” (Rawls, 1971, p. 92). But as Fleurbaey (1996, p. 71)
suggested, we shall not base a conception of justice upon the availability of in-
formation, inequality aversion shall be based upon deeper ethical considerations.
19Taking the opposite problem, Deschamps and Gevers (1978) found a set of axioms leading
both to utilitarianism and leximin.
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0.2.3 Selected approach
My purpose is to study equity issues about environmental resources of a
whole society. Such issues may of course be studied in particular environment,
but at a macro scale, links between intra and intergenerational concerns are eas-
ier to understand. In their short but relevant review, Arnsperger and Van Par-
ijs (2003) mentioned four main theories of social justice: utilitarianism, liberal
egalitarianism, libertarianism and Marxism. Out of reaching exhaustiveness, a
convenient way to deal with different theories may be found in classic SWF à la
Bergson-Samuelson. We need first to assume a welfarist view. It can of course
be argued than more objective elements, such as capabilities, may be relevant for
a justice purpose. But conversely, it is hard to argue that utility has nothing to do
with justice. Besides, the utility concept may be interpreted here in several ways:
primary goods, resources (broad sense), opportunities, etc. The only restriction
is its unidimensionality (Fleurbaey and Hammond, 2004, pp. 1189-90). For the
sake of simplicity, I concentrate in here only on utility. That being said, let me
argue why SWF are flexible enough to be interesting here. It is better under-
standable if one relies on inequality aversion. Indeed, society may be assumed
to have a nil inequality aversion, that is to say only the sum of happiness counts.
This is precisely the utilitarianism. At the opposite, society may be assumed to
have an infinite inequality aversion. Such a feature is exactly what the Rawlsian
liberal egalitarianism applied to utilities would suggest: one should focus on the
worst-off individual, i.e. using the maximin criterion. Of course, all intermediary
cases are conceivable. As it has been said, when natural assets are at hand, lib-
ertarianism relies on appropriation. Right-libertarians would simply recommend
no transfer at all, while left-libertarians would recommend a transfer of resources
such as to perfectly equalize the utilities (in a welfarist interpretation). Finally,
Marxism could be interpreted in a way giving a share to individuals according
to their needs. A minimalist view could be to set a minimal threshold on utility.
Developments on needs may be found e.g. in Sen (1973, ch. 4).
The artificial distinction between, in a broad sense, social choice theory and
fair allocation theory has been criticized for a long time by Fleurbaey and by
Maniquet. For example, in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), they try to gather
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social choice (social preferences), fair allocation (fairness issues), and public
economics (policy recommendations). For this, they “construct interpersonal
comparisons on the basis of ordinal noncomparable preferences over bundles of
resources” (p. xvi). But while such recent developments are appealing and give
insights for future researches, they are hardly applicable in simple frameworks.
In particular, their criterion is not a function (inspired from envy-free and lex-
imin). For this reason, I prefer resorting to more rudimentary SWF which will
give an easier interpretable indicator for dynamic evolution.
Finally, let me have a word on interpersonal comparison of utility. In clas-
sic social choice theory, they are completely ruled out, and impossibilities come
out. But as argued by Hammond (1976, p. 793), “some notions of equity rest
on interpersonal comparisons”. More recent works were able to avoid both
interpersonal comparison of utility and impossibilities (see e.g. Fleurbaey and
Maniquet, 2011) with the modification of some ‘classic’ axioms. Nonetheless,
I am still convinced by the relevance of interpersonal comparison of utility to
some extend. Even if utility represents generally an individualistic measure of
welfare, it can be understood as seen by an ethical observer. Such an observer
would be able to determine if some claims are legitimate or not. This is abstract,
but in everyday life, we are generally able to say that healthy people are better-
off than disabled, that workers are better-off than unemployed, etc. Of course,
there are some exceptions and some preferences (e.g. expensive tastes) have not
to be taken into account. Interested reader on interpersonal comparisons may re-
fer to Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004) for more details and references. A short
and nuanced summary may also be found in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, pp.
xvii-xviii).
Obviously, environmental and resources issues exist only if we care about
future generations. The equity concern has therefore to be extended to the inter-
generational dimension.
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0.3 Intergenerational equity
0.3.1 Historical background
Intergenerational issues concerning sharing equitably capital and consump-
tion goods across generations is not new. This was dealt for example by the litera-
ture on capital accumulation and growth. A well-known example is the Ramsey’s
(1928) pioneering work on optimal saving. But this issue clearly peaked with en-
vironmental concerns. Firstly with pollution concerns, with notably the Rachel
Carson’s (1962) book Silent Spring, and secondly with the warning of finiteness
of some resources with the well-known report by the Club of Rome The Limits
to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). This has shifted the priority as mentioned
by Arrow (1973a, p. 260): “to what extent is one generation obligated to save,
so as to increase the welfare of the next generation? The traditional economic
problem has been the general act of investment in productive land, machines,
and buildings which produce goods in the future; more recently, we have become
especially concerned with preservation of undisturbed environments and natural
resources”. Basically, the literature is interested in comparing individuals be-
longing to different generations, that is to say here living at a different date. A
generation is generally summarized through one single individual. Generations
may be successive or overlap each other. And the literature on sustainable devel-
opment is mainly split into two different schools of thought: ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
sustainability. The first one concentrates on welfare and assumes a substitutabil-
ity between human-made and natural capitals, while the second one stresses the
necessity to maintain some stocks of natural assets. For more details, interested
reader may refer to Neumayer (1999/2013) and Martinet (2012). Like in the
previous section on intragenerational equity, the intergenerational equity may be
understood with or without referring to welfare. Here also, I argue that it is
hard to completely not refer to welfare when choice of development paths are at
hand. But, that said, some specific natural assets may be preserved per se (e.g.
the Great Barrier Reef). Concerning the debate on substitutability, as concluded
Pezzey and Toman (2002, p. 213), it is at the end an empirical issue. But if we
agree with Solow (1991, p, 182) that “sustainability [. . . ] is about the sharing
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of well-being between present people and future people”, one still has to find
ethical bases to make such a distribution.
0.3.2 Axiomatic approach
A criterion – a function of all instantaneous SWFs – is generally used for
intertemporal decisions. A SWF is generally simply the utility of the representa-
tive agent of the generation. Time may be discrete or continuous and is generally
infinite, in order to avoid the controversial issue of defining the last date, i.e. the
last generation taken into account. I described in the intragenerational part ax-
ioms that a social ordering could satisfy, likewise axioms that an intertemporal
criterion could satisfy can be described.
In a famous article, Koopmans (1960) showed that imposing some a pri-
ori desirable axioms on a trajectory of utility (or SWF) over an infinite hori-
zon, strongly constrains the criterion. He considered the following properties:
the utility is ordinal, continuous, satisfies sensitivity – one can distinguish two
trajectories even if they differ only in their first element, – intertemporal com-
plementarity – consumption on a given period does not impact the comparison
between two alternatives on another period, – stationarity – comparison of two
alternatives does not change when one goes forward in time – and if a best path
and a worst path exist. All together, these requirements lead to elect a criterion
exhibiting “impatience”, i.e. a constant discount rate has to be used. This obliges
to prefer the present over the future.
Among axioms that we might wish to be satisfied, the Pareto one seems
unavoidable. As it is well-known, considering only the Pareto principle is not
enough for an equity concern: a world with one agent having everything and
another one having nothing is optimal. But conversely, a non-optimal situation
cannot be selected since there would be unnecessary losses. Indeed, under its
weak version, it says that a path always superior to another is preferred. Under
its strong version, a path that is at least as good as another and strictly better than
it on at least one date is preferred. Efficiency is generally understood as satis-
fying the strong Pareto axiom. Intergenerational equity may be understood as a
matter of sharing welfare between generations. But in this view, some restric-
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tions have to be imposed. As in the intratemporal perspective, it will be required
here the social planner to be impartial between all generations, whatever their
date of appearance. This ensure each generation to have the same weight. In
other words and in a more abstract way, a criterion is required to be neutral to
any number of permutations in the order of appearance of the generations. Here
also, this idea is captured by the anonymity axiom. But in the vein of Koop-
mans (1960), Diamond (1965) stated an impossibility result, recalling the classic
‘efficiency-equity’ trade-off. Indeed, he showed that such a criterion cannot be
both efficient and anonymous. For more details see Martinet (2012, pp. 46-7)
and the references therein. Especially Asheim (2010), who proposed a critical
review of the results about this dilemma and means to avoid it. Basically, one
has either to work with incomplete binary relations of preference or to weaken
the two concerned axioms.
Set of axioms can lead to construct criteria. And conversely, usual criteria can
be analyzed in light of the axioms they satisfy. Intergenerational equity issues
are indeed usually dealt with a criterion to optimize over time. Let us now turn
to the presentation of the main ones. Constraints such as a non-declining utility
(or SWF), keeping a minimal level of stock, etc. could also be added.
0.3.3 Intertemporal criteria
I detail here the main criteria used in the literature. More details may be
found in Heal (1998) and Martinet (2012). For an overview of different ap-
proaches dealing with intergenerational equity, see Roemer and Suzumura (2007).
DISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM. It consists of summing all future expected
successive utilities (or SWF), weighted by a constant discount rate. That is to
say, the farther a generation, the less its utility counts. Example: with a 1%
yearly rate, 100 units in a hundred years is approximatively equivalent to 37
units today. This criterion comes from work on optimal growth theory. It was
indeed first envisioned by Ramsey (1928), then adopted and enhanced notably
by Samuelson (1937), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). In parallel, it was
applied to the field of sustainable growth in presence of exhaustible resources
by notably Hotelling (1931) and Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979). This criterion
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has rapidly dominated the literature. But regarding intergenerational issues, this
criterion has been criticized by economists themselves, especially for not giving
importance to the far future, while environmental issues have to be managed on
a long time horizon (Heal, 1997). The ‘right’ rate to apply for public policies
is also controversial (Arrow et al., 1996, 2013), especially in the climate change
debate (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; Heal, 2009; Drupp et al., 2018). I think
that Solow (1993, p. 165) summarized quite well this debate. “You may wonder
why I allow discounting at all. I wonder, too: no generation ‘should’ be favored
over any other. The usual scholarly excuse – which relies on the idea that there
is a small fixed probability that civilization will end during any little interval
of time – sounds far-fetched. We can think of intergenerational discounting as
a concession to human weakness or as a technical assumption of convenience
(which it is). Luckily, very little of what I want to say depends on the rate of
discount, which we can just imagine to be very small”.
Another type of criticism is its incompatibility with a sustainability objec-
tive, which can be approximately defined as sustaining an indicator over time
(e.g. stocks, utility, etc.). For example, Pezzey and Toman (2002, pp. 176-7)
stated that this criterion has nothing to do with sustainability, even if we add
some constraints of sustainability. Indeed, it may lead consumption to approach
zero in the classic Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model with manufactured capital and
exhaustible resource (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979; Solow, 1974). From an
axiomatic point of view, this criterion is efficient, but not anonymous.
Some authors still found interest in discounting and try to apply it only in
some circumstances. For example, the Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism
(Asheim, 2010; Asheim et al., 2012) allows for discounting future utilities if and
only if the future is better-off than the present. And the Rank Discounted Utilitar-
ianism (Zuber and Asheim, 2012; Asheim, 2012) applies discounting according
to the rank of the welfare of generations instead of their place in time (more
weight on utility of worse-off generations). Finally, it should be mentioned that
this equity-efficiency dilemma arises in infinite but not in finite time (Fleurbaey
and Michel, 1999).20
20Supplementary difficulties arise with a growing population (Koopmans, 1965; Fleurbaey and
Michel, 1999). Population is assumed constant here.
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UNDISCOUNTED UTILITARIANISM. Ramsey (1928) was against discount-
ing and coined a criterion to avoid it. By a trick, he managed to sum all future
utilities with an equal weight. Technically, he minimized the difference between
the maximal utility attainable, called “Bliss”, and the actual utility, at every sin-
gle date. But not avoiding the previously mentioned impossibility, this criterion
is incomplete (all trajectories cannot be ranked). Indeed, if the trajectory does
not converge fast enough, no optimum exist (Chakravarty, 1962). But it is both
efficient and anonymous.
MAXIMIN. As in its intratemporal version, maximin focuses on the least
well-off generation and tries to rise its welfare to the extend possible. Applied
by Rawls (1971) to justice issues, it was popularized by Solow (1974) for capital
accumulation problems. More precisely, to face the challenge of sustaining a
utility with an exhaustible resource as an input of production. This criterion was
criticized for intertemporal issues by Rawls (1971, sec. 44, 1974) himself. He
qualified the difference principle to be inapplicable due to the unidirectionality
of time: “there is no way for later generations to improve the situation of the
least fortunate first generation” (Rawls, 1971, p. 291). But Solow (1974, p. 30)
was in its own words “plus Rawlsien que le Ralws” and found nonetheless inter-
est in maximin for intergenerational issues. Besides, and as in its intratemporal
version, criticisms focus on its ‘radical’ feature: only the worst-off generation
counts. In particular, if the current generation is poor, maximin, forbidding any
sacrifice from this generation, lead the economy to stay in a ‘poverty trap’. Parti-
sans of maximin retort that maximin paths are efficient. Therefore, a growth can
only come with investment, this implies consuming less for the current genera-
tion, even if this one is very poor (Cairns, 2011, p. 1352). This criterion satisfies
finite anonymity (finite number of permutations) and the weak version of the
Pareto axiom: all generations cannot be better-off in another configuration. The
strong version is satisfied by the leximin (Asheim and Zuber, 2013).
THE GREEN GOLDEN RULE. The only objective here is to obtain the maxi-
mum utility level on the long run. The intermediary path to reach this final goal
does not count. Inspired from the golden rule in capital accumulation theory
(popularized by Phelps, 1961), this criterion was coined by Chichilnisky et al.
(1995). It applies to environmental issues its basic idea: finding the savings rate
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giving the highest level of utility for the entire future. A natural criticism to
this criterion is that it does not take into account current and near generations.
Ironically, Chichilnisky (1996, p. 233) herself stated: “I [do not] accept the ro-
mantic view which relishes the future without regards for the present”. As the
undiscounted utilitarianism, this criterion is incomplete.
MIXED CRITERIA. To overcome the drawbacks of some criteria, some au-
thors preferred to combining them. I present here the two main mixed criteria.
The Chichilnisky criterion. Wanting to avoid what she called the dictatorship
of the present (e.g. discounted utilitarianism) and the dictatorship of the future
(e.g. the green golden rule, GGR), Chichilnisky (1996) proposed a mixed crite-
rion. It is a linear combination of discounted utilitarianism and the GGR. But it
does not tell anything on the specific weighting of each element. Cairns (2011,
p. 1350) pointed out also that in this criterion the limit of the trajectory directly
matters, while it is generally only a mathematical device for lack of determina-
tion.
The Bentham–Rawls criterion. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009) proposed
a weighted average of discounted utilitarianism and maximin. It avoids three
dictatorships: of the present, of the future and of the least advantaged generation.
Even if some models which had no solution with the previous criterion may
now have a solution, it may be time-inconsistent (Martinet, 2012, p. 71) – the
decision-maker will want to change of path at a future date (Strotz, 1955-6).
0.3.4 Selected approach
To be consistent with the intratemporal part and to have a broad enough ap-
proach to be flexible, I will here also be welfarist. Here also, if other elements
may come into the equation,21 dealing with equity without referring to well-
being seems unsatisfying. As in the intra part, a flexible criterion would be in-
teresting, to not consider only a particular view of intergenerational equity. As
argued by Rawls (1971, p. 286): “how the burden of capital accumulation and of
raising the standard of civilization and culture is to be shared between genera-
21For example, non-welfarist information may include rights and entitlements (Anand and
Sen, 2000), birth dates and lengths of life (Blackorby et al., 2007) and standard of living (Sil-
vestre, 2007).
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tions seems to admit of no definite answer”. Still, our restriction on equal weight
in intragenerational will be applied also in the intergenerational dimension. Be-
sides, a criterion inefficient cannot, of course, be elected. I shall argue here that
the Ramsey’s (1928) criterion has kept interest for my purpose. Indeed, and as
in the intragenerational part, I will be able to deal with different intertemporal
inequality aversion. From zero, when any level of utility are summed identically,
to infinity, when only the least level count, which is the maximin.
More recent works tried to overcome the dilemma by sophisticating the ax-
ioms asked. For example, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) coined the “Hammond
Equity for the Future” (HEF) axiom: a sacrifice of the current generation to a
uniform gain of the future is allowed if the current generation stays better-off. It
was concretely applied to usual models by Asheim and Mitra (2010) and Asheim
et al. (2012). It is both a conceptual and a practical progress. But except that the
HEF axiom can be seen to be ad hoc, the SWF used seems to be too sophisti-
cated to be employed when one wants to deal with another dimension, namely
intragenerational issues. Still, it makes interest in discounting in some specific
configurations that needs to be discussed.22
Here also, utility comparison arises. But now, and contrary to the previous
section, it is physically not possible to know with certainty the utility functions
of future generations. Except modeling endogenous modifications in the pref-
erences, the best we can do is projecting our utility function toward the future.
But more fundamentally, according to the information we think we know, drastic
differences in the criterion may appear. Indeed, discounted utilitarianism needs
a cardinal common unit, while maximin needs only ordinal level comparability
(Lauwers, 1997). Here also it can be argued that the ‘availability’ of information
cannot be in itself a criterion of choice.
I described the two dimensions separately as well as the way they are under-
stood here. Let me now review how the literature has studied them both together.
22Asheim and Zuber (2014, 2017) studied population ethics, but with no intragenerational
inequalities.
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0.4 Linking the two dimensions
The two equity dimensions – intragenerational and intergenerational – have
for a long time been studied separately. Either for methodological reasons, such
as Rawls (1971), or, and more generally, for reasons of parsimony such as Solow
(1974). But when the intragenerational distribution affects the global capacity to
produce well-being, we can find interest in studying them both together.
Anand and Joshi (1979) was one of the first studies to address this issue in
an article devoted to employment and wage policy. They studied, in a two-sector
model (industry and agriculture), the correction of a distortion coming from a
minimum wage by a State having an income distribution constraint. They dis-
cussed in an extension (sec. II, iv) intertemporal considerations through rein-
vestment of a possible industrial surplus, but without formalizing it explicitly.
We can also mention the empirical study by Stymne and Jackson (2000) in-
corporating intragenerational distribution of income into measures of welfare.
Vojnovic and Darden (2013) analyzed a particular case of intragenerational in-
justice: racial segregation in Detroit. Whites, living more and more far from
Blacks in downtown, exert long-term pressures on the environmental (agricul-
tural lands degradation, forests, rising of travels by car, etc.). Isaac and Piac-
quadio (2015) addressed the two dimensions through an overlapping generation
model. But they were mainly interested in studding tensions between efficiency
and equity criteria from the competitive equilibrium literature (e.g. no-envy). In
theses models, ‘intergenerational’ is understood between young and old people.
The links between the two dimensions was directly addressed by Baumgärtner
and colleagues. In particular, Baumgärtner et al. (2012) analyzed, by mean of
what they call an “opportunity set”, the efficiency of “couple of equity”, these
ones being delimited by a “justice possibility frontier”. The shape of such a
frontier is determined by technology, resources, institutions, etc. And it charac-
terizes the link between theses two objectives: independence, facilitation and/or
rivalry. Glotzbach and Baumgärtner (2012) analyzed this link in the context of
ecosystem services23 and argued that it depends upon several elements: quantity
and quality of services, their substitutability with manufactured goods, technol-
23Glotzbach (2013) further justified the choice of ecosystem services as object of justice.
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ogy, institutions, etc. Besides, readers interested by the interdisciplinary liter-
ature of this field may refer to Glotzbach (2012). Generally, their approaches
are a progress for understanding the links between the two dimensions. We can
regret, however, that little is said about the long run (models are generally on
two periods), about how to measure equity (to construct sets) and about dealing
with different visions (the maximin, both intra and intergenerational versions, is
mainly used). Whatever, these works demonstrate that the interest of this ques-
tion increased quite recently in the economics literature related to environmental
issues. Yet, this issue was existing for a long time in the climate change literature.
For example, Schelling (1992, sec. IV) argued that the best way for developing
countries to fight against the negative effects of climate change is to continue to
develop. That said, with the recent developments in the field, it would seem that
the two objectives do not point toward the same direction. Indeed, Heal (2009)
argued that on the one hand our preference for equality between generations and
our preference for equality within each generation may be opposed. If one ex-
pects a rising consumption, one may afford a higher (consumption) discount rate,
what does not encourage us to take preventive measures due to the important net
cost to bear. On the other hand, due to the greater vulnerability of poor coun-
tries, a higher preference for equality between rich and poor countries would
lead to take action more rapidly. On the same topic, Kverndokk et al. (2014)
study a two-region model – North and South – that have to reduce greenhouse
gases emissions. They show that inequality aversion leads generally optimal cli-
mate policy to make higher investments in clean capital in the North and in dirty
capital in the South, allowing this latter to develop faster. Their work is consis-
tent with the climate issues since present and future generations are expected to
bear different costs. As well, there are disparities in vulnerability between North
and South. For the intergenerational dimension, they used the classic discounted
utilitarian criterion, which is questionable from an ethical point of view, even in
the case when it may vary. Indeed, does a lower discount rate make the problem
more just? If it is unavoidable, it can be answered by the positive. As argued by
Rawls (1971, p. 4): “an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid
an even greater”. Otherwise, the answer is not trivial. These two dimensions
are also present around climate negotiations issues (World Bank, 1992, p. 165;
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Lecocq and Hourcade, 2012; Piketty and Chancel, 2015; Pottier et al., 2017).
Intragenerational considerations may also be found in social cost-benefit anal-
ysis of investment projects. For example, Fleurbaey and Zuber (2015) studied
the impact of risk and inequality on the discount rate. The impacts of inequal-
ity within generations on the social discount rate were also studied by Gollier
(2015), Budolfson et al. (2017) and Emmerling (2018).24 Meya et al. (2018) was
interested in the impacts of the intra and the intertemporal distribution of income
on the willingness to pay for a public good. More generally, such considera-
tions may be found in the inequality-environment nexus. For example, Laurent
(2011) distinguished four types of environmental inequalities: unequal access to
resources (including unequal exposure), unequal effects from policies, unequal
responsibilities and unequal involvement in environmental policies. For more
developments see Boyce (2002, 2013) and Chancel (2017).
0.5 Research questions
The emergence of anthropogenic environmental problems, like the famous
example of the damage caused by DDT,25 became the new threat to Western
countries in the late 1960s. At the end of the 1980s, this pessimistic view of
the environment became widespread around the world with problems such as
the ozone hole, Chernobyl nuclear disaster and climate change. This new eco-
logical wave has made us aware, both locally and internationally, that changes
in socioeconomic structures have to be operated in order to avoid irreversible
damage to our environment. In this debate, the term sustainable development
has found some resonance after being defined for the first time in a ‘politically
acceptable’ way by the World Commission on Environment and Development
(1987). This definition, although vague, has the merit of appreciating present
development in relation to its subsequent repercussions, that is to say to empha-
size intergenerational equity. But elsewhere in the report we can read that “even
the narrow notion of physical sustainability implies a concern for social equity
24For sub-regional inequalities in climate issues, see Anthoff and Emmerling (2016).
25DDT stands for Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, a chemical compound widely used in the
United States as an insecticide after the World War II (Carson, 1962).
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between generations, a concern that must logically be extended to equity within
each generation” (chap. 2, § 3). Sustainable development is therefore based,
from its ‘origin’, on a dual principle of inter and intragenerational equity.
While the first dimension was extensively studied in the economic literature
concerned with these questions, the second one has received much less attention
(Stymne and Jackson, 2000). Yet, both seem inevitably linked when it comes
to environmental problems, according to Haughton (1999, p. 234): “the unjust
society is unlikely to be sustainable in environmental or economic terms; the
social tensions that are created undermine the recognition of reciprocal rights
and obligations, leading to environmental degradation and ultimately to politi-
cal breakdown”. For some authors, it is also curious to focus on the well-being
of future generations, and therefore not yet born, even before that of the present
generation (Solow, 1991; Schelling, 1995; Anand and Sen, 2000). Interestingly,
Boyce (2013, p.13-4) raised two hypothetic channels by which inequalities and
the environment are linked. “The relatively wealthy and powerful tend to ben-
efit disproportionately from the economic activities that generate environmental
harm. The relatively poor and powerless tend to bear a disproportionate share
of the environmental costs. Second, the total magnitude of environmental harm
depends on the extent of inequality. Societies with wider inequalities of wealth
and power will tend to have more environmental harm. Conversely, societies
with relatively modest degrees of economic and political disparities will tend to
have less environmental harm”.
On these bases, I propose to study the interconnection between intra and in-
tergenerational equity through the sharing of environmental resources. In partic-
ular, can greater justice be conceived for those who benefit from the environment
today to improve the capacity to benefit from it in the future? This refers, among
other things, to the fact that equity within a generation would be a prerequisite
to that between generations, as argued for example by Anand and Sen (2000)
and Boyce (2013). Or, on the contrary, is there a necessary trade-off between
the two dimensions? In the sense that greater concern for the future requires
investment (in the broadest sense), while greater concern to the current deprived
would imply greater consumption (Solow, 1991, pp. 185-6).26 More precisely,
26Another argument is that “when those who bear the costs are more powerful than the benefi-
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can one conceive that different visions of equity between individuals living in
the same period impact the welfare distribution differently between individuals
living at different dates? Conversely, does the requirement of sustainability af-
fect the intragenerational distribution of resources? And if so, how to implement
a redistribution in one dimension that does not negatively impact the other one?
Or what type of trade-off a society has to make? I now turn to the structure of
the dissertation.
0.6 Outline and results
In the Chapter 1, I study the impacts of an intergenerational equity con-
straint on intragenerational consumptions of renewable resources. The economy
is composed of two regions, ‘North’ and ‘South’ for simplicity. The representa-
tive agent of each region has access to a renewable resource. But I assume the
stock of South is relatively scarcer and marginally more productive. A social
planner bases the decisions upon a SWF derived from utilities in North and in
South. An equal treatment is guaranteed through its symmetry. But different
substitutability between the two utilities are considered to capture different in-
equality aversion. For the sake of simplicity, individual utilities will be assumed
to be linear. This has two advantages: it avoids utility comparisons and it con-
sidered the two regions being responsible for turning consumption into welfare.
The intergenerational dimension is taken through the maximin criterion. Even
if this choice can be criticized, it is certainly a good benchmark to evaluate the
possibility given to future generations. It may also be viewed as a limit case of in-
finite intertemporal inequality aversion. I also show that the maximin is not only
(weakly) anonymous, but it is also most of the time strongly efficient. More im-
portantly, departures from its dictated trajectory are analyzed. A first result from
this framework is that an economy can do better for the future when it dictates
specific consumption paths to the regions than when resources are exploited in
isolation. South shall under-consume (compared to its highest sustainable level
of consumption) - its consumption increases, - while North shall over-consume -
its consumption decreases. This comes from the fact that savings in South have
ciaries, we might expect the opposite: greater inequality yields less environmental harm” (Boyce,
2013, p. 15).
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a better return. The Hartwick’s rule still holds: keeping a constant SWF when
the economy relies on several assets requires net investments to be nil. In other
words, and out of a steady state, the decreasing of a consumption in a region
has to be compensated by a increasing in the consumption in the other region.
The two regions converge toward a steady state where their stock are equally
productive at the margin. A second result concerns relations between inequal-
ity aversion and the highest sustainable welfare level. Globally, the lower the
intratemporal inequality aversion, the higher intertemporal welfare. Intuitively,
less inequality aversion makes substitutions of individual well-beings (consump-
tions here) easier and allows more possibility to ‘manipulate’ consumptions and
investments to improve the intertemporal dimension. To better understand this
feature I consider two limit cases. The first one corresponds to a classic utilitarian
criterion, with a nil inequality aversion. In this case, substitution of individual
well-beings are maximal: North consumes at the highest possible (the global
maximin consumption) while South consumes nothing, to let its stock grow.
The second case corresponds to the (intratemporal) maximin, with an infinite
inequality aversion. Here, the region with the lowest production ‘constrains’ the
intertemporal dimension since no substitution of well-being is allowed. Finally,
I study intratemporal decisions that do not corresponds to what the intertemporal
criterion dictates. I show, among other things, that consuming less than what the
maximin allows may not necessarily lead to make future generations globally
better-off. Marginal productivities of each stock have to be considered. Here
“taking advantage” of physical inequalities lead to a better welfare but at a price
of higher inequalities during the transition. In the first and second chapters, no
transfer between North and South is allowed. This is studied in the third chapter.
Maximin provided a good benchmark, but would the results be affected if society
seeks to maximize the welfare of every future generations rather than that of the
worst-off?
In the Chapter 2, I study how the two regions have to share a required sacri-
fice to grow toward the highest sustainable welfare, the golden rule. Following
the approach of the first chapter, each region has access to a different resource.
The intratemporal dimension is still dealt with a symmetric SWF. But the in-
tertemporal dimension is now dealt with the undiscounted utilitarianism. This
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latter, additionally of being anonymous, allows a lot of special cases such as
the maximin. The main result is that the sacrifice sharing depends upon three
fundamental elements: the difference of marginal productivities of the two re-
sources, the intra and the intertemporal inequality aversions. Except if resources
are marginally equally productive or if there is an infinite intra or intergenera-
tional inequality aversion, regional consumption growth rates are different. In
particular, and for the same previously mentioned reason, South has to make
generally a relatively higher sacrifice than North. Interestingly, when the in-
tratemporal inequality aversion is nil, the problem reduces to two independent
problems where each region reaches its golden rule in isolation. The (original)
Ramsey rule still holds here: the farther we are from the golden rule, the more
we have to invest. Eventually, I study an unequal treatment of both individuals
and generations putting different weights on them. This modifies the evolution
of the regional consumptions and of the welfare. But the initial rule of the evo-
lution of ‘sacrifice sharing’ is unchanged. The main change is that introducing
discounting reduces sacrifice. Especially, the economy grows toward the modi-
fied golden rule. On this basis I discuss the justification of discounting. On the
one hand one may prefer to not discount the future, but on the other hand one
may argue that discounting can prevent huge sacrifice to the benefit of future
generations that are, in a productive world, better-off. It turns out that the Ram-
sey criterion is sufficiently ‘malleable’ to refuse such an argument. It also turns
out that giving equal weights to South and North may be not enough to obtain
appealing ethical outcomes. The first two chapters come to the same conclusion.
Sustaining, or growing, welfare implies to ‘take advantage’ of natural differences
of the regions. The better-off region shall thus make transfers to the worse-off
one.
In the Chapter 3, I study a transfer from the North to the South. In particu-
lar, I assume North has a free access to its resource and works to extract a part.
While South is constrained on its harvesting. I study then the ‘net’ utility of
South above its constrained level. The intratemporal dimension is dealt as be-
fore with a symmetric SWF, while the intertemporal dimension is taken through
a minimalist view to keep things simple, by considering a value function which
is non-decreasing with the stock. I analyze the introduction of a transfer taken
27
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
on the catch: a lump sum transfer and a proportional tax. The consequences, de-
pending on the chosen transfer, are different. In each case, I build utility possibil-
ity frontier (‘Pareto-frontier’) to see the choices allowed. Afterward, maximizing
the social welfare allows to determine the optimal allocation. The frontier from
the lump-sum (‘first-best’) exhibits an intuitive trade-off: the higher the transfer,
the higher the utility of South and the lower the utility of North. The frontier
from the tax (‘second-best’) exhibits a less intuitive but well-known feature: a
higher transfer makes the North still worse-off, but it makes the South better-
off until a certain point from which on its utility decreases. This is known as a
‘Laffer effect’. Not surprisingly, as the proportional tax creates a distortion (it
changes the relative price of consumption compared to that of leisure), it leaves
fewer possibilities of redistribution to the public decision-maker than the lump
sum transfer. The intragenerational inequality aversion is allowed to vary. But
even if the intragenerational inequality aversion tends toward infinity, a perfect
equality of regional welfares may not arise. This is because the resource needs
to be harvested and it is not freely available. It also raises ‘interpersonal’ com-
parison issues since very different results are obtained depending on who society
considers to be better-off. As North is assumed to be better-off here. a higher
aversion leads to increase the transfer. More importantly, lump-sum and tax have
opposite consequences on the resource. A rising lump-sum leads North to com-
pensate the transfer and at the end the global harvest rises. On the opposite,
a rising tax rate leads North to work less and at the end the global harvest de-
creases. I take reaching the golden rule a benchmark of development for North.
If the inequality aversion increases, the social planner shall use the right mech-
anism depending on the situation. When the current configuration leads to a
steady-state stock lower than the golden-rule one, it has to implement a transfer
through a tax. While when the current configuration leads to a steady-state stock
higher than the golden-rule one, it has to implement a lump-sum transfer. If the
right mechanism cannot be used, a necessary trade-off between the two dimen-
sions has to be made. The trade-off disappears only in the very specific case
where the optimal allocation is equality, whatever the inequality aversion. This
model also raises the feature that a huge decreasing of consumption may lead to
over-accumulation of the resource, and being ‘too generous’ toward the future.
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Sustaining welfare when
intratemporal inequalities matter1
Abstract
Sustaining the highest possible level of welfare over time has different conse-
quences on regions unequally endowed with renewable resources. Consider the
North being endowed with a larger stock than the South. The stock of the North is
then relatively less productive at the margin. It is showed that North has to over-
consume – its marginal productivity grows – while South has to under-consume
– its marginal productivity rises. The steady state is reached at an equality of
the marginal productivities in the two regions. The higher the intragenerational
1The first chapter is largely inspired from Cairns, Robert D.; Del Campo, Stellio and Mar-
tinet, Vincent, Sustainability of an Economy Relying on Two Reproducible Assets (December 12,
2016). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6314.
Abstract: Evaluating the sustainability of a society requires a system of shadow or accounting
values derived from the sustainability objective. As a first step toward the derivation of such
shadow-values for a maximin objective, this paper studies an economy composed of two repro-
ducible assets, each producing one of two consumption goods. The effect of the substitutability
between goods in utility is studied by postulating, in turn, neoclassical diminishing marginal
substitutability, perfect substitutability and perfect complementarity. The degree of substitutabil-
ity has strong effects on the maximin solution, affecting the regularity or non-regularity of the
program, and on the accounting values. This has important consequences for the computation
of genuine savings and the sustainability prospects of future generations.
I restate this model in this chapter. The calculus are identical. Only the interpretations and the
results are reformulated. Nonetheless, one restriction is imposed: the social welfare (ex-utility)
function is now symmetric.
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inequality aversion, the lower the highest sustainable welfare. But as long as this
inequality aversion is finite, South bears a higher cost than North to sustain the
global economy. The next chapter will study this feature when one no longer
wants to sustain welfare, but one wants to grow. The first two chapters ignore
the possibility of transfer, which is addressed in the last chapter.
1.1 Introduction
The growing impacts of human activity on the environment have increased
concern for sustainability and call for the definition of tools to assess it. To
Solow (1993), sustainability means the ability to support a standard of living for
the very long-run, and requires conserving a “generalized capacity to produce
economic well-being”, accounting for all components of human well-being, in-
cluding the consumption of manufactured goods, the flow of services from the
environment, etc. A growing body of work proposes metrics for sustainabil-
ity accounting (Neumayer, 2013), among which genuine savings indicators are
prominent. Genuine savings measures the evolution of the productive capacities
of the economy through net investment in a comprehensive set of capital stocks.
If the concerns for sustainability come from the hypothesis that society’s current
decisions are not sustainable, it can hardly be held that observed, market prices
can be used for sustainability accounting. Most of the genuine savings literature
is based on the maximization of a welfare function, which defines a value V (X)
for any economic state X (vector of capital stocks). Shadow values ∂V (X)/∂Xi
are then used to compute genuine savings as ∑i
∂V (X)
∂Xi
dXi
dt (Asheim, 2007; Das-
gupta, 2009).2 Genuine savings then measures the net investment in the capacity
to produce the chosen measure of welfare.
But distributional issues happen alongside with the sustainability objective.
Indeed, people living in rich countries and people living in poor countries are
2A notable exception is the work of Dasgupta, Mäler, and colleagues (Dasgupta and Mäler,
2000; Arrow et al., 2003) who use a general, possibly non-optimal resource allocation mecha-
nism (ram) instead of maximizing welfare. As in the optimization models, the accounting price
of each capital stock corresponds to the marginal contribution of that stock to the value (dis-
counted utility in their case) associated to the trajectory determined by the ram. Integrating the
dynamic path and computing the associated value as a function of all capital stocks can be done
only for simple models with strong assumptions on the ram.
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likely to face different challenges. This is well known in the climate change
literature (Heal, 2009), but it is intimately linked with natural assets. Environ-
mental problems are complex, uncertain and important, but ultimately ethical.
A first step toward a better implementation of policies would be to consider di-
rectly distributional issues into a sustainability objective. Do we want a general
capacity of the economy (including goods and services from the environment) to
produce well-being if some individuals would be more and more deprived in the
future? Still, defining and assessing sustainability remains an issue in itself.
The literature on genuine savings mostly adopts discounted utility as a mea-
sure of welfare. While it is the customary measure of intertemporal value in
economics, discounted utility is criticized in the sustainability literature as being
inequitable (Heal, 1998; Martinet, 2012). An alternative measure is the maximin
value (Rawls, 1971), which is related to intergenerational equity (Solow, 1974)
and defines the highest egalitarian and efficient path that could be implemented
from current state in regular problems (Burmeister and Hammond, 1977). This
criterion motivated Hartwick’s work on nil net investment (Hartwick, 1977),
which is the backbone of genuine savings measures. For non-regular problems,
though, the highest egalitarian path may not be efficient. As the maximin crite-
rion does not satisfy Pareto efficiency (Asheim and Zuber, 2013), an important
stream of the literature, mainly axiomatic, has focused on the definition of alter-
native social welfare functions (SWFs) that encompass both economic efficiency
and intergenerational equity (Chichilnisky, 1996; Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long,
2009; Asheim et al., 2012; Asheim and Zuber, 2013). This literature tries to
overcome impossibility theorems stating that there is no SWF satisfying both the
axiom of strong anonymity and the axiom of strong Pareto efficiency. A crite-
rion relaxes either the axiom for efficiency (e.g., the maximin criterion is anony-
mous but does not satisfy strong Pareto efficiency) or the axiom for equity (such
as Chichilnisky’s (1996) criterion, which replaces anonymity by the axioms of
non-dictatorship of the present and non-dictatorship of the future), or it has to be
incomplete (such as overtaking criteria) or non-constructible.3 While this litera-
ture raises interesting normative issues, most of the SWFs it produced are not as
3See Basu and Mitra (2003); Zame (2007); Asheim (2010); Lauwers (2012), among others.
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readily implementable into a sustainability accounting system as maximin.4
I see at least three interests in studying maximin for intergenerational pur-
poses. First, the maximin value has a clear, positive interpretation in terms of sus-
tainability, as soon as one defines sustainability as the ‘ability to sustain welfare’.
This value is the highest level of welfare that can be sustained forever given the
current state of the economy (Cairns and Long, 2006; Cairns, 2011, 2013; Fleur-
baey, 2015a). It is my measure of ‘intergenerational equity’ herein. A genuine
savings indicator can be defined for maximin, the shadow-value of a stock being
its marginal contribution to the maximin value. Net investment accounted using
these shadow-values, for any given dynamic path – efficient or not, and whether
or not maximin is the pursued social objective, – represents the evolution over
time of the highest sustainable level of utility and is interpreted as a measure
of sustainability improvement or decline (Cairns and Martinet, 2014). Comput-
ing net maximin investment is thus meaningful for sustainability accounting as
it informs on the effect of current decisions on the ability to sustain utility that
is bequeathed to future generations. Second, it guarantees a procedural equity
since all generations are treated equally (finite anonymity). It seeks to maximize
the welfare of the worst-off generation to the extend possible, irrespectively of
its date of appearance. At the end, every generation can enjoy the maximin wel-
fare, possibly constant over time. Third, if society is concerned with the effective
distribution of welfare over time (consequentialist approach), it may have an in-
tertemporal inequality aversion (IA). If one interprets IA through (the converse
of) the elasticity of substitution (Atkinson, 1970), it may be shown that max-
imin corresponds to the limiting case of infinite intertemporal IA (d’Autume and
Schubert, 2008a).
The possibility of developing a sustainability accounting system based on
maximin values requires defining the various capital stocks’ shadow-values. As
with any other measure of welfare, the shadow-values are determined through
4A genuine savings indicator can be defined for any dynamic, forward-looking welfare func-
tion satisfying the property of independent future (Asheim, 2007). The sustainable recursive
social welfare functions characterized by Asheim et al. (2012), and the particular case of sustain-
able discounted utilitarianism (Asheim and Mitra, 2010), satisfy this axiom, but the associated
genuine savings indicators have not been studied yet, to the best of my knowledge. Dietz and
Asheim (2012), however, implemented this criterion in the DICE integrated assessment model
for the evaluation of climate policies, emphasizing its tractability.
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differentiating the corresponding value function. The computation of maximin
shadow-values for any actual economy, with all its various assets, consumption
goods, production techniques, etc., is presently out of reach. A sensible way
to proceed is to build up from the few solved maximin problems, and to try to
gain a greater understanding of the economic issues involved, as it was done
for discounted utility (Arrow et al., 2003). To tackle distributional considera-
tions within each generation, I will consider that there are two distinct renewable
resources available in two different regions, say ‘North’ and ‘South’. Besides,
the general idea of genuine savings was constructed on several assets (Hartwick,
1977). I postulate an economy with two regions that do not interact together.
By solving the maximin problem for this economy, I provide both some insights
of the interplay between intratemporal IA and the sustainable welfare and some
insights for the future development of a system of accounting based on maximin
shadow-values. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that each regional in-
dicator of well-being is linear with respect to the regional consumption. This
avoids inter-regional comparisons of utility, but mainly it considers regions re-
sponsible for turning consumption into utility. Thus I will be interested in allo-
cation of regional consumptions.
A key constituent of my examination is the question of elasticity of substi-
tution (EOS) between consumption of North and consumption of South. This
refers both to IA and substitutability issues. The ‘welfarist’ approach allows
for dealing with two famous limiting cases, as well as all intermediary cases.
Indeed, utilitarianism is concerned with the global welfare irrespectively of its
inter-individual distribution. It is characterized by a nil IA (infinite EOS). At the
opposite, intragenerational maximin is concerned with the worst-off individual.
It corresponds to an infinite intratemporal IA (nil EOS). Interestingly, this echoes
concerns with substitutability between different stocks, in North and South here.
Neumayer (2013) stresses that substitutability in production as well as in welfare
plays a central role in the study of sustainability. The influence of substitutability
in production on the maximin solution has been emphasized since the work of
Solow (1974) and Dasgupta and Heal (1979), who studied interactions between
sectors in the form of a sector extracting a non-renewable resource used as an
input to a manufacturing sector. Some authors (e.g. Asako, 1980; Stollery, 1998;
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d’Autume and Schubert, 2008a; d’Autume et al., 2010) study maximin problems
with two substitutes in welfare (utility), one of which is a decision variable (con-
sumption) and the other a state variable (the ambient temperature or the stock of
a non-renewable resource). Substitutability of consumption goods in welfare has
received less scrutiny but is as important a question for sustainability as substi-
tutability in production.5
Keeping the economy at a steady state by maintaining current capital stocks
is a proposal that appeals to some proponents of sustainability (Daly, 1974; Neu-
mayer, 2013). By solving the maximin problem for our economy, it is shown
in Section 1.2 that, whenever the IA is finite (but non-zero), if regions are dif-
ferently productive at the margin, it is possible to sustain welfare at a higher
level than at that regional steady state. There are a higher consumption in the
marginally less productive region (North) and a lower consumption in the more
productive one (South). From a social welfare point of view, the depletion of the
less productive stock is compensated for by investment in the more productive
one, which echoes the Hartwick’s nil net investment rule (Hartwick, 1977; Dixit
et al., 1980; Cairns and Long, 2006). This investment pattern is driven by the
shadow-values of the stocks, i.e., the sustainability accounting prices. What is
maintained is a general capacity to sustain welfare, not levels of particular natural
assets. This calls for transfers from North to South as discussed later on.
In single-sector models such as the Solow (1956) growth model with capital
depreciation or the simple fishery, stocks that are beyond the golden-rule level or
the maximum sustainable yield have negative marginal products and are redun-
dant for maximin value (Solow, 1974; Asako, 1980). In such a non-regular case,
an egalitarian path is not efficient (Burmeister and Hammond, 1977), and the
maximin value and shadow-values are of little information. It is thus important
to identify the conditions under which such non-regularity occurs. In our two-
sector model, there is no such inefficiency when abundant stocks can be used in
the investment pattern (in North) to build up a scarce resource (in South), and so
have a positive sustainability accounting value. Stock redundancy, which is as-
5Substitutability of consumption goods in utility has been studied in the discounted utilitarian
framework (Quaas et al., 2013; Baumgärtner et al., 2017) and shown to strongly influence optimal
development paths and their ability to sustain utility.
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sociated with nil sustainability accounting prices, arises only if all technologies
have a single productivity peak, and is thus less likely to occur in a multi-region
model with substitutability. Positive shadow-values directly indicate scarcity.
It is shown is the Section 1.3 that substitution/investment pattern is influenced
by the degree of intragenerational IA between regional consumption goods in a
subtle way, in interplay with the relative ‘productivity’ of the natural stocks.
Moreover, in the limiting case of infinite IA, the region (South) with the less
abundant resource limits sustainability and the more abundant one is redundant
(North). Only the former has a positive accounting price for intergenerational
equity.
The consequences of these results for sustainability accounting with max-
imin shadow-values are discussed in Section 1.4. In particular, two conditions
for current decisions to improve the level of welfare that can be sustained are de-
termined. First, current welfare has to be lower than the maximin value. Second,
the resource thus freed-up must be invested in order to get a positive maximin
net investment. Llavador et al. (2011) stressed that the year 2000 consumption in
the USA was lower than the sustainable, maximin value. Such a lower welfare
can be consistent with long-run growth as long as both investment decisions re-
sult in an increase of the maximin value and proper transfers toward developing
countries are implemented.
Conclusions and prospects for future research are given in Section 1.5. Ad-
ditional mathematical details and analyses (for special cases, in particular) are
provided in the Appendix.
1.2 Two regions, two reproducible assets
In this section, the maximin solution in a two-region model is characterized:
each region, North and South, having access to a distinct renewable resource. A
social planner derives an instantaneous social welfare function (SWF) W from
utilities of the regions. For the sake of simplicity, utilities are assumed to be
linear: u(ci) = ci, i = N,S. This avoids utility comparisons and it considers re-
gion responsible for turning consumption into utility. I start with neoclassical
assumptions on production. Then single-peaked technologies (SPT) are consid-
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ered, introducing a source of stock redundancy which happens generally with
renewable resources (e.g. a logistic growth).
1.2.1 A neoclassical benchmark
Consider an economy with two reproducible assets, XN and XS, produced
by separate regions, North and South, according to technologies Fi(Xi), which
depend only on the stock Xi and are assumed to be twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing (F ′i > 0)6 and strictly concave (F ′′i < 0).7 Production is
either consumed (ci) or ‘invested’
(
X˙i
)
and capital dynamics are
X˙i(t)≡ dXi(t)dt = Fi(Xi(t))− ci(t) , i = N,S . (1.1)
The economy is composed of infinitely many generations of identical con-
sumers, each living for an instant in continuous time. Consider an ordinal so-
cial ordering over the two consumptions, represented by a twice-differentiable,
strictly quasi-concave and symmetric SWF W (cN ,cS), such that both goods have
a positive marginal social welfare and are socially ‘essential’.8
The maximin value m of a state (XN ,XS) is the highest level of welfare that
6Derivatives of single-argument functions are denoted with primes. Partial derivatives of
functions with several arguments are denoted with subscripts, e.g., Wci ≡ ∂W (cN ,cS)∂ci .
7This is a stylized, canonical model to start with. The general results of this subsection hold if
one production function (say Fi) is weakly concave and the other one (say Fj) is strictly concave,
as long as F ′i (0) < F ′j (0). An example combining an AK-technology with a sector with capital
decay is analyzed in the Appendix A.5. The assumption of positive marginal product is relaxed
in Subsection 1.2.2, so that the model can represent the production function of a manufactured
good with capital decay or the growth function of a renewable natural resource with a carrying
capacity.
8 Formally, it means Wci > 0 and limci→0 Wci |W=w = +∞. Strict quasi-concavity implies
that marginal rates of substitution are decreasing, a property that is used below in the proof of
Proposition 2. These hypotheses are relaxed in Section 1.3, where I study the limiting cases of
intragenerational maximin and utilitarianism.
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can be sustained forever from that state:
m(X1,X2) = max
w,cN(·),cS(·)
w , (1.2)
s.t. (XN(0),XS(0)) = (XN ,XS) ;
X˙i(t) = Fi(Xi(t))− ci(t), i = N,S, and
W (cN(t),cS(t))≥ w for all t ≥ 0 . (1.3)
Herein, the term value refers to maximin value. Below, I omit the time argument
in the expressions where no confusion is possible.
Differentiation of the maximin value with respect to time yields the net max-
imin investment (Cairns and Martinet, 2014, Lemma 1):
dm(XN ,XS)
dt
=
∂m(XN ,XS)
∂XN
X˙N +
∂m(XN ,XS)
∂XS
X˙S . (1.4)
The links between the maximin problem and net investment have been studied
since the work of Hartwick (1977), with recent contributions by Doyen and Mar-
tinet (2012) and Fleurbaey (2015a). The links between net maximin investment
and sustainability accounting are studied in Section 1.4.
Before solving the maximin problem for this economy, let us establish the
following lemmata.
Lemma 1 (Stationary fallback). For any state (XN ,XS), the maximin value is at
least equal to the welfare derived from consumption at the corresponding steady
state:
m(XN ,XS)≥W (FN(XN),FS(XS)) .
Proof of Lemma 1. The dynamic path X˙i = 0 driven by decisions ci = Fi(Xi) is
feasible and yields the constant utility W (FN(XN),FS(XS)). This provides a lower
bound for the maximin value.
Lemma 1 relies on the fact that consuming the whole production, keeping the
economy in a steady state, makes it possible to sustain W (FN(XN),FS(XS)). A
dynamic path may, however, yield a higher sustainable utility.
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Lemma 2 (Dynamic maximin path). If the maximin value of a state (XN ,XS) is
greater than the welfare derived at the steady state, i.e., if
m(XN ,XS)>W (FN(XN),FS(XS)), then, along the maximin path (i) the consump-
tion of at least one good is greater than the production of the corresponding stock
and (ii) that stock decreases.
Proof of Lemma 2. This is a direct result from Lemma 1 and the dynamics.
The existence of such a dynamic path means that keeping the economy at a
steady state (Daly, 1974) is not the only sustainable option. Solving the maximin
problem (1.2) may provide a superior path. To do so, I follow the direct approach
to maximin proposed by Cairns and Long (2006). Taking the sustained utility
level w as a control parameter and denoting the costate variables of the stocks by
µi, the Hamiltonian writes:
H (X ,c,µ) = µNX˙N +µSX˙S = µN (FN(XN)− cN)+µS (FS(XS)− cS) . (1.5)
Denoting the multiplier associated with the constraint (1.3) by ω , the Lagrangian
is
L (X ,c,µ,w,ω) =H (X ,c,µ)+ω (W (cN ,cS)−w) . (1.6)
In an interesting problem, both initial stocks are strictly positive, i.e., Xi(0)>
0 for i = N,S (otherwise, one is back to the single sector problem). Under the
condition that both goods are essential to consumption, and given Lemma 1, one
can say that consumption of both goods is positive (ci > 0, i = N,S) at any time
along a maximin path. The necessary conditions are, for i = N,S, and for any
time t:
∂L
∂ci
= 0 ; (1.7)
∂L
∂Xi
= −µ˙i ; (1.8)∫ ∞
0
(
−∂L
∂w
)
ds =
∫ ∞
0
ω(s)ds < ∞ ; (1.9)
lim
t→∞µiXi = 0 ; (1.10)
lim
t→∞H (X ,c,µ) = 0 ; (1.11)
(ω,µN ,µS) >> (0,0,0) ; (1.12)
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along with the usual complementary slackness conditions
W (cN ,cS)−w≥ 0 , ω ≥ 0 , ω (W (cN ,cS)−w) = 0 . (1.13)
Whenever equality is efficient, the maximin path corresponds to an egalitar-
ian and efficient path, with welfare equal to the constant maximin value. The
solution is said to be regular (Burmeister and Hammond, 1977) and corresponds
to a (strong) Pareto allocation of utility among generations. The variable ω mea-
sures the shadow cost of the equity constraint, i.e., how much would be gained
in value if the constraint was locally relaxed. This is the opportunity cost of
meeting the constraint at the current state.9
Cairns and Long (2006, Proposition 1) show that along a maximin path, the
µi are the shadow-values of each stock at current state, i.e., µi = ∂m(XN ,XS)∂Xi , and
that the Hamiltonian, which thus represents net investment at maximin shadow-
values (eq. 1.4), is nil:
H (X ,c,µ) = µNX˙N +µSX˙S = m˙ = 0 . (1.14)
Eq. (1.14) is related to Hartwick’s rule (Hartwick, 1977; Dixit et al., 1980; Witha-
gen and Asheim, 1998). The maximin value is constant over time and, as welfare
is equal to the maximin value (W (cN ,cS) = m(XN ,XS)), so is welfare.
The optimality conditions above can be given economic meanings in a regu-
lar problem, when (µN ,µS,ω) 6= (0,0,0).10
9Maximizing the minimal utility over time can be perceived as successively raising the level
of the least well-off to the extent possible (Solow, 1974). The end result of this sequence of
redistributions can be an equalization of welfare. Intergenerational equality may be the outcome
of the maximin problem but is not its objective. In this context, Cairns and Long (2006) interpret
the multiplier ω as a shadow-value or cost of equity, which provides information on the difficulty
of satisfying the minimal utility constraint at time t. Equity does not necessarily mean equality,
however. Even if a maximin solution exists, a redistribution to achieve equality is not always
possible or efficient. When it is not efficient to distribute well being equally over time, the
solution is non-regular, as discussed below in Subsection 1.2.2.
10Note that, for simple fishery models, the constraint qualification is not satisfied (cf. Cairns
and Long, 2006, pp. 279 and 291-295). In the case of maximin, the usual necessary conditions
may not be necessary. In particular, it may be that ω = 0 (that the problem is not regular). One
has to solve the problem and check that the solution “makes sense” and in particular does not
violate feasibility constraints. This will be the case in our analysis of cases departing from the
neoclassical benchmark in Subsection 1.2.2.
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From eq. (1.7), the shadow-value of stock Xi is equal to the marginal utility
of consumption ci weighted by the shadow-value of equity
µi = ωWci , i = N,S . (1.15)
As long as ω > 0, the relative shadow-value is equal to the marginal social rate
of substitution in consumption:
µN
µS
=
WcN
WcS
. (1.16)
From eq. (1.8), µ˙i = −µiF ′i (Xi), so that each shadow-value decreases at a rate
equal to the current marginal product of the corresponding stock:
− µ˙i
µi
= F ′i (Xi) , i = N,S . (1.17)
This depreciation rate is the cost of postponing an investment over a short period
of time (see Dorfman, 1969, p. 821). The lower a stock, the higher its marginal
product and the more costly in terms of maximin value it is to postpone invest-
ment in the stock.
The relative shadow-value µNµS decreases at a rate equal to the current differ-
ence between the stocks’ marginal products:
1
µN/µS
d(µN/µS)
dt
=
µ˙N
µN
− µ˙S
µS
=−(F ′N(XN)−F ′S(XS)) . (1.18)
Taking the logarithmic derivative of eq. (1.15) gives µ˙iµi =
ω˙
ω +
W˙ci
Wci
. Substitut-
ing µ˙iµi by −F ′i (Xi), we obtain, for i = N,S,
−ω˙
ω
= F ′i (Xi)+
W˙ci
Wci
. (1.19)
The shadow-value of equity decreases at a rate equal to the sum of a stock’s
marginal product and the rate of change of the marginal utility of consumption
for the associated good. Eq. (1.19) is analogous to the ‘Keynes-Ramsey rule’.
The rate ρ ≡− ω˙ω has features of a utility discount rate and ω can be interpreted
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as a virtual discount factor along the maximin path (Cairns and Long, 2006). A
maximin path thus has analogies to a discounted-utility path with this discount
factor.11 The shadow-value ω , however, is endogenous, and so is the virtual
discount rate ρ , which is unlikely to be constant (except at a steady state), unlike
in a discounted-utilitarian problem.12
The following Proposition characterizes optimal, regular steady states. Since
conditions (1.15)-(1.19) remain valid for n stocks, this condition is general to an
economy with any number of separate regions.13
Proposition 1 (Steady state). In an optimal steady state (X?N ,X?S ) the marginal
products of all stocks are equal:
F ′N(X
?
N) = F
′
S(X
?
S ) = ρ
? . (1.20)
Proof of Proposition 1. At a steady state (X?N ,X
?
S ), X˙i = 0, i.e. ci = Fi(Xi), then
c˙i = 0 and thus W˙ci = 0, i=N,S. It follows from eq. (1.19) that− ω˙ω = F ′N(X?N) =
F ′S(X
?
S ).
For any of the states satisfying the marginal productivity condition of Propo-
sition 1, the stationary path yielding utility W (FN(X?N),FS(X
?
S )) is egalitarian and
efficient, and corresponds to the maximin solution from that state. At such steady
states, the virtual discount rate ρ? is endogenously set equal to the marginal
productivity of all capital stocks so that there is no possibility of arbitrage by
investing in or depleting the stocks.
Any state satisfying the condition F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S ) is an optimal steady
state. This is different from the optimality condition for an optimal steady state in
a discounted utility problem with constant discount rate δ , which is fully deter-
mined by the exogenous discount rate through the condition F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S ) =
δ . In the discounted utility framework, the no-arbitrage condition of stationarity
is verified only for that particular steady state, and the optimal trajectory would
converge to that state whatever the initial state of the economy. One shall see
11If the marginal welfare Wci is the shadow current price of consumption for good i, by
eq. (1.15), the shadow-values µi are analogous to present-value prices.
12E.g., the discount rate in Withagen and Asheim (1998) varies over time.
13Weitzman (1976) originally used such a model with separate sectors to establish the formal
links between national accounting and welfare in the discounted utility framework.
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that in the maximin framework trajectories converge to different steady states,
depending on the maximin value of their initial state.
When the economy is not at an optimal steady state, it follows a dynamic
path characterized by nil net investment (eq. 1.14) and the following conditions.
Proposition 2 (Transition path). Along an optimal maximin path, when F ′i (Xi)>
F ′j(X j), consumption and investment levels are such that:
• There should be a positive investment in the region with the higher marginal
productivity of capital (with ci < Fi(Xi) and X˙i > 0). Its marginal product
decreases and its consumption increases.
• The stock with the lower marginal product is reduced (with c j >Fj(X j) and
X˙ j < 0). Its marginal product increases and its consumption decreases.
• The maximin path leads to an optimal steady state, either in finite time or
asymptotically, with the marginal products converging to equality.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since both stocks have to satisfy condition (1.19), there
is the equality F ′N(XN) +
W˙cN
WcN
= F ′S(XS) +
W˙cS
WcS
, which gives us, for F ′S(XS) >
F ′N(XN):
F ′S−F ′N = c˙S
(
WcNcS
WcN
−WcScS
WcS
)
− c˙N
(
WcScN
WcS
−WcNcN
WcN
)
> 0 . (1.21)
Under strict quasi-concavity, marginal rates of substitution are decreasing. It can
be shown that the expressions in both parenthesis in eq. (1.21) are positive,14
which allows us to rearrange the inequality as follows:
c˙S > c˙N
(
WcScN
WcS
−WcNcN
WcN
)
/
(
WcNcS
WcN
−WcScS
WcS
)
. (1.22)
Levels of consumption cannot both increase or decrease at the same time along
the maximin path, where utility is constant over time. As such, c˙N and c˙S must
14 ∂MRScN/cS
∂cS
< 0⇔ ∂(WcS/WcN )∂cS < 0⇔WcScSWcN −WcSWcN cS < 0⇔
WcN cS
WcN
− WcScSWcS > 0 and
∂MRScN/cS
∂cN
> 0⇔ ∂(WcS/WcN )∂cN > 0⇔WcScNWcN −WcSWcN cN > 0⇔
WcScN
WcS
− WcN cNWcN > 0.
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be of opposite sign. Under condition (1.22), c˙N > 0 would imply c˙S > 0. One
must thus have c˙N < 0 and c˙S > 0.
From eq. (1.18), we know that when F ′S(XS) > F
′
N(XN), one has
µ˙S
µS −
µ˙N
µN =
−F ′S(XS)+F ′N(XN)< 0. The relative price µSµN decreases. As the optimal Hamil-
tonian is nil (eq. (1.14)), we have − dXSdXN =
µS
µN ; the tangents (in absolute value)
to the paths in the state map (XS,XN) have to decrease as well, implying X˙S =
FS(XS)− cS > 0 and X˙N = FN(XN)− cN < 0. Therefore, F ′N(XN) rises while
F ′S(XS) decreases.
Formally, we can study the stability of the steady states. To do so, sum up
the necessary conditions into the following dynamic equations, with pi ≡ µNµS ;{
X˙i = Fi(Xi)− ci , i = N,S ;
p˙i = pi
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
.
Steady states are characterized by ci = Fi(X?i ), i=N,S, and F
′
N(X
?
N) = F
′
S(X
?
S ). It
may be shown (see the Appendix A.3) that the Jacobian matrix of the linearized
system, evaluated at the steady states, has eigenvalues with opposite sign. There-
fore, a saddle-point steady state exists on the locus F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S )> 0.
The transition path to a steady state is such that welfare is sustained at the
maximin level (i.e., W (cN(t),cS(t)) = m(XN(t),XS(t))) through substitution of
the less productive stock for the more productive one. There is a disinvestment in
the stock with the lower marginal product (North), compensated for by a positive
investment in the stock with the higher marginal product (South), so that max-
imin net investment is nil and the maximin value is constant over time. The two
stocks evolve in opposite directions so long as the marginal products are unequal,
toward an optimal steady state. The steady state reached depends on the initial
state, in the sense that a trajectory starting for an arbitrary state (XN(0),XS(0))
with maximin value m(XN(0),XS(0)) will converge to the steady state (X?N ,X
?
S )
satisfying W (FN(X?N),FS(X
?
S )) = m(XN(0),XS(0)) = m(XN(t),XS(t)), as well as
the optimality condition of Proposition 1: F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S ). The maximin tra-
jectories are characterized by the shape of the associated iso-value curves as
follows.
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Proposition 3 (Iso-value curves). Along a maximin path with constant welfare
w, the current state (XN ,XS) and optimal controls (cN ,cS) satisfy
X˙S
X˙N
=
c˙S
c˙N
=−µN
µS
⇔ dXS
dXN
∣∣∣∣
m(XN ,XS)=w
=
dcS
dcN
∣∣∣∣
W (cN ,cS)=w
. (1.23)
Proof of Proposition 3. Along the optimal path, for any state (XN(t),XS(t)), the
partial derivatives of the maximin value equal the shadow-price of the stocks, i.e.,
∂m
∂Xi
= µi(t) (Cairns and Long, 2006). From condition (1.15), one gets ∂m∂XN /
∂m
∂XS
=
µN
µS =
WcN
WcS
. At the optimum, the global marginal rate of transformation equals the
social marginal rate of substitution. Along the optimal path, µNX˙N + µSX˙S = 0
(eq. 1.14). By eq. (1.15), apart from a steady state:
X˙S
X˙N
=−µN
µS
=−WcN
WcS
< 0 . (1.24)
When welfare is constant, dW (cN ,cS)dt = c˙NWcN + c˙SWcS = 0 and, apart from a
steady state:
c˙S
c˙N
=−WcN
WcS
< 0 . (1.25)
Combining conditions (1.24) and (1.25), one gets
X˙S
X˙N
=
c˙S
c˙N
⇔ dXS
dXN
=
dcS
dcN
. (1.26)
At the steady state, i.e. when X˙i = 0, for i = N,S, dcidXi = F
′
i (X
?
i ). As F
′
N(X
?
N) =
F ′S(X
?
S ),
dcS
dcN
= dXSdXN . Therefore, eq. (1.26) is also satisfied at the steady state.
A maximin trajectory thus follows an iso-value curve toward a steady state
at which the marginal products of the two stocks are equal. A graphical repre-
sentation in Fig. 1.1 below illustrates the paths of consumption and stock levels
starting at an arbitrary point A in the state space (XS,XN) and obeying eq. (1.23).
The conditions derived in Propositions 1-3 are general, for any strictly con-
cave, strictly increasing SWF, and strictly concave production functions. Deriv-
ing further general results is difficult. In particular, determining explicitly the
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F'N>F'S
F'N<F'S
F'N(XN)=F'S(XS)
m(XN,XS)
A(XN* ,XS*)
(cN* ,cS*)
W(cN,cS)
cS(⋅)
cN(⋅)
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure 1.1: Graphical representation for the general case
steady state reached from an arbitrary initial state would require integrating the
trajectory implicitly characterized by Proposition 3. This requires specifying all
functional forms and solving completely the particular maximin problem. The
results would then be case-specific. A closed-form solution can be obtained for
some problems, but for other problems, numerical approaches may be needed.
A full treatment for a particular case, with closed-form solutions is given in the
Appendix A.5 as an illustration.
The implicit results of Proposition 3 allow us to provide general interpreta-
tions, however. By equation (1.23), the slopes of the indifference curve in the
decision map and of the path of the state variables are equal. Therefore, the
maximin paths are convex to the origin. The relative shadow-value of the stocks
governs the slopes dcNdcS and
dXN
dXS
. In particular, it defines the relative value of the
two stocks in terms of maximin investment. In Section 1.4 is examined how this
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result can be used to set up a sustainable accounting system based on maximin
values.
Graphical representation Fig. 1.1 is a plot of the solution, with power func-
tions used to represent technologies and symmetric Cobb-Douglas SWF. It is a
four-quadrant graph in which the east axis represents XN , the south axis XS, the
north axis cN and the west axis cS. The upper-right quadrant represents produc-
tion FN(XN) and the lower-left quadrant production FS(XS). The upper-left quad-
rant plots indifference curves in the consumption map (cS,cN), and the lower-
right quadrant is the state map (XS,XN) in which state trajectories can be drawn
as well as iso-value curves.
The dashed curve starting at (0,0) in the state map corresponds to optimal
steady states satisfying F ′N(XN) = F ′S(XS).
15 The corresponding optimal steady
state consumption levels are represented by the dashed curve starting at (0,0) in
the consumption map, which makes it possible to relate the steady states to their
maximin value on the indifference curves.
For any state north-east of the steady states curve (e.g., for state A on the
figure), stock XN is less productive at the margin (F ′N(XN)< F ′S(XS)). Along the
maximin path, consumption of stock N exceeds its production, while consump-
tion of stock S is lower than its production. The trajectory goes south-west along
the iso-value curve. Consumption levels and states converge toward the corre-
sponding steady state. A similar pattern occurs south-west of the equilibrium
line. For any state, maximin shadow-values are positive.
1.2.2 Single-peakedness: A source of stock redundancy
In the neoclassical benchmark with increasing and concave technologies, the
solution of the maximin problem is characterized by Propositions 1-3 and pos-
itive shadow-values (µN ,µS,ω). Many possible technologies, however, attain
a maximum for a finite level of the state variable. In the Solow (1956) growth
model with capital decay at a constant rate, output reaches a maximum, called the
15This curve starts from (0,0) because the two production functions have the same, infinite
marginal product at zero in this example. For different technologies, the curve could start from a
point (XN ,0) satisfying F ′N(XN) = F ′S(0).
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Golden-Rule (GR) level, so that marginal net product turns negative for a large
capital stock. In the study of environmental and resource economics, to which
sustainability is intimately related, the simple fishery has a maximum or GR level
called the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and from that point productivity
turns downward, reaching a growth rate of zero at what is called the environ-
mental carrying capacity.16 Such technologies have interesting features for the
study of sustainability, and have been studied in one-sector models (Asheim and
Ekeland, 2016).
Let us now consider SPT, they are characterized by Fi(0) = 0=Fi (X¯i), where
X¯i stands for the carrying capacity, and take a maximum at Fi
(
XGRi
)
, reached at
the golden-rule stock.17
From a maximin point of view, a central property in a one-sector model is that
a stock is redundant if it is beyond the golden-rule level (Asako, 1980), resulting
in non-regularity (Burmeister and Hammond, 1977). For such non-regular paths,
welfare can be larger than the maximin value without affecting it: the shadow
cost of equity ω is nil (Cairns and Martinet, 2014), as well as the shadow-values
of stocks (eq. (1.15)). There is no opportunity cost of satisfying the minimal con-
sumption constraint. Non-regularities in maximin problems have been found in
the models by Solow (1974), Asako (1980), and Cairns and Tian (2010), and are
discussed in Doyen and Martinet (2012). Cairns and Martinet (2014) stress its
consequences for maximin shadow-values, and thus for sustainability account-
ing. As non-regularity emerges even for simple problems and is a concern for
accounting purposes, it is important to determine if, and under what conditions,
non-regularity occurs in our two-region model.
These features are characterized with the following definition.
Definition 1 (Single-peaked technology). A natural renewal F(X) is single-
peaked if there exists XGR such that F ′(X) > 0 for X < XGR and F ′(X) < 0
for X > XGR.
16As I do not include stock dependent harvesting costs on the one hand, and consider concave
production functions, the model may not be suitable for some resources. Here again, the purpose
is to study a stylized economy.
17In practice, the domain of Xi is [0, X¯i], but technically it is possible to admit that, somehow,
historically, Xi is bounded and greater than X¯i. This possibility is, however, not pursued herein.
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By differentiability, XGR is implicitly defined by the condition F ′
(
XGR
)
= 0.
Stock XGR is the stock which yields the highest production level. A SPT is a
source of non-regularity in a maximin problem, because production is bounded
from above by level F(XGR), and so is the sustainable utility in the single-sector
case (Cairns and Martinet, 2014).
Stock redundancy can occur in our two-region economy too.
Proposition 4 (Bounded maximin value). If each natural renewal has a single
peak, the maximin value is bounded from above by
mGR =W
(
FS
(
XGRS
)
,FN
(
XGRN
))
.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider two SPTs with F ′i (XGRi ) = 0, i = N,S, and the
value mGR = W
(
FS
(
XGRS
)
,FN
(
XGRN
))
. Assume that the utility level mGR + ε
for some ε > 0 is sustainable. A maximin path sustaining mGR + ε would have
no steady state, as none can sustain this level. Such a dynamic path cannot
have a consumption decreasing to zero and the other increasing to infinity either,
as production is bounded from above. The maximin path would either corre-
spond to a limit cycle or to a back-and-forth along a curve. Along a limit cycle,
there would be a part of the cycle where the two stocks increase at the same
time. This requires ci < Fi(Xi)≤ Fi
(
XGRi
)
for both regions, which would imply
W (cN ,cS)≤W (FS(XGRS ),FN(XGRN ))≤mGR+ε , a contradiction. For a back-and-
forth, at switching times, both stocks are at a steady state. Here again, mGR+ ε
cannot be sustained. The highest sustainable level of utility is mGR. Any path
sustaining this level converges to state (XGRS ,X
GR
N ).
Proposition 4 generalizes to two dimensions (and can be extended to more
than two dimensions) the idea of GR. It also generalizes to two dimensions the
non-regularity associated with the GR in an economy with a single asset. It
does not mean, however, that capital above the production peak is necessarily
redundant. For states such that m(XN ,XS) < mGR, a stock above the peak can
be used intensively as a substitute for a more productive resource to build it up,
just as in the neoclassical benchmark. Capital is not redundant. On the other
hand, one stock may be below the productive peak and yet the other stock may
be so abundant that m(XN ,XS) = mGR. Redundancy occurs when capital stocks
are more than sufficient to sustain the highest possible maximin value mGR.
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Corollary 1 (Stock redundancy). The iso-value curve m(XN ,XS) =mGR delimits
an area of redundant stocks with maximin value mGR and shadow-values of zero.
The iso-value curve m(XN ,XS) = mGR is the edge of a plateau of the max-
imin value function, represented as the hatched area in Fig. 1.2a. This figure
is similar to Fig. 1.1, except that the production functions are single-peaked.18
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the stocks are indexed such that
there is an XN ≥ 0 where F ′N(XN) = F ′S(0). Optimal steady states are along
the line XNM. Any state in the hatched area has maximin value m(XGRN ,X
GR
S ).
Any maximin path starting from a state in this region is non-regular in the sense
that welfare can be larger than the maximin value mGR for some time, until a
point on the iso-value curve m(XN ,XS) = mGR is reached, after which utility is
constant at W (cN ,cS) = mGR. In this case, both stocks are redundant and have
nil shadow-values, even a stock below its sector productive peak. Along the
iso-value curve m(XN ,XS) = mGR, which is the boundary separating the area of
redundant stocks from the states with positive shadow-values, the shadow-prices
are also zero. Such a frontier is known as the as-good-as-golden locus (Phelps
and Riley, 1978).
Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 depend on the fact that both technologies have
a production peak. If one technology does not, so that F ′i (Xi) > 0 for all Xi
(whether or not the production is bounded from above), there is neither a upper
bound on the maximin value nor stock redundancy. When one region is always
productive at the margin, the asset of another, single-peaked region is never re-
dundant if it can be used as a substitute for the other region to grow, as illustrated
in Fig. 1.2b. All capital stocks have positive shadow-values. This is a useful re-
sult for building a sustainability accounting system in a world with substitutable
assets.
An example combining an AK-technology with a region with capital decay
is provided in the Appendix A.5 and fully characterized.
18Quadratic growth functions are used to represent the technologies. As a consequence, the
steady states curve is a straight line as the marginal products F ′i (Xi) are proportional to the stocks
Xi, i = N,S, giving a linear relationship between X?N and X
?
S , for which F
′
N(X
?
N) = F
′
S(X
?
S ).
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m(X1 ,X2)= mGRFN' (XN)>FS' (XS)
FN' (XN)<FS' (XS)
M
XNcS
cN
XSGR
XNGR
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
(a) Two single-peaked technologies
F'N(XN)=F'S(XS)
XNcS
cN
XS
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
(b) One single-peaked technology
Figure 1.2: Graphical representation for single-peaked technologies
1.3 Inequality aversion and sustainability
Proposition 3 characterizes the shape of the iso-value curves, which is related
to the shape of the social indifference curves and thus to the inequality aversion
of the two regions. In this section, the interplay between inequality aversion
and sustainability is discussed, focusing on the neoclassical benchmark and then
describing the limiting cases of utilitarianism and intragenerational maximin.
Recall that the higher the inequality aversion (IA), the lower the substitutability
of consumptions.
The degree of substitutability of consumptions influences the maximin value
in a subtle way. Its effect depends on the shape of the welfare function of course
but also, and perhaps less intuitively, on that of the production functions. For
the sake of simplicity, let us consider only (symmetric) Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) SWFs in the following discussion, to focus on the role of
technology.
One is at comparing the maximin value of any economic state in two different
substitutability contexts. As welfare has not been assumed to be cardinally mean-
ingful so far, different maximin values are compared through the corresponding
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optimal steady states, ranking them according to their relative position on the
optimal steady states curve (the farther from the origin, the better). I start with
a simplified case in which the two technologies are the same (i.e., FN ≡ FS) and
then examine how the results change when the two technologies are different.
Similar technologies with CES welfare. Assume for now that FN ≡ FS. In
this case, optimal steady states (satisfying F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S )) fall on the line
XN = XS. The corresponding steady state consumption levels are on the line
cN = cS.19 Consider two different sets of social indifference curves having dif-
ferent degrees of substitutability, representing different degrees of IA. For sym-
metric CES SWFs, the indifference curves of both sets are tangent along the
equal consumption line. According to Proposition 3, the iso-value curves are
also tangent in the state map along the optimal steady states line XN = XS, the
ones with the lower degree of substitutability having greater curvature and thus
lying south-east of the corresponding ones for the higher degree of substitutabil-
ity. This pattern is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Technologies are represented by the
same power function, and the two sets of preferences by symmetric CES SWFs
with different elasticity parameters.
For any initial endowments (XS(0),XN(0)) away from the steady state (e.g.,
state A on the figure), a lower degree of inequality aversion (higher degree of
substitutability) implies higher steady state levels of the stocks and higher steady
state levels of consumption. As the relative shadow-value µN/µS is closer to
unity with higher substitutability, compensating a given reduction of a resource
stock requires a lower investment in the other resource stock. In this case, the
effect of IA on sustainability is unambiguous. The lower the degree of IA, the
‘better’ for sustainability (apart from the steady states, where IA plays no role).
The farther from the optimal steady states curve, the stronger the effect of IA on
sustainability.
The degree of substitutability strongly influences the optimal steady state of
the economy in the maximin framework. In the discounted-utilitarian frame-
19This configuration allows to rank all iso-value maximin curves through their steady state.
Furthermore, at the steady states cN = cS. Thus, they can be related to an equally distributed
equivalent level of consumption (Atkinson, 1970).
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cN=cS
FN' (XN)=FS' (XS)
A
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure 1.3: Effect of inequality aversion on sustainability with identical tech-
nologies
work, on the other hand, modifying substitutability does not change the optimal
steady state, but only the transition path to it (Baumgärtner et al., 2017).
Different technologies and CES welfare. For FN 6= FS, the findings just above
are modified because consumption levels at the optimal steady states are not
points of tangency of indifference curves for the different elasticities of substitu-
tion. Fig. 1.4 is helpful to illustrate and discuss the effects of the non-tangency.
It is drawn with different power functions for production and symmetric CES
SWFs.
Consider an initial state with relatively low capital stocks, for which the op-
timal steady states is such that FN(X?N)> FS(X
?
S ), and thus c
?
N > c
?
S. On the asso-
ciated iso-value curves, away from the optimal steady state, for states such that
F ′N(XN)< F ′S(XS), stock S is more productive and is built up along the maximin
path. This entails the substitution of consumption of S by a higher consumption
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FN' >FS' FN' <FS'
(c*N,c*S)
cN=cS
FN' (XN)=FS' (XS)
A
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure 1.4: Effect of inequality aversion on sustainability with different tech-
nologies
in N, and we have cN(t) > cS(t) all along the path (including at equilibrium).
As substitutability of good S by good N is improved by a higher elasticity of
substitution for such consumption levels, a lower IA increases the level of the
sustainable utility.
On the contrary, for states such that F ′N(XN) > F ′S(XS), the effect of a higher
elasticity of substitution is ambiguous. The maximin path entails a higher con-
sumption of good S to build up the capital stock N, with possibly an initial sit-
uation with cN < cS, but eventually cN > cS as the economy gets closer to the
steady state. In this case, iso-value curves for the two levels of substitutability
are not tangent at a steady state but cross twice. When the state is far from the
optimal steady state (i.e., when stock S is large and stock N is small) substitu-
tion improves sustainability. When the two stocks are close to the steady state
(roughly speaking, if the state is north-east of the crossing point), a higher elas-
ticity of substitution implies reduced sustainability. The substitutability of good
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N by good S is improved by a higher elasticity only for cN < cS, and not all along
the maximin path. As a consequence, a higher steady state can be reached from
Point A in Fig. 1.4 when the elasticity is lower.
Even though this result may seem surprising, it is not unheard of in the max-
imin literature. The same type of ambiguous effect of substitutability on sus-
tainability occurs for substitutability in production in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow
model (Solow, 1974; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Martinet and Doyen, 2007).
Martinet (2012, pp. 145-6) shows that, for low capital stocks, a higher elasticity
between inputs reduces the level of utility that can be sustained from a given
state, whereas for larger capital stocks a higher elasticity increases sustainability.
The previous analysis examines the effect of the degree of (marginal) substi-
tutability on maximin value within the class of ‘moderate’ inequality aversion.
However, the literature has for a while been considering to polar cases: utilitar-
ianism, with a nil IA, and the intragenerational maximin, with an infinite IA. I
now examine the two limiting cases of the spectrum of substitutability of regional
consumptions.20
Utilitarianism. Consider the case in which the social planner is indifferent to
inequalities between consumptions in North and consumption in South. The
SWF is then assumed to be linear in the consumption of each good: W (cN ,cS) =
aNcN +aScS, aN = aS = 12 .
21
Just as in the neoclassical benchmark, interior optimal steady states have
equal marginal products
(
F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S )> 0
)
. Apart from these steady states,
maximin paths follow a dynamics in which the less productive resource (North)
is used up and the more productive resource (South) is built up. However, with
perfect substitutability, substitution in welfare is complete: the less productive
20Interestingly, these special cases are of interest of (classic) sustainability literature. Indeed in
the discounted-utility framework, the degree of substitutability between goods affects the social
discount rate and is central to the debate between proponents of weak and strong sustainability,
as discussed in Traeger (2011) and Drupp (2018). That debate is, however, more often presented
in terms of the limiting cases of perfect substitutability and perfect complementarity (Neumayer,
2013). Non-substitutability between manufactured and environmental goods may make sense
(Baumgärtner et al., 2006), especially in the very-long run (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2002).
21I keep aN and aS for generality. Illustrations and additional results are provided in the Ap-
pendices A.1 and A.4.
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stock is consumed exclusively, to let the more productive stock grow as fast as
possible. When the steady state is reached, the levels of consumption jump to
ci = Fi(X?i ), i = N,S.
Contrary to the benchmark neoclassical case, on the path toward the steady
state, the relative shadow-value is different from the marginal rate of substitution,
with µNµS >
aN
aS
. The equality µNµS =
aN
aS
holds only at a steady state. The more
productive resource is relatively more valued in maximin terms than in welfare
terms. The relative value used to account for investment is larger than the relative
welfare from consumption. The shadow-prices provide the signal for the more
productive resource to be conserved and its entire product to be invested along
the maximin path. The iso-value curves are convex to the origin in the state map
and do not have the same shape as the linear indifference curves.
Moreover, under utilitarianism, exhaustion of the resource stock with the
lower marginal product may be optimal (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). This
result is endogenous to the initial stocks. It occurs when the two marginal prod-
ucts can not be equalized, if the stock with the lower marginal product is still
relatively unproductive when it declines toward zero whereas the marginal prod-
uct of the other stock does not fall too much as it is built up. This result is in
striking contrast to the result of Quaas et al. (2013) in the discounted-utilitarian
framework, where exhaustion of the stock with the higher marginal product may
be optimal when resources are complements.22 This difference is due to the in-
equitable treatment of generations under discounting.
Intragenerational maximin. Let us now consider a case where the social plan-
ner is infinitively averse to inequalities between regions. No one substitution in
22Quaas et al. (2013) study a model with a manufactured good and two renewable natural
resources in the discounted-utilitarian framework. They investigate the resilience of this econ-
omy to a one-time shock. Solving the post-shock optimum, they show that when a stock is low
(and thus has a higher marginal product), building it up is optimal only if the two resources are
substitutable enough. The transition requires limiting the consumption of the more productive
stock to build it up. If the resources are substitutes, there is only a limited effect on utility. On
the other hand, if the resources are complements, building up the stock of the scarce resource
has a high utility cost. It may even be optimal to exhaust this stock if the discount rate is high.
However, Quaas et al. (2013) assume identical technologies. The discussion in this section has
shown that this is not an innocuous assumption for the study of the effects of substitutability on
sustainability.
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consumptions is tolerated.23 As the social planner focuses only on the worse-off
region, the SWF is of the form W (cN ,cS) = min{aNcN ,aScS} , aN = aS = 12 . In
this case, total, not marginal, products drive the solution. The maximin value
depends on the level of production that can be maintained in each region24 and is
given by m(XN ,XS) = min{aNFN(XN),aSFS(XS)}. The production in one region
limits sustainable welfare, reflecting the scarcity of the corresponding resource.
Complementarity among consumption goods implies the redundancy of a
stock whenever it produces more (in welfare terms) than the other. If stocks
are such that aiFi(Xi) > a jFj(X j), increasing stock i does not increase the max-
imin value, and this stock has a nil shadow-value. It is redundant, even if it
is below its production peak, and even if there is no production peak with the
technology. Only the capital of the limiting sector has a positive shadow-value
µ j = a jF ′j(X j).25 Maximin value m(XN ,XS) is still a non-decreasing function.26
It was stated in Subsection 1.2.2 that a lower IA (more substitutability) limits
stock redundancy due to SPT (as long as one of the region has a strictly positive
marginal product). On the contrary, whatever the type of technology (single-
peaked or not), an infinite IA (complementarity) induces redundancy. In the
world depicted by the proponents of strong sustainability (Neumayer, 2013), in
a maximin accounting system, only the limiting resource would have a positive
shadow-price. At the margin, increasing that resource increases the sustainable
welfare.
23An issue raised by environmentalists and ecologists is the possibility that some natural assets
may not have substitutes in well-being (Neumayer, 2013).
24In the case of SPT, a region may limit the long-run consumption. In that case, it is not the
current level of production that matters, but the level of production that can be sustained, i.e., the
current level of production Fi(Xi) if Xi < XGRi , or Fi
(
XGRi
)
if Xi ≥ XGRi .
25For the steady state satisfying aiFi(Xi) = a jFj(X j), both shadow-values are zero because
increasing one stock in isolation does not change the maximin value.
26There is an upper bound for the maximin value if one technology, say j, is single-peaked:
mGR = a jFj
(
XGRj
)
. Any state with this maximin value is characterized by stock redundancy,
with nil shadow-values.
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1.4 Accounting for changes in sustainability
The maximin path in this two-region economy was characterized. It can now
be used as a benchmark to assess the sustainability of current decisions, which
may not correspond to maximin decisions. From previous results, one can exam-
ine the consequences of consumption choices on the evolution of the sustainable
level of welfare, measured by the maximin value and its evolution. This exami-
nation provides insights for sustainability accounting for non-maximin paths.
Cairns and Martinet (2014) described the interplay among consumption, the
maximin value and changes in sustainability. Net investment at maximin shadow-
values is a measure of these changes. For any economic state, it is possible to
define the consumption levels resulting in a positive maximin investment and an
increasing of the level of welfare that can be sustained, i.e., sustainability im-
provement. I consider the neoclassical benchmark case of subsection 1.2.1 in the
following discussion.27
For a given economic state (XN ,XS), denote by (c?N ,c
?
S) the maximin con-
sumption levels. These decisions, which satisfy W (c?N ,c
?
S) = m(XN ,XS), can be
used as a reference point. To do so, consider the indifference curve W (cN ,cS) =
m(XN ,XS). At (c?N ,c
?
S), one has
WcN
WcS
= µNµS (eq. 1.16). From the definition of net
investment (eq. 1.4), let us derive the condition for non-negative net investment,
for given levels of the stocks and shadow-values:
m˙ = µN [FN(XN)− cN ]+µS[FS(XS)− cS]≥ 0
⇔ cS ≤ µNµS [FN(XN)− cN ]+FS(XS) .
When m˙ = 0, there is a linear relationship between cN and cS.
Fig. 1.5 depicts the possible consumption decisions along with their conse-
quences for changes in sustainability. In the consumption map, the line m˙ = 0 is
tangent to the indifference curve W (cN ,cS) = m(XN ,XS) at (c?N ,c
?
S). Three areas
of interest are defined by the two curves.
Area 1 corresponds to consumption decisions with a sustainable welfare
27A similar analysis can be performed for the cases of utilitarianism and intragenerational
maximin. The corresponding figures are provided in the Appendix A.2.
57
CHAPTER 1. SUSTAINING WELFARE WHEN INTRATEMPORAL
INEQUALITIES MATTER
cS⋆(XN,XS)
cN⋆ (XN,XS)
3
3
2
1
-μN/μS
m > 0
m < 0
U < mU > m
U(cN,cS) = m(XN,XS)
m(XN,XS,cN,cS)|(XN,XS) = 0
(XN,XS)
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure 1.5: Welfare, maximin and sustainability improvement
W (cN ,cS)< m(XN ,XS) and positive net maximin investment, i.e., to sustainabil-
ity improvement. Area 2 corresponds to decisions with a unsustainable wel-
fare W (cN ,cS)> m(XN ,XS), implying sustainability decline (m˙ < 0). In the two
parts of Area 3, consumption decisions induce a sustainability decline in spite of
the fact that welfare is lower than the maximin value. With different decisions,
the same welfare could have been compatible with sustainability improvement.
These areas illustrate how reducing welfare below the maximin level improves
sustainability only if there is an investment that increases the maximin value.
Changes in sustainability can be measured by net maximin investment along
any path. Therefore, maximin shadow-values can be used as sustainability ac-
counting prices. Basing an accounting system on shadow-values requires that
these values be well defined and computable. The present analysis stresses that,
as for any optimization problem, finding shadow-values is a challenging task.
The task for a maximin problem, however, is likely no more difficult than for
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other objectives.28 The challenge can be met with proper numerical tools. Given
the theoretical characterization of the maximin solution in this paper, and given
the recursive structure of the maximin objective, a Bellman algorithm could be
used to compute approximate maximin values and shadow-values. Because there
are strong links between maximin and viability (Doyen and Martinet, 2012), the
numerical tools for set-valued analysis could also be used to find maximin values
and shadow-prices.
We have found that substitutability in utility is important for the properties
of the maximin solution and accounting values, as is substitutability in produc-
tion (Solow, 1974; Hartwick, 1977; Mitra et al., 2013). One task is to estimate
the substitutability among the different goods in the economy. For some sectors
(manufactured goods and services), substitutability at the margin is a reasonable
assumption and the elasticities of substitution estimated in the macroeconomic
literature can provide a starting point. For environmental resources, the task is
harder. Drupp (2018) surveys the empirical estimates of the substitutability be-
tween manufactured goods and ecosystem services. He relates this substitutabil-
ity to the income elasticity of the willingness-to-pay for environmental goods,
and emphasizes the variability of the substitutability parameter. Most studies
find a relatively high substitutability. However, the degree of substitutability may
change as the environment becomes scarcer (Baumgärtner et al., 2017; Drupp,
2018). At some point, or for some resources or ecosystem services, substitution
may not be possible. In an extreme case of complementarity, our results imply
that only limiting resources have a maximin shadow-value, and improving sus-
tainability requires building up these particular stocks, possibly environmental
resources, at the cost of reducing current utility below the maximin level.
Last, when all technologies are single-peaked, stock redundancy may occur.
In that case, all maximin shadow-values are zero. Society is faced with surplus
stocks (from the maximin point of view) and sustainability accounting is trivial.
28The fishery problem is quite difficult to solve in the discounted utilitarian framework, and
is comparatively simpler in a maximin setting. The Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model was solved
immediately for a maximin problem (Solow, 1974), but not until much later for a discounted-
utilitarian problem (Benchekroun and Withagen, 2011).
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1.5 Conclusion
Considering heterogeneous assets, one renewable resource in North and one
in South here, allowed to give insights both for sustainability accounting pur-
poses and for intragenerational inequality considerations. Indeed, sustaining
welfare is the very objective of a maximin problem. Even if maximin is not
chosen as a social objective and society does not aim at following a maximin
path from its current stage of development, the maximin value is an indicator of
the highest welfare level that could be sustained given current economic and en-
vironmental endowments (Cairns and Martinet, 2014; Fleurbaey, 2015a). Max-
imin shadow-values can be used along any trajectory to compute maximin net
investment, a particular genuine savings indicator which measures the evolution
of the capacity of the economy to sustain welfare. These shadow-values have to
be derived from the resolution of the maximin problem.
Maximin has been applied to only a handful of problems. In Cairns et al.
(2016), we have characterized the maximin solution for an additional class of
problems, corresponding to economies with two separate resources. In this chap-
ter, I restated this problem in my dissertation formulation, in which each resource
is available in a distinct region of which consumptions enter in a social welfare
function. Maximin calls for a dynamic investment pattern that outperforms the
static option of maintaining current productive stocks. Whenever a resource in
a region renews itself more at the margin than the other, positive investment in
this region would be made possible through substitution in consumption and a
decline of the less productive capital stock, according to Hartwick’s rule of nil
net investment (Hartwick, 1977; Dixit et al., 1980; Solow, 1993). The maximin
path ultimately leads to some optimal steady state, however, which depends on
the initial state of the economy and its maximin value. In the limiting case of nil
inequality aversion (utilitarianism), a less productive stock can be exhausted.
Maximin has been criticized as a social objective at possibly maintaining a
poor economy in poverty. If growing out of poverty is pursued, it must be within
sustainable limits. Computing the evolution of the maximin value informs us on
the effect of current consumption and investment decisions on the level of sus-
tainable welfare. This accounting has to be done with maximin shadow-values.
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The degree of inequality aversion between the regions influences the relative
shadow-values of the stocks and thus the value of the investments. In the limiting
case of infinite inequality aversion, only the limiting capital stock, possibly an
environmental asset in a poor region, has a positive accounting price for sustain-
ability. Investment in this region is required to improve sustainability and make
growth possible. In the presence of a single-peaked technology (e.g. a logistic
growth of a renewable resource), if the other technology is everywhere produc-
tive at the margin (e.g. a manufactured capital), both asset stocks have positive
accounting prices. If all technologies are single-peaked, capital stocks may be
redundant, and accounting prices for sustainability nil. In all cases, maximin ac-
counting prices are well-defined and provide the relevant information about the
relative marginal values of different stocks for net investment in the capacity to
sustain welfare.
Concerning the intragenerational inequalities, four messages may be retained.
Consider the South is endowed with a relatively less abundant resource than the
North, and has then a relatively more marginally productive stock. Firstly, out of
the steady state, a maximin policy leads North to consume more than its natural
renewal (to deplete the stock and make its stock productivity increase) and South
to consume less than its natural renewal (to make its stock level increase). In-
equalities increase in the short-term but decrease over time to reach an equality
of marginal renewals, except if there is an infinite inequality aversion (third point
below). Secondly, a less averse economy is likely to reach a higher sustainable
level of welfare. The intuition is that one can take more advantages of disparities
between regions to make consumption-investment trade-offs more ‘efficient’.
Conversely, a more inequality aversion limits ‘sustainability’. Thirdly, the two
special cases - infinite and nil intragenerational inequality aversion - highlight
the previous result by exacerbating the mechanisms. Utilitarianism, with a nil
inequality aversion, indicates to North to increase its consumption while South
shall consume nothing. At the opposite, the intratemporal maximin, with an infi-
nite inequality aversion, allows no substitution between regional consumptions,
then the lower regional (absolute) renewal, in South, ‘constraints’ the intergener-
ational welfare at its current level. Fourthly, deviations from the maximin policy
were studied. It has been showed that reducing consumptions is not enough,
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such sacrifices have to be properly coordinated according to shadow-prices of
resources.
At this stage, two questions remain unanswered. If an economy is endowed
with low resource stocks, maximin may stick it at a low welfare level. If growth
comes at the price of reducing consumptions, how do they have to be made
between North and South? Besides, it has been showed that sustaining welfare
asks a larger sacrifice to South compared to North. Naturally, this calls for imple-
menting transfers in oder to improve the general capacity to produce economic
well-being. Theses question are addressed respectively by the next and by the
last chapters. Chapter 2 will endorse the well-known critics – acknowledged by
Solow (1974) himself – against maximin: if initial stocks are low, it perpetuates
‘poverty’. Growth is then analyzed is a similar model. Chapter 3 will tackle the
issue of transfers from North to South, which are ignored in the first two chap-
ters. Chapters 2 and 3 will echo arguments stated by Rawls (1971, p. 286). “If
for theoretical purposes one thinks of the ideal society as one whose economy is
in a steady state of growth (possibly zero), and which is at the same time just,
then the savings problem is to choose a principle for sharing the burdens of get-
ting to that growth path (or to such a path if there is more than one), and of
maintaining the justice of the necessary arrangements once this is achieved”.
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A.1 Illustrations for the limiting cases
A.1.1 Illustration: Utilitarianism
Let W (cN ,cS) = aNcN +aScS. A full mathematical treatment, which is quite
similar to that of the neoclassical benchmark, is provided in the Appendix A.4.
F'N(XN)>F'S(XS)
F'N(XN)<F'S(XS)cS(2)
cN(2)
cN
cS
cN(1)
cS(1) XS
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure A.6: Utilitarianism: Nil inequality aversion
In this case, the iso-value curves are convex to the origin in the plane (XN ,XS),
with − dXSdXN =
µN
µS ≥
aN
aS
. Exhaustion of the less productive stock may be optimal.
Let F ′i (0)>F ′j(0), and denote by X i > 0 the stock level such that F ′i (X i) =F ′j(0).
A maximin path starting from any state (Xi,X j) such that F ′i (Xi) > F ′j(X j) and
m(Xi,X j)≤ aiFi(X i) exhausts asset X j. At exhaustion, the steady state must sat-
isfy F ′i (X?i ) ≥ F ′j(0). The results for this case are illustrated in Fig. A.6, with
a renewable natural resource with logistic growth (FN(XN) = rXN(1−XN)) and
an AK technology (FS(XS) = AXS). In the Appendix A.5, I provide a full res-
olution of this case, computing an explicit solution for the maximin value and
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shadow-values.
The interpretation is the same as that of Fig. 1.1, except that one has cor-
ner solutions for the consumption. A path exhausting resource XS illustrates
Lemma 4, which is formulated in the Appendix A.1.1.
A.1.2 Illustration: Intragenerational maximin
Let W (cN ,cS) = min{aNcN ,aScS}, whith aN = aS = 12 .
redundant part of stock XN{
aNFN(XN)
X♯N(XS(0))
(XN(0),XS(0))
U(cN,cS)=m
M
X*NcS
FN(XN)
aNFN(X*N)
aSYS
XSGR
XNGR
cN
FS(XS)
XS
XN
Figure A.7: Intragenerational maximin: Infinite inequality aversion
The results for this case are illustrated in Fig. A.7, for two SPTs with
aNFN
(
XGRN
)
> aSFS
(
XGRS
)
. The curve 0M, from (0,0) to
(
X?N ,X
GR
S
)
where
X?N = aS/aNFS(X
GR
S ), represents the states for which aNFN(XN) = aSFS(XS). For
these states, both resources limit utility and there is no redundancy of one of
the stocks, but the shadow-values are zero. The maximin solution is to stay
at the steady state (XN ,XS). The corresponding maximin value is given by
W (cN ,cS) = aNFN(XN) = aSFS(XS). It increases along 0M, from 0 at (0,0) to
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mGR = m(X?N ,X
GR
S ). Shadow values of the stocks are zero on 0M but off the line
0M one shadow-value is positive and the other zero. For states east of the curve
0M, resource S is limiting. Its shadow-value is positive. A part of stock XN is
redundant and maximin value is given by the point on the curve directly west.
Stock XS has a positive marginal maximin value. For states south of the curve, re-
source N is limiting, with a similar interpretation. Iso-value curves are given by
perpendicular lines starting from any state on 0M. The hatched area south-east of
point M =
(
X?N ,X
GR
S
)
corresponds to states in which both stocks are redundant.
From such states, one can temporarily increase the utility above the maximin
value, along a non-regular maximin path. Both stocks’ shadow-values are nil.
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A.2 Sustainability improvement: Graphical illus-
trations for the limiting cases
cS*(XN,XS)
cN* (XN,XS)=0
32
1
-μN/μS
m > 0
m < 0
U < m
U > m
U(cN,cS) = m(XN,XS)
m(XN,XS,cN,cS)|(XN,XS) = 0
(XN,XS)
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
(a) Utilitarianism
cS*(XN,XS)
cN* (XN,XS)
3
2
1
m > 0m < 0
U < m
U > m
U(cN,cS) = m(XN,XS)
m(X1,X2,cN,cS)|(XN,XS) = 0
(XN,XS)
cS
cN
FN(XN)
FS(XS)
XS
XN
(b) Intragenerational maximin
Figure A.8: Welfare, maximin and changes in sustainability for the limiting cases
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A.3 Stability of the steady state
Let me sum up the necessary conditions into three main equations to get the
following dynamic system, with pi ≡ µNµS ;
X˙N = FN(XN)− cN ;
X˙S = FS(XS)− cS ;
p˙i = pi
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
.
(A.27)
Steady states are characterized by
c?N = FN(X
?
N) ;
c?S = FS(X
?
S ) ;
F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S ) .
(A.28)
Consider the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system, evaluated at the steady
states29
J? =
 F
′
N(X
?
N) 0 −∂cN(pi)∂pi
0 F ′N(X?N) −∂cS(pi)∂pi
−piF ′′N (X?N) piF ′′S (X?S ) 0
 (A.29)
Let us compute the roots of the characteristic polynomialP(λ ) = det(J?−
λ I3): ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
F ′N(X?N)−λ 0 −∂cN(pi)∂pi
0 F ′N(X?N)−λ −∂cS(pi)∂pi
−piF ′′N (X?N) piF ′′S (X?S ) −λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣= 0
⇔ (F ′N−λ)
∣∣∣∣∣F ′N−λ −∂cS(pi)∂pipiF ′′S −λ
∣∣∣∣∣−piF ′′N
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 −∂cN(pi)∂piF ′N−λ −∂cS(pi)∂pi
∣∣∣∣∣= 0
⇔ (F ′N−λ)(−(F ′N−λ)λ +piF ′′S ∂cS∂pi
)
−piF ′′N
(
F ′N−λ
) ∂cN
∂pi
= 0
⇔ (F ′N−λ)(−(F ′N−λ)λ −pi ∂cN∂pi F ′′N +pi ∂cS∂pi F ′′S
)
= 0 . (A.30)
The first eigenvalue is λN = F ′N . Also, due to the strict convexity of indifference
29We use the equality F ′N(X?N) = F ′S(X
?
S ) and express the Jacobian with respect to F
′
N(X
?
N) only.
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curves (recall that at the optimum, pi = WciWc j ), let αN ≡−
∂cN
∂pi > 0 and αS ≡ ∂cS∂pi >
0. Let Γ ≡ −pi (αNF ′′N +αSF ′′S ) > 0. We can reduce eq. (A.30) to λ 2−F ′Nλ −
Γ = 0. Eigenvalues are then λN = F ′N > 0, λS =
F ′N−
√
(F ′N)2+4Γ
2 < 0, and λ3 =
F ′N+
√
(F ′N)2+4Γ
2 > 0.
30 The steady state is a saddle-point.
A.4 Utilitarianism: Mathematical details and proofs
Consider the case W (cN ,cS) = aNcN+aScS. The Lagrangean associated with
the maximin problem is linear in the decisions, which implies corner solutions
for the controls.
L (X ,c,µ,W˜ GR,ω)= µN (FN(XN)− cN)+µS (FS(XS)− cS)+ω
(
aNcN +aScS−W˜ GR
)
.
(A.31)
By Lemma 1, cN = cS = 0 cannot be solution of the problem. The necessary
conditions (1.7) are, for i = N,S;
∂L
∂ci
=−µi+aiω ≤ 0 , ci ≥ 0 , ci∂L∂ci = 0 . (A.32)
The other conditions are unchanged. The complementary slackness conditions
are
ω ≥ 0 , (aNcN +aScS−u)≥ 0 , ω (aNcN +aScS−u) = 0 .
From conditions (1.8), we get for i = N,S
−∂L
∂Xi
=−µiF ′i (Xi) = µ˙i, ⇔
µ˙i
µi
=−F ′i (Xi) . (A.33)
For a regular path, (µN ,µS,ω) 6=(0,0,0),ω > 0 and thus W (cN ,cS)=m(XN ,XS).
Suppose that both consumption levels are strictly positive, i.e., ci > 0, i = N,S.
Eq (A.32) then implies that ∂L∂ci = 0 and thus that ω =
µN
aN
= µSaS . Taking the time
derivative of ω , one gets ω˙ω =
µ˙N
µN =
µ˙S
µS . Moreover, from eq. (A.33), one gets the
conditions µ˙iµi = −F ′i (Xi), i = N,S. Combining these conditions, I can state that
an internal solution, with cN > 0 and cS > 0 is possible only for states (XN ,XS)
30Note that strict concavity of production functions rule out nil eigenvalues.
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such that F ′N(XN) = F ′S(XS). This is dynamically possible only for a steady state,
with cN = FN(X?N) and cS = FS(X
?
S ).
Apart from a steady state, the dynamics is as follows.
Lemma 3 (Utilitarianism: Transition path). In an economy with a nil inequal-
ity aversion between two regions producing each one a reproducible asset, for
any state such that F ′i (Xi) > F ′j(X j), the constant consumption path with c j =
m(XN ,XS)
a j
> Fj(X j) and ci = 0 is an optimal maximin path. Stock X j decreases
while stock Xi increases.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a state (Xi,X j)>> (0,0) such that F ′i (Xi)> F ′j(X j)
and F ′i (Xi) > 0. This last condition ensures that the more productive resource
is below its production peak XGRi .
31 I demonstrate that, under these conditions,
stock X j is consumed alone while stock Xi builds up as long as the previous
inequality holds by proving that the opposite is not possible.
Assume that ci > 0 and c j = 0. Let us denote the maximin value by m.
Along such a maximin path, one would have W (cN ,cS) = aici = m, which is
constant. Therefore, ci would is. By Lemmata 1 and 2, ci > Fi(Xi). Therefore,
dXi
dt = Fi(Xi)− ci < 0. Also, d
2Xi
(dt)2
= F ′i (Xi)
dXi
dt − dcidt = F ′i (Xi)dXidt < 0. Therefore,
stock Xi is exhausted in finite time (τ). After that time, utility is derived only from
the sustained consumption of stock X j. At time τ , stock X j would have increased
to some level X?j ≡ X j(τ) such that Fj(X?j ) = m/a j, allowing consumption c j to
sustain exactly the maximin utility. The steady state is (0,X?j ).
Let me make a step backward and examine the states through which the path
goes just prior to exhaustion. The dynamics before exhaustion is
X˙i = Fi(Xi)− ci ⇔ dXi = (Fi(Xi)−m/ai)dt ,
X˙ j = Fj(X j) ⇔ dX j = Fj(X j)dt .
Consider an infinitesimal time lapse dt. At time τ − dt, stock Xi is equal to
X˜i = dXi = mai dt. Stock X j is equal to X˜ j = X
?
j −dX j = X?j − ma j dt.
31If both marginal products are negative, both stocks are above their golden-rule value XGR
and one is in a non-regular case in which the two stocks decrease and converge to a steady state
at
(
XGRi ,X
GR
j
)
. Lemma 3 is relevant only if one stock is below its golden-rule level.
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By Lemma 1, we know that the maximin value at time τ−dt is greater than
or equal to the equilibrium utility of state (X˜i, X˜ j). Let us denote this utility level
by W˜ =W
(
X˜i, X˜ j
)
= aiFi(mai dt)+a jFj(X
?
j − ma j dt). We have m(τ−dt)≥ W˜ . By
subtracting m(τ) from both sides of the equation, we obtain the following.
m(τ−dt)−m(τ) ≥ W˜ −m(τ) ;
≥ aiFi
(
m
ai
dt
)
+a jFj
(
X?j −
m
a j
dt
)
−a jFj(X?j ) ;
≥ ai
(
Fi
(
0+
m
ai
dt
)
−Fi(0)
)
+a j
(
Fj
(
X?j −
m
a j
dt
)
−Fj(X?j )
)
;
≥ mdt
Fi
(
0+ mai dt
)
−Fi(0)
m
ai
dt
−mdt
Fj
(
X?j − ma j dt
)
−Fj(X?j )
− ma j dt
.
Let us write εi = mai dt and ε j =− ma j dt, as well as τ˜ = τ−dt (and thus τ = τ˜+dt).
We get
m(τ˜)−m(τ˜+dt) ≥ mdt Fi(0+ εi)−Fi(0)
εi
−mdt Fj(X
?
j + ε j)−Fj(X?j )
ε j
;
⇔ 1m
(
m(τ˜+dt)−m(τ˜)
dt
)
≤ Fj(X
?
j + ε j)−Fj(X?j )
ε j
− Fi(0+ εi)−Fi(0)
εi
.
By taking the limits εi,ε j,dt→ 0, we obtain
m˙
m
≤ F ′j −F ′i < 0 .
As the maximin value cannot decrease along a maximin path, we get a contra-
diction. We thus can say that if F ′i (Xi)> F ′j(X j), ci = 0 and c j > 0.
By regularity, m =W (cN ,cS) = aNcN +aScS. Thus, c j =
m(XN ,XS)
a j
.
Exhaustion of the less productive stock may be optimal. Let F ′i (0) > F ′j(0),
and denote by X i > 0 the stock level such that F ′i (X i) = F ′j(0).
Lemma 4 (Intragenerational maximin: Optimal exhaustion). In an economy
with an infinite inequality aversion between two regions producing each one a
reproducible asset, a maximin path starting from any state (Xi,X j) such that
F ′i (Xi)> F ′j(X j) and m(Xi,X j)≤ aiFi(X i) exhausts asset X j.
70
CHAPTER 1. SUSTAINING WELFARE WHEN INTRATEMPORAL
INEQUALITIES MATTER
Proof of Lemma 4. According to Lemma 3, if F ′i (Xi) > F ′j(X j), ci = 0 and c j =
m
a j
. Assume that there is a steady state such that W (·) = m ≤ aiFi(X i), then
this steady state must satisfy X?j = 0 and X
?
i ≤ X i. Otherwise, it would satisfy
F ′i (Xi) = F ′j(X j) and we would have W ≥ aiFi(X i). Given that Xi ≤ X i, we have
F ′i (Xi)> F ′j(X j) and we exhaust X j.
From the necessary conditions, one has ω = µ ja j and
ω˙
ω =
µ˙ j
µ j =−F ′j(X j). One
also has −µi + aiω ≤ 0⇔ µi ≥ aia j µ j ⇔
µi
µ j ≥
ai
a j
. Given that µi = mXi and ai =
Wci, i = N,S, one gets that the marginal rate of transformation of maximin value
is greater than the marginal rate of substitution of consumption.
Let me examine how this relative price evolves over time, recall pi ≡ µiµ j .
Given conditions (A.33), I obtain
p˙i
pi
=
µ˙i
µi
− µ˙ j
µ j
=−F ′i (Xi)+F ′j(X j)< 0 . (A.34)
The relative price of stock j rises. Since one harvests only the stock j, F ′j(X j)
increases and F ′i (Xi) decreases until the marginal levels of growth are equal.32
In other words, if one begins with a resource relatively abundant and with a low
relative (shadow) price, one has to harvest only that resource at a level that keeps
utility constant. Meanwhile the other one grows until the steady state at which
both resources have the same marginal product.
Lemma 5 (Utilitarianism: Iso-value curves). The iso-value curves are convex to
the origin in the plane (XN ,XS), with − dXSdXN =
µN
µS ≥
aN
aS
.
Proof of Lemma 5. From condition (1.26), the optimal path is characterized by
− dXS
dXN
=
µN
µS
, (A.35)
but contrary to the general case, here the SWF and the maximin value do not
have the same shape.
32One cannot pass from µiµ j >
ai
a j
to µiµ j <
ai
a j
since the equality is a steady state of the system.
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A.5 An example: Utilitarianism with AK-technology
and a renewable resource
I provide an example which illustrates the results of the utilitarianism case,
with an explicit solution for the maximin value and shadow-values in a simple
economic model with a renewable natural resource with logistic growth (FN(XN)=
rXN(1−XN)) and an AK technology (FS(XS) = AXS). The respective dynam-
ics are X˙N = rXN (1−XN)− cN and X˙S = AXS− cS, with A,r > 0. Welfare is
W (cN ,cS) = aNcN +aScS.
I assume that r > A, so that low resource stocks are more productive than the
manufactured capital stock, and the natural resource is not exhausted. I give the
maximin value for states (XN ,XS) satisfying F ′N(XN)≥ F ′S(XS), i.e., for XN(0)≤
XN ≡ 12
(
1− Ar
)
> 0.
Along the maximin path, the capital stock XS is consumed to let the natural
resource XN grow (recovery). For paths that do not exhaust the manufactured
capital stock, i.e, trajectories reaching a steady state with X?S > 0 and X
?
N =
XN , the maximin value function is given by m(XN ,XS) = aNΩ
(
1
XN
−1
)−Ar
+
aSAXS, with Ω= r4
(
1+ Ar
)1+Ar (1− Ar )1−Ar . Associated shadow-prices are µN =
aN ArΩ(1−XN)−1−
A
r X
−1+Ar
N and µS = aSA.
For states (XN ,XS) such that m(XN ,XS) ≤ aNFN(XN), maximin paths ex-
haust the manufactured capital stock and the maximin value function is implicitly
given by m =
aNr
(
1− aSAXSm
) r
A
(
1
XN
−1
)
(
1+
(
1− aSAXSm
) r
A
(
1
XN
−1
))2 .
The mathematical details are as follows.
I have a linear social welfare function W (cN ,cS) = aNcN +aScS, a renewable
resource with the renewal FN(XN) = rXN(1−XN)), and a manufactured capital
with the production function FS(XS) = AXS. The steady state condition for a
non-exhaustion, F ′i = F ′j , is XN =
1
2
(
1− Ar
)
. I note Xi(0) = Xi0, i = N,S.
I have two types of paths, according to the steady states characterized by:
1. X?S > 0,X
?
N = XN ;
2. X?S = 0,X
?
N ≤ XN (manufactured capital is exhausted).
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A.5.1 Case 1
Let m be the maximin value. I know that in such a case; cN = 0 and cS = maS ,
i.e. X˙N = rXN (1−XN) and X˙S = AXS − maS . It may be checked that the so-
lution of theses equations is of the form XN(t) = X10X10+e−rt(1−X10) and XS(t) =(
X20− maSA
)
eAt + maSA .
From XN , one may obtain the inverse function t? = −1r ln
(
1−XN
XN
X10
1−X10
)
and
compute it at the steady state: t? =−1r ln
(
1+Ar
(1−Ar )
(
1
X10
−1
)
)
, which may serve to
compute X?S = XS(t
?) as
X?S =
(
X20− maSA
) 1+ Ar(
1− Ar
)( 1
X10
−1
)
−Ar + m
aSA
. (A.36)
Besides, at the steady state, one has c?N =FN(X
?
N)= r
1
2
(
1− Ar
)(
1− 12
(
1− Ar
))
=
r
4
(
1− A2r2
)
. Then, one may compute the maximin value at the steady state
m? = aNc?N +aSc
?
S = aN
r
4
(
1− A
2
r2
)
+aSAX?S . (A.37)
I substitute (A.36) into (A.37) to get the maximin value function
m(X10,X20)= aNΩ
(
1
X10
−1
)−Ar
+aSAX20 , with Ω=
r
4
(
1+
A
r
)1+Ar (
1− A
r
)1−Ar
.
Knowing that shadow-prices are partial derivatives of the maximin value
function, I have
µN =
∂m(X10,X20)
∂X10
= aN
A
r
Ω(1−X10)−1−
A
r X
−1+Ar
10 ;
µS =
∂m(X10,X20)
∂X20
= aSA .
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A.5.2 Case 2
I want to find paths that end up with X?S = 0.
X?S = 0 ⇔
(
X20− maSA
)
eAt
?
+
m
aSA
= 0 ⇒ t? = 1
A
ln
(
m
m−aSAX20
)
.
The corresponding resource stock is
X?N =
X10
X10+ e
− rA ln
(
m
m−aSAX20
)
(1−X10)
⇔ X?N =
1
1+
(
1− aSAX20m
) r
A
(
1
X10
−1
) .
Besides, I have m = aNFN(X?N), which becomes
m = aNr
1
1+
(
1− aSAX20m
) r
A
(
1
X10
−1
)
1− 1
1+
(
1− aSAX20m
) r
A
(
1
X10
−1
)
 ;
⇔ m =
aNr
(
1− aSAX20m
) r
A
(
1
X10
−1
)
(
1+
(
1− aSAX20m
) r
A
(
1
X10
−1
))2 .
Even in this simple framework, if the manufactured capital is exhausted, max-
imin value function and associated shadow-prices are hard to find.
Fig. A.6 in the Appendix plots a non-exhaustion case (1) and an exhaustion
one (2).33
33The dashed lines represent consumption paths, denoted by exponents (1) and (2).
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Chapter 2
Distributional considerations
during growth toward the golden
rule
Abstract
In a productive economy, savings made by a generation are expected to ben-
efit more than proportionally to future generations. But how such a sacrifice for
growth should be shared among heterogeneous regions? The unequal ‘burden-
sharing’ between North and South depicted in the previous chapter is less signif-
icant, but still present, when the economy grows toward the highest sustainable
level of welfare. Here, contrary to the previous chapter, the intragenerational
inequality aversion does not impact the final steady state. But the intra and in-
tergenerational inequality aversions do impact the dynamic. In particular, the
higher the inequality aversions, the more North and South share an equal burden
to grow. This chapter leads to the same conclusion than the previous one: trans-
fers from North to South shall be implemented for a sustainable development.
This will be addressed in the last chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
Growth rather than decline is surely an unanimous criterion of economic de-
velopment. At least as long as this process is sustainable. But for making a
production (then implicitly an asset) to grow, we shall not consume our entire
income, i.e. “the amount which [people] can consume without impoverishing
themselves” (Hicks, 1939/1946, p. 172).1 For a natural resource, we shall not
harvest the entire renewal. In a word, we need savings. In an intergenerational
perspective, as conceived by Ramsey (1928), this can be viewed as a sacrifice of
the current generation to the benefit of future ones. But how should this sacrifice
be shared among individuals living in the same generation? Growth theory al-
ready answered this question for an aggregate capital and a representative agent
through the optimal savings timing. But the question of sharing sacrifice comes
to interest once there is an heterogeneity. As argued by Schelling (1995): “it is
this willingness to model all humankind as a single agent that makes optimiza-
tion models attractive, feasible, and inappropriate”.
The one-sector Solow-Swan (1956) neoclassical growth model was extended
to the two-sector case by Uzawa (1961, 1963), but the savings rate is considered
as exogenous. The Ramsey model of optimal saving was extended to the mul-
tiple goods-sectors case by Samuelson and Solow (1956). But their approach
was not very much followed in the literature. A notable exception that does not
collapse to the single sector case was provided by Pitchford (1977). But the
two sectors, each in one region of the economy, produce one single good, which
does not allow to consider inequality in consumptions. Rather, two-sector econ-
omy was mainly analyzed through the discounted version of the Ramsey model
(Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) (RCK hereafter). This was the
case to deal with, for instance, physical capital and exhaustible resources (Das-
gupta and Heal, 1974) or physical and human capital (Lucas, 1988).2 On the
1Hicksian income refers more precisely to “the maximum value which [a man] can consume
during a week, and still expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was at the beginning.
Thus, when a person saves, he plans to be better off in the future; when he lives beyond his
income, he plans to be worse off ” (p. 172). This idea can be tracked back to Fisher (1906) and
Lindahl (1933) (cited in Heal, 1998, p. 156).
2In a sense, a two-sector RCK model was earlier proposed by Srinivasan (1964) and Uzawa
(1964), but in an non-utilitarian approach.
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other hand, heterogeneity of agents was analyzed both in the Solow-Swan model
(Stiglitz, 1969) and in the RCK model, through different individual discount
rates (Ramsey, 1928; Becker, 1980; Becker and Foias, 1987) or through differ-
ent initial endowments of wealth (Chatterjee, 1994; Caselli and Ventura, 2000)3.
Heterogeneity of both sectors and agents in the RCK model was proposed by
Becker and Tsyganov (2002), but there are one capital good and one production
good that can be aggregated into one single production. Endress et al. (2014)
combined intergenerational equity with individual impatience in an overlapping
generations model, but without referring to inequality aversion.
More broadly, both intra and intergenerational considerations of sharing re-
sources can be found in the growth-inequality literature. Even if trends of long-
term economic development and allocation of wealth was analyzed by the clas-
sical economists in the Nineteenth century, it was first extensively analyzed with
use of data by Kuznets (Kuznets and Jenks, 1953; Kuznets, 1955). According
to him, inequalities rise, then decrease, in the process of development. This
topic was further analyzed by Atkinson and Harrison (1978), and current works
refute the Kuznets hypothesis (e.g. Piketty, 2015). For a review of the growth-
inequality relationship see Aghion et al. (1999) and Garcìa-Peñalosa (2017).
Though linked, the question here is different in the sense that I am interested
in linking ethical judgments with outcomes of the allocation, both between indi-
viduals living at the same time and between different generation living, by defi-
nition, at different dates. This is the so-called intra and intergenerational equity
relationship (Isaac and Piacquadio, 2015, Kverndokk et al., 2014, and the refer-
ences in there). Equity can be taken as a requirement of equal treatment. Here,
all individuals (and all generations between them) will have the same weight in
the public decision4.
On the intergenerational dimension, the intertemporal social welfare criterion
has to satisfy finite anonymity: a finite number of permutations in the time of ap-
pearance of two generations shall not change the result. This is supported by a
3See also Garcìa-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2012) and the references in there.
4There is not a unique accepted definition of the word ‘equity’. Our requirement here is in
line with a dictionary definition: “equity is the quality of being fair and reasonable in a way
that gives equal treatment to everyone.” (source: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/
dictionary/english/equity, visited on May 2018).
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long tradition in economics and philosophy against discounting future welfares.
For Sidgwick (1874/1962, p. 414) “the time at which a man exists cannot affect
the value of his happiness from a universal point of view”. Ramsey (1928, p. 543)
qualified discounting as “a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises
merely from the weakness of the imagination”. Pigou (1920, p. 25) argued that
“our telescopic faculty is defective”, and suggested that “the State should protect
the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our irrational dis-
counting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants (Pigou, 1932,
p. 29). For Harrod (1948, p. 40), the pure time preference is a “polite expression
for rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion”. For Rawls (1971, p. 287),
“from a moral point of view there are no grounds for discounting future well-
being on the basis of pure time preference”. Finally, according to Solow (1993,
p. 165) “no generation ‘should’ be favored over any other”. But as shown by
Koopmans (1960), if a (social) criterion of infinite utility stream satisfies some5
a priori desirable axioms, it has to exhibit ‘impatience’, i.e. discounting. Fol-
lowing his approach, Diamond (1965) stated a classic impossibility result: such a
criterion cannot both be efficient (strong Pareto) and treat all generations equally.
For a critical survey of related results see Asheim (2010). The Ramsey (1928)
approach satisfies both ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ but is incomplete.
The intragenerational equity can be understood in several ways, see for ex-
ample Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). But, far from reaching exhaustiveness,
a symmetric social welfare function à la Bergson (1938)-Samuelson (1947) can
represent different equity views of a society.
Here I study savings – understood as the difference between the sustainable
individual maximal consumption and the actual consumption – made by dif-
ferent individuals when society wishes to reach the highest sustainable social
well-being: the golden rule (Ayong Le Kama, 2001). This may be interpreted as
‘generosity’ toward future possible attainable welfare (Gerlagh, 2017). I model
two regions, North and South, each one has access to a different resource stock,
in the spirit of Samuelson and Solow (1956). The intratemporal social prefer-
ences are represented through a social welfare function (SWF) with a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES). The parameter of elasticity may be interpreted
5See the introduction of the dissertation.
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as a parameter of inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970). Indeed, such a function
encompasses two famous special cases: utilitarianism (elasticity goes to infin-
ity) and the symmetric minimum, sometimes called “Rawlsian” (elasticity goes
to zero). Symmetrically, the intertemporal social preferences are represented
through an intertemporal SWF with a constant intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution (CIES). More precisely, I minimize the difference between the welfare
targeted and the actual welfare, in the spirit of Ramsey (1928). Here also, the
parameter of intertemporal elasticity may be interpreted as a parameter of in-
tertemporal inequality aversion (IA). As in its instantaneous counterpart, such
a function can tend to a nil IA case (elasticity goes to infinity) or to an infinite
IA case (elasticity goes to zero). Interestingly, this latter case corresponds to the
maximin (d’Autume and Schubert, 2008a), which has resonance with assessing
sustainability (Cairns and Martinet, 2014; Fleurbaey, 2015a).
I show that when society has to make an intergenerational sacrifice, three el-
ements guide its sharing. The marginal productivity gap, the intragenerational
inequality aversion and the intergenerational inequality aversion. The former in-
dicates that the region having access to a relatively more productive asset (North)
may afford a relative higher consumption. Paradoxically, the region having ac-
cess to the relatively less productive asset (South) has to make a higher sacrifice.
This comes from the fact that the South has a higher marginal productivity. The
impact of the productivity gap on the consumption growth rates of the region
is weighted by the two inequality aversions (IAs). The role played by the IAs
can be ambiguous according to their level. But generally, the more society is
willing to substitute welfare of each region, the more one can take advantage of
their differences, then the more is the difference in terms of sacrifice. At the
opposite, when society exhibits an infinite intragenerational inequality aversion,
growth rates of North and South are equal, whatever the productivity gap. And if
society exhibits an infinite intergenerational inequality aversion, growth rates of
North and South are equal (at the limit) to zero, since no sacrifice for the future
is tolerated.
The next Section introduces the model: first in isolation, regions are collec-
tively considered afterward. Section 2.3 exhibits links with the green accounting
literature. I allow for an unequal treatment of regions and generations in Sec-
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tion 2.4. I discuss the relevance of discounting as a tool to prevent huge sacrifices
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Maximizing intergenerational welfare
I study an economy composed of two regions – North and South – with an
infinite number of generations, each one consuming ci of the asset i = N,S. I
first study how each region in isolation can grow efficiently toward their highest
sustainable level of utility, their golden rule (GR) uGRi . Then I consider a global
social planner that derives an instantaneous social welfare function (SWF) from
the utilities of the regions. And I study how this global economy can grow effi-
ciently toward the global golden rule W GR.
2.2.1 Framework
Each region is endowed with a stock of renewable resource Xi. The natural
renewals Fi is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and such that Fi(0) =
0 = Fi (X¯i), where X¯i stands for the carrying capacity.6 They reach a maximum
at the golden-rule stock XGRi . The dynamics of the stock is then given by
dXi(t)
dt
≡ X˙i(t) = Fi(Xi(t))− ci(t) , i = N,S . (2.1)
Two approaches are possible to handle the welfare part. (1) Considering
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) SWF of consumptions (or utilities)
from North and from South. And taking an increasing transformation of such a
SWF to obtain a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitutions (CIES) SWF.
(2) Considering a CIES utility function in each region with the same elasticity
parameter and representing them through a CES SWF. I represent them formally
below.
Let θ be the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, with θ > 0 , θ 6= 1. And
let σ be the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ > 0 , σ 6= 1. For the sake of
6I recognize that the dynamics of some resources cannot be represented by such functions.
This is a stylized feature.
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simplicity, let us introduce the parameters η ≡ θ−1θ and ν ≡ σ−1σ , with η ,ν < 1
and η ,ν 6= 0. Those elasticities (θ and σ ) can be interpreted as parameters of
inequality aversion (Atkinson, 1970): from 0 (infinite inequality aversion) to
infinity (nil inequality aversion). Let me also put regional weights aN ,aS > 0
such that aN + aS = 1.7 But for now consider only the case aN = aS = 12 . In
mathematical terms, the two versions of the SWF are8
W (1) (cN ,cS) =
((
aN · cηN +aS · cηS
) 1
η
)ν
ν
; (2.2)
W (2) (cN ,cS) =
(
aN
(
cνN
ν
)η
+aS
(
cνS
ν
)η) 1η
. (2.3)
The first version allows to disentangle intertemporal from intratemporal dis-
tributional issues. Indeed the intertemporal substitution applies on each instanta-
neous aggregated SWF.9 On the opposite, the second version allows to compare
intertemporal decisions for each region and for the whole economy. With η→ 1
(θ → ∞) the global problem tends to be the sum of each regional ones. For this
reason, I will follow the second approach (actually, it can easily be shown that the
two approaches are formally equivalent10). Regional utilities are strictly concave
but identical: ui(ci) =
cνi
ν . Here again, this captures the idea of responsibility for
turning consumption into utility.
Let me now solve the intertemporal problem for our two regions considered
separately. Afterward they will be considered collectively to allow for compar-
isons.
7The condition aN + aS = 1 (resp. the −1 in its intertemporal counterpart) is there only for
having the Cobb-Douglass (resp. the logarithm) as a special case in the limit.
8To simply calculus, I omit the −1 usually put in CIES functions.
9See d’Autume and Schubert (2008a) and d’Autume et al. (2010) for models adopting this
approach.
10Consider the following variable change: η ′ = νη . It comes W (2) (cN ,cS) =(
aN
(
cνN
ν
) η ′
ν
+aS
(
cνS
ν
) η ′
ν
) ν
η ′
=
(
aN ·cη
′
N +aS·cη
′
S
) ν
η ′
ν .
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2.2.2 Two regions considered separately
At the beginning, the regions are endowed with the stocks Xi(0) = Xi0. It is
useful to compute the maximin consumption for each region in isolation. One
directly obtains it by
cmi =
{
Fi(Xi0) if Xi0 ≤ XGRi ;
Fi
(
XGRi0
)
if Xi0 > XGRi .
(2.4)
If a region is endowed with a low stock (lower than the golden-rule stock), it can
at best consume its regional production. Growth toward a higher consumption
can come only at the price of a sacrifice, ci < Fi(Xi), over any period of time.
On the contrary, if a region is endowed with an abundant stock (higher than the
golden-rule stock), the GR uGRi = ui
(
Fi
(
XGRi
))
, is attainable at no cost. Indeed a
path with dissavings, ci > Fi(Xi), is possible as long as the stock, when decreas-
ing, does not overshoot the golden-rule stock. I am particularly interested here
in the first scenario because reaching the GR calls for sharing sacrifice between
generations. To do so, let us maximize the welfare of all future generations. To
get a solvable problem, I resort to the classic Ramsey’s (1928) device. Recall
ui(ci) =
cνi
ν . The regional intertemporal welfares are given by
11
v(Xi0) =max
ci
∫ ∞
0
(
ui(ci)−uGRi
)
dt ; (2.5)
subject to X˙i = Fi(Xi)− ci ; (2.6)
Xi0 given . (2.7)
I assume the utilities evolve fast enough such that the integrals are finite (discus-
sion on convergence may be found in Chakravarty, 1962, and Chiang, 1992, pp.
99-101). The Hamiltonians are
Hi(Xi,ci,ψi) = ui(ci)−uGRi +ψi(Fi(Xi)− ci) . (2.8)
11As a by-product of this analysis, the ‘abundance’ case – when the initial stock is higher than
the golden-rule stock – is also handled: the objective maximize the current utility, net of its lower
limit.
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The necessary conditions are
∂Hi(Xi,ci,ψi)
∂ci
= 0 ⇔ ψi = cν−1i ; (2.9)
−∂Hi(Xi,ci,ψi)
∂Xi
= ψ˙i ⇔ −ψ˙iψi = F
′
i (Xi) ; (2.10)
lim
t→∞Hi(Xi,ci,ψi) = 0 . (2.11)
As usual, the shadow-price of a stock equals its marginal value in terms of
utility (eq. (2.9)). Here, as there is no time preference, it always pays to save
(ψ˙i < 0⇔ c˙i > 0) as long as the marginal return on capital is positive (eq. (2.10)).
From the equations (2.9) and (2.10), one obtains
(1−ν) c˙i
ci
= F ′i (Xi) ⇔
c˙i
ci
= σF ′i (Xi) . (2.12)
This is the so-called ‘Keynes-Ramsey rule’ without discount factor. The con-
sumption growth rates depend positively on the marginal productivity, since it
pays to save for growth, and positively on the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion (IES), since a higher value of this parameter represents a higher willingness
to substitute current for future welfares. Society saves more today in order to
have a higher utility in the future. At the limit, if the parameter tends to infinity,
the sacrifice at the benefit of future generations is maximal. At the other limit,
the growth rate becomes constant, i.e. the sacrifice tends to be nil, when the
IES approaches zero. No substitutions between current and future welfares are
tolerated and one approaches the individual maximin consumptions cmi .
12
As a preliminary for comparison with the collective problem, let me simply
remark that the eq. (2.12) hold for North and South. One can therefore write
c˙S
cS
− c˙N
cN
= σ
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
. (2.13)
The difference in regional growth rates equals the (marginal) productivity gap
weighted by the IES.
12For a proof of a CIES approaching the maximin at a zero IES, see d’Autume and Schubert
(2008a). See also d’Autume et al. (2010) for the undiscounted case.
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With the transversality condition, the unique individual steady states are char-
acterized by (the proof of the stability is omitted since this case is very classic)
c?i = Fi
(
XGRi
)
, F ′S
(
XGRS
)
= 0 = F ′N
(
XGRN
)
, ui(c?i ) = u
GR
i , i = N,S . (2.14)
Integrating both sides of the equation (2.13) and using the final consump-
tions, it comes13
cN(t)
cS(t)
=
cGRN
cGRS
eσ
∫ ∞
t (F ′S(XSr)−F ′N(XNr))dr . (2.15)
I will come back to this equation for the collective problem.
2.2.3 Two regions considered collectively
I now consider the problem of a ‘world’ social planner. At the beginning, the
economy is still endowed with stocks (XN0,XS0). The maximin solution of this
problem was given in the Chapter 1. A useful reference path is the as-good-as-
golden locus (Phelps and Riley, 1978) obtained with the maximin framework: all
stocks from which the welfare level is exactly that of the GR. It generalizes the
GR concept to several dimensions. As in the previous subsection, I will mainly
be interested in initial stocks lower than such a locus (this corresponds to the
regular part of Chapter 1). The GR is now given by W GR =W
(
cGRN ,c
GR
S
)
, with
cGRi = Fi
(
XGRi
)
. Recall W (cN ,cS) =
(
aN
(
cνN
ν
)η
+aS
(
cνS
ν
)η) 1η
. Let us compute
13∫ ∞
t
(
c˙S
cS
− c˙NcN
)
dr =
∫ ∞
t σ
(
F ′S(XSr)−F ′N(XNr)
)
dr + a ⇔
[
−ln
(
cN
cS
)]∞
t
=
σ
∫ ∞
t
(
F ′S(XSr)−F ′N(XNr)
)
dr+a ⇔ ln
(
cN(t)
cS(t)
)
= ln
(
cGRN
cGRS
)
+σ
∫ ∞
t
(
F ′S(XSr)−F ′N(XNr)
)
dr.
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the global intertemporal welfare in the same manner than previously14
V (XN0,XS0) =max
cN ,cS
∫ ∞
0
(
W (cN ,cS)−W GR
)
dt ; (2.16)
subject to X˙N = FN(XN)− cN ; (2.17)
X˙S = FS(XS)− cS ; (2.18)
(XN0,XS0) given . (2.19)
Here also, I assume that the welfare evolves fast enough such that the integral is
finite. The Hamiltonian is
H (Xi,ci,ψi) =W (cN ,cS)−W GR+ψN(FN(XN)− cN)+ψS(FS(XS)− cS) .
(2.20)
The necessary conditions are
∂H (Xi,ci,ψi)
∂ci
= 0 ⇔ ψi = aiW 1−η · c
ην−1
i
νη−1
; (2.21)
−∂H (Xi,ci,ψi)
∂Xi
= ψ˙i ⇔ −ψ˙iψi = F
′
i (Xi) ; (2.22)
lim
t→∞H (Xi,ci,ψi) = 0 . (2.23)
From the equations (2.21) and (2.22), it comes
−(1−η)W˙
W
+(1−ην) c˙i
ci
= F ′i (Xi) ⇔
c˙i
ci
=
θσ
θ +σ −1
(
F ′i (Xi)+
1
θ
W˙
W
)
.
(2.24)
The (apparent) consumption growth rates still depend on marginal productivity,
but also on elasticities of substitutions in a subtle way. Let me first study the
consumption growth rates when each elasticity reaches its limits. There are four
cases.15 Note θ ≡ 11−η and σ ≡ 11−ν .
L1. Intragenerational utilitarianism: θ → ∞, c˙ici → σF ′i (Xi).
L2. Intragenerational maximin: θ → 0, c˙ici → σσ−1 W˙W .
14Here also, as a by-product of this analysis, the ‘abundance’ case is also handled.
15The names of theses four cases are a misuse of language since the general case approaches
the one mentioned.
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L3. Intergenerational utilitarianism: σ → ∞, c˙ici → θF ′i (Xi)+ W˙W .
L4. Intergenerational maximin:16 σ → 0, c˙ici → 0.
When the intragenerational IA is nil (case L1), the collective problem corre-
sponds to the problem of two separated regions (see the eq. (2.12)). And only the
intergenerational IA matters. In the same way, when the intergeneration IA is nil
(L3), only the intragenerational IA matters. Interestingly, when the IA becomes
infinite in one dimension (L2 or L4), the consumption growth rates do not longer
depend on productivities, and are therefore equal. Intuitively, as no ‘substitution
of well-being’ is tolerated with the maximin, there is no growth rates inequality.
In the intragenerational maximin (L2), growth rates depend equally on the inter-
generational dimension. When the intergenerational IA is infinite (L4), growth
rates approach zero, and the sacrifice is very low. For the opposite reason, when
IA become nil in the two dimensions (θ ,σ → ∞), growth rates becomes infinite
and then ‘close’. I now turn the study of the difference in growth rates.
Let us equalize the common term in the eq. (2.24), for i = N,S, to obtain
c˙S
cS
− c˙N
cN
= κ
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
, with κ ≡ θσ
θ +σ −1 . (2.25)
Relatives growth of individual consumptions depend on the difference of marginal
productivities, weighted by the intra and the intergenerational inequality aver-
sions. Without loss of generality, I will only consider the case of a marginally
more productive stock in the South, F ′S(XS) ≥ F ′N(XN), to capture the idea of a
relative less abundant stock.
It may firstly be noted that the two elasticities have a different impact on the
regional consumption paths (eq. (2.24)), but exactly the same on the difference
of consumption growth rates (eq. (2.25)). Let me differentiate κ in order to study
the relationship between the two dimensions. One has
−dσ
dθ
∣∣∣∣
κ
> 0 ⇔ 1−σ
1−θ > 0 . (2.26)
16This case shall not be compared with the framework presented in the Chapter 1. It is valid
only at the limit and the economy has to grow toward the GR (to insure convergence of the
objective).
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Then, as far as the evolution of the difference in consumptions is concerned,
the two IA are ‘substitutes’ if they are both sufficiently high (θ ,σ < 1) or both
sufficiently low (θ ,σ > 1). And ‘complements’ in all other cases.
To better understand these features, I now study the sign of κ and make
simple comparative statics.
• κ > 0 ⇔ θ +σ > 1 ;
• dκdθ > 0 ⇔ σ > 1 and dκdσ > 0 ⇔ θ > 1 .
Five cases have to be distinguished, as it is shown in Fig. 2.1.
I
III
II
IV
V
1
10
σ
θ
Figure 2.1: Possibilities for inequality aversions
Let us sum up the signs of level and variations of κ in each situation.
I. κ > 0 ; dκdθ > 0 ;
dκ
dσ > 0 .
II. κ > 0 ; dκdθ > 0 ;
dκ
dσ < 0 .
III. κ > 0 ; dκdθ < 0 ;
dκ
dσ > 0 .
IV. κ > 0 ; dκdθ < 0 ;
dκ
dσ < 0 .
V. κ < 0 ; dκdθ < 0 ;
dκ
dσ < 0 .
Regarding sign, if intra and intergenerational IAs are low (I to IV), the dif-
ference in regional consumption rates is positive (see the eq. (2.25)). That means
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that everything else being equal, the higher the marginal productivity of the stock
available in the South, the higher its consumption growth rate. Since the South
has access to a more productive stock, a reduction of its consumption leads to a
better return. South has therefore to make a relative higher sacrifice. This could
seem surprising: taking into account intragenerational concerns in a classic ac-
cumulation model leads to rise the difference of optimal development between
unequal regions. Rather, it seems rational to take advantage of initial differences,
but of course this calls for redistribution mechanism both for ethical and for prac-
tical reasons of implementing such a decision rule. Interestingly, if intra and
intergenerational IAs are sufficiently high (V), the previous reasoning is reverse
and North has to make a relative higher sacrifice. In any case, when marginal
productivities converge toward each other (approaching the GR), the regional
consumption growth rates converge too. The levels of consumption converge as
well, as explained below.
Regarding variations, if intra and intergenerational IAs are sufficiently low
(I), the lower the IA, the higher the difference in regional consumption growth
rates (see the eq. (2.25)). On the opposite, and counter-intuitively, if both IA are
high (IV and V), the lower the IA, the lower the difference in regional consump-
tion growth rates. There are two intermediary cases when the IA is low in one
dimension but high in the other dimension (II and III). They correspond to the
‘complementarity’ cases displayed in the eq. (2.26).
Let me now have a word on the comparison between regions in isolation
and regions collectively considered. Of course, regional consumption growth
rates differ in the two problem (compare eq. (2.12) and (2.24)). But as far as
the difference in growth rates in concerned, the problem reduces in comparing σ
(eq. (2.13)) with κ (eq. (2.25)). It is not hard to see that κ >σ if and only if σ < 1
and θ +σ > 1. In other words, the collective problem lead to a higher difference
in consumption growth rates than the individual problem only in cases III and
IV. They correspond to a case where both the intragenerational IA is relatively
low (intuitively, a low IA lead to high differences) and the intergenerational IA
is high (counter-intuitively). Let me now go back to the study of the limits, but
for κ only.
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L1. Intragenerational utilitarianism: θ → ∞, κ → σ : if the intragenerational
IA is nil, the difference of consumption growth rates depends only on the
intertemporal IA and on the productivity gap (as in the problem of two sep-
arated regions).
L2. Intragenerational maximin: θ → 0, κ → 0: if the intragenerational IA is
infinite, the regional consumptions grow at the same rate.
L3. Intergenerational utilitarianism: σ → ∞, κ → θ : if the intergenerational
IA is nil, the difference of consumption growth rates depends only on the
intratemporal IA and on the productivity gap.
L4. Intergenerational maximin:17 σ → 0, κ → 0: if the intergenerational IA is
infinite, the regional consumptions grow at the same rate.
L1 and L3 corresponds to cases when the ‘distribution of well-being’ does not
count in one dimension. Then the relative sacrifice depends only on the IA of the
other dimension. Cases L2 and L4 lead to the same result of an equal evolution
of the consumption growth rates, but for different reasons. In the case L2, the
infinite intragenerational IA leads the growth rates to be as close as possible.
While in the case L4, one refrains oneself as much as possible to substitute a
current (lower) consumption for a future (higher) consumption. This leads the
growth rates to be as small as possible, and therefore to be close. In other words,
if the IA is infinite in at least one dimension consumptions evolve at the same
rate. If the IA is nil in one dimension, the difference in growth rate depends
only on the IA of the other dimension. And finally, if the IAs are nil in the two
dimensions, the social welfare is nearly only supported by the consumption of
the North (low sacrifice) while the South let its stock grow as fast as possible
(huge sacrifice). Consumptions approach a corner solution.18 In this last case,
the productivity gap is fully exploited. It calls even more clearly for a transfer
from the North to the South.
17This case shall not be compared with the framework presented in the Chapter 1. Firstly,
because it is valid only at the limit. Secondly, because the approach followed here lead to a CES
of two regional maximin paths. And thirdly, because the economy grows toward the GR.
18This limit is easily computable with the notation κ ≡ 11−ην . When η ,ν → 1, κ → ∞.
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Finally, it shall be noted that in case of equal marginal productivities (e.g. if
natural renewal are identical), the IAs play no role and the consumptions grow
at the same rate toward their golden-rule levels.
With the transversality condition, the unique steady state is characterized by
(the stability is shown in the Appendix A.1)
c??i = Fi
(
XGRi
)
, F ′S
(
XGRS
)
= 0 = F ′N
(
XGRN
)
, W (c??N ,c
??
S ) =W
GR . (2.27)
Integrating both sides of the equation (2.25) and using the final consump-
tions, it comes (as for the eq. (2.15))
cN(t)
cS(t)
=
cGRN
cGRS
eκ
∫ ∞
t (F ′S(XSr)−F ′N(XNr))dr . (2.28)
This equation helps understanding the evolution of the consumptions through
their ratio. Let me concentrate on cases where κ > 0 (i.e. θ+σ > 1). As long as
the stock of the South is more productive than that of the North, the current ratio
is higher than the final ratio and converges toward it. It shows, more directly,
how a more productive stock leads to a higher sacrifice. But to visualize this
feature even more easily, I turn to a graphical representation.
2.2.4 Graphical representation
As in the Chapter 1, Fig. 2.2 is a four-quadrant plot that represents the differ-
ent elements. The upper-right quadrant plots the evolution of the consumption
and the stock of the North. Symmetrically, the lower-left plots these elements for
the South. In such a way, the upper-left quadrant plots the consumption paths.
And the lower-right quadrant plots the stock paths.
The upper-right and lower-left quadrants are, individually, similar to a one-
sector Ramsey model.19 They depict a saddle point: consumption has to increase
(resp. decrease) if the initial stock is lower (resp. higher) than the golden-rule
19It is direct from the eq. (2.21) and (2.22), noticing that ψi > 0 is a decreasing function of ci:
∂ψi
∂ci
= ∂
2W (·)
(∂ci)2
< 0.
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Figure 2.2: Global evolutions of the consumptions and the stocks
stock. For the sake of the representation, I use the transversality condition (reach-
ing the GR) to project the c˙i = 0 curves in the upper-left quadrant and the X˙i = 0
curves in the lower-right one. The upper-left and lower-right quadrants represent
then only optimal paths, ending up at the steady state M (corresponding to M′).
The paths never cross the F ′N = F ′S locus
20 (XNM and 0M′), otherwise one would
have a steady state that does not satisfy the transversality condition.21 I con-
jecture that paths never cross the curve passing through M (M′) depicting W˙ = 0
20It is a straight line because I plotted symmetric production functions.
21Approaching the steady state (possibly asymptotically), stock and consumption paths have
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(W =W GR).22 As mentioned before, this curve represents the as-good-as-golden
locus. The hatched area depicts stocks from which the social welfare decreases
toward its steady-state value. More generally, no cycle occurs (in consumptions
or states) since paths cannot cross the ‘critical loci’.
An example of path is plotted from R′ to M′. It is very similar to a classic
path in a Ramsey model. But we can now better visualize the impact of κ on
the consumption ratio, exposed in the eq. (2.28). The lower κ , the closer the
current ratio to the final ratio. The consumptions path gets closer and closer
to the straight line 0M′. For example, if the IAs are initially low (θ ,σ > 1),
the higher the inequality aversions, the lower the actual inequalities during the
convergence. But the previous explanations showed that this intuitive feature
does not always hold.
Finally, let me have a word on the ‘regular’ part (the non-hatched area) of the
area B. From initial stocks in this part, the North has an abundant stock XN0 >
XGRN while the South has a scarce stock XS0 <X
GR
S . Here North shall overshoot its
production to decrease toward the GR, while South shall make classic savings to
grow. Clearly, here, we could take a part of the ‘manna’ in North to compensate
the sacrifice in South. But how regional sacrifices contribute to the improvement
of the welfare? This is depicted by Green accounting tools.
2.3 Accounting considerations
During the transition toward the GR, savings are made. One expects therefore
an indicator of sustainability to be increasing. What I interpreted as ‘sacrifice’
at any given date is given by the difference between the production Fi(Xi) and
the current consumption ci, i.e. by the distance between the current and the sus-
tainable consumption, for Xi < XGRi . But this difference was already measured
by the evolution of the stocks since X˙i = Fi(Xi(t))− ci(t). In other words, the
instantaneous sacrifice made by a region is represented by X˙i and its total instan-
taneous sacrifice by XGRi −Xi0. And, as well-known, the marginal impact of a
the same tangent (by L’Hospital’s rule): limt→∞ dXNdXS = limt→∞
F ′N(XN)X˙N−c˙N
F ′S(XS)X˙S−c˙S
= dcNdcS =
cGRN
cGRS
.
22A discussion on this point can be found in Samuelson and Solow (1956).
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stock on the value function V is given by shadow-prices ψi. I study this formally.
In autonomous problems, the optimal Hamiltonian is constant (see e.g. Chi-
ang, 1992, p. 190). The transversality condition (2.23) implies thereforeH opt =
0. The equation (2.20) can then be rewritten as
ψNX˙N +ψSX˙S︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net investment
=W GR−W︸ ︷︷ ︸
Welfare gap
. (2.29)
Along a rising path, W < W GR, net investment (NI) is positive and is linked to
the ‘welfare distance’. The farther the economy is from the target, the more
it has to invest. Each region makes a contribution of ψiX˙i. And investment
tends toward zero as W approaches W GR. Once at the GR is reached (possibly
asymptotically) one obtains, in a sense, the Hartwick’s rule (Hartwick, 1977;
Dixit et al., 1980; Withagen and Asheim, 1998).23 Actually, this feature was
already found by Ramsey (1928) himself – it is the ‘genuine’ Keynes-Ramsey
rule – and was restated with exhaustible resource and capital accumulation by
d’Autume and Schubert (2008b). Here, positive, nil and negative investments
could be possible according to the initial states.
Let me now turn to the final analysis when a unequal treatment is considered.
2.4 Intra and intergenerational inequity
From a purely positivist view, one may consider treating both regions and
generations unequally. Actually, Ramsey (1928) himself considered discounting
at the end of his paper, while he strongly rejected it on an ethical ground at the
beginning. In the same vein, Koopmans (1965) used a discount rate to compare
discounted and undiscounted versions. At any time, the discount rate may be nil
to come back to the previous case of undiscounted welfare.
Let me follow this approach by considering discounting as well. What rep-
resents a higher weight on current and near welfares than futures ones. What
Heal (2009, p. 5) called as “the rate of intergenerational discrimination”. By the
same token, let me also attach different weights on regions to see if changes hap-
23This always holds for the as-good-as-golden locus.
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pen. These intra and intergenerational weights may be interpreted as a measure
of (procedural) ‘inequity’.
Let aN and aN be now elements of (0,1), still with aN + aS = 1. And let us
introduce a positive discount rate δ . I study only the collective problem, but at
any time, recall that letting θ → ∞ allows to approach individual ones.
The intertemporal welfare is now given by
V d(XN0,XS0) =max
cN ,cS
∫ ∞
0
e−δ t
(
W (cN ,cS)−W GR
)
dt ; (2.30)
subject to the same constraints .
The eq. (2.24) becomes
c˙i
ci
=
θσ
θ +σ −1
(
F ′i (Xi)+
1
θ
W˙
W
−δ
)
. (2.31)
In comparison with the situation without discounting, consumption growth rates
are lower. Intuitively, if future generations count less, we less need to save in
order to increase their welfares. And less investments lead to a lower growth.
Apparently, intragenerational weights do not play a role here. Indeed, they im-
pact W but they have the same impact on the evolution of the consumptions
(same W˙W for both). Actually, they do impact the levels of optimal consumptions.
To see this let us rewrite the green accounting equation.
ψNX˙N +ψSX˙S = e−δ t
(
W GR−W
)
. (2.32)
As ψi depends positively on ai, the ‘sacrifice sharing’ depends well on those
weights. Everything else being equal, a higher weight ai means a lower X˙i, then
a lower sacrifice.
Interestingly, when the IA is infinite in at least one dimension (L2 or L4), in-
tergenerational weights (discounting) disappear in the eq. (2.31).24 They become
“immaterial” (d’Autume and Schubert, 2008b). This feature is well-known in a
static framework: when the elasticity of substitution tends to zero, a CES func-
24When θ → 0 discounting disappear but intragenerational weights do still play a (undiffer-
entiated) role on consumption growth rates through W (L2). But when σ → 0, no weight matter
(L4).
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tion tends to the symmetric minimum.25 This common feature both in intra and
in intergenerational dimensions is not so surprising. Weights (attached to in-
dividuals or generations) guide the priority of resources. But, in parallel, the
elasticity of substitution tells to what extend society is willing to substitute the
well-being of an individual (or generation) for that of another one. When the
elasticity tends to zero, substitution are no longer tolerated. Therefore, whatever
the attached weights, the absolute priority is given to the worst-off. Only in this
case, weights do not matter. This is even clearer when θ → ∞ (η → 1):
c˙i
ci
= σ
(
F ′i (Xi)−δ
)
. (2.33)
In the classic so-called ‘Keynes-Ramsey rule’, a nil IES ‘erases’ the discount
rate. Let us now merge the two equations (2.31), for i = N,S. One still has
c˙S
cS
− c˙N
cN
= κ
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
. (2.34)
Therefore, the evolution of the inequality between the consumption growth rate
in the North and in the South is robust to both intra and intergenerational ‘in-
equity’. But as said before, the levels of consumption are impacted. In particu-
lar, the steady state is now characterized by a lower welfare, the modified golden
rule. It is reached when
F ′S (XS) = F
′
N (XN) = δ . (2.35)
That means that the sacrifice shall stop when the marginal productivities are both
equal to the pure rate of time preference. Taken in another way, the discount rate
can be chosen so as to meet any states on the F ′S = F
′
N locus, and then limits the
global sacrifice. This brings me to my last discussion.
25A proof is provided in the Appendix A.1 of Chapter 3, p. 129.
95
CHAPTER 2. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING GROWTH
TOWARD THE GOLDEN RULE
2.5 Discussion: Equity, inequality aversion and dis-
count rate
The Ramsey criterion has been criticized for leading to a significant sacrifice
of every generation at the benefit of subsequent ones (Arrow, 1999). As argued
by Rawls (1971, p. 287): “the utilitarian doctrine may direct us to demand heavy
sacrifices of the poorer generations for the sake of greater advantages for later
ones that are far better off. But this calculus of advantages, which balances the
losses of some against benefits to others, appears even less justified in the case
of generations than among contemporaries”. But as Rawls (1971, sec. 44) re-
frained himself to apply either discounting or the difference principle criterion
(‘maximin’) in an intertemporal perspective, he gave no precise recommenda-
tions about the optimal savings rate.26 And he admitted that “it is not possible,
at present anyway, to define precise limits on what the savings rate should be”
(p. 286). To find a solution, some authors prefer to adopt a consequentialist
approach and to discuss the resulting allocation of well-being of a particular cri-
terion. For example, Zuber and Asheim (2012) allow for weights according to
the rank of generational well-being. This was built up on the “Hammond Eq-
uity for the Future” axiom (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004), which captures the
following idea: a sacrifice of the present for the future is (weakly) desirable if
the present stays better-off than the future. In this view, discounting comes from
the expression of inequality aversion if future generation are better-off (Asheim
and Mitra, 2010; Asheim, 2012; Zuber and Asheim, 2012; Asheim and Ekeland,
2016). I see several potential problems with the view of ‘equitable discounting’.
The intratemporal part allows to better understand the distinct role of weights
and of the intragenerational IA. Undesirable consequences from unequal weights
can indeed be reduced with a higher inequality aversion. And when IA is infinite,
weights disappear. But why changing weights rather than the IA? In the present
26It is sometimes mentioned that Rawls (1971) acknowledged the interest of discounting to
avoid sacrifices. But one shall add that he was in contradiction with the primitive problem. He
wrote: “introducing time preference may be an improvement in such cases; but I believe that
its being invoked in this way is an indication that we have started from an incorrect conception.
[. . . ] It is introduced in a purely ad hoc way to moderate the consequences of the utility criterion”
(p. 298).
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framework, sacrifices may also be reduced by two ways: with a higher intertem-
poral IA or with a discount rate. The first option (consider θ > 1 for simplicity)
leads to make regional consumption paths closer when growing toward the GR.
The second option leads to a situation where sacrifice is less needed. And then
each generation has to make a lower sacrifice. Both options may be desirable,
but in light of this framework it seems odd to justify discounting by the IA. By
the way, such a practice would be intolerable in the intragenerational dimension.
Also, I find odd that the IA be dependent upon the situation. How to justify that
such a change in the IA arises merely because the situation changed? I think that
linking directly the IA with the specific situation can lead to arbitrary decisions.
The underlying justification that future can benefit from current sacrifice, more
than proportionally, does not seem to justify per se a departure from impartiality
(Fleurbaey and Michel, 1999, p. 723). Besides, if equity requires that something
is equalized, I do not see precisely what is equalized with discounting. That
said, resulting allocation of well-being may be worth discussing, but one needs,
I think, another vocable.
Giving the priority to the worst-off individuals because they are worse-off is
advocated by proponents of prioritarianism (Parfit, 1995; Fleurbaey, 2015b). In
this view, weights should be inversely related to the relative initial well-being.
Here, in the intertemporal dimension, it would justify discounting for increasing
welfare paths. In the intratemporal dimension, it would also recommend to give
more weight to the South as long as it is less well-off than the North.
I propose to argue that the undiscounted utilitarian criterion is sufficiently
malleable to handle different intergenerational inequality outcomes (Fleurbaey
and Michel, 1994, 1999; Asheim and Buchholz, 2007). Which comes back to
asking, ultimately, what is the appropriate shape of the welfare function (Schelling,
1995). But this malleability comes at a price when intratemporal issues are taken
into account. Even if the difference in relative sacrifices reduces over time, the
inequality may be important during the transition path. Giving the same weight
to the regions turned out to be insufficient.
97
CHAPTER 2. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DURING GROWTH
TOWARD THE GOLDEN RULE
2.6 Conclusion
This simple framework enables us to have straightforward insights. When
regions have access to unequally productive renewable resources, the sacrifice to
attain the highest sustainable level of welfare – the golden rule – is not evenly
shared. Basically, the region which is endowed with a lower stock, South, has
to make a higher sacrifice than the other one, North. The intuition behind this
startling result is that the resource of the South, being lower than that of the
North, is marginally more productive. The same sacrifice leads then to a higher
return in the South than in the North. The difference in regional growth rates
depends generally positively on the productivity gap, and negatively on the in-
tratemporal and the intertemporal inequality aversions. The sacrifice for reaching
the golden rule is evenly shared only in three cases. (1) If the marginal produc-
tivities are equal, because one cannot take advantage of differences of the two
regions. (2) If the intratemporal inequality aversion is infinite, because one does
not want to take advantage of differences of the two regions. (3) If the intertem-
poral inequality aversion is infinite, because one does not want to make sacri-
fice. The (original) Keynes-Ramsey rule holds in this framework: the farther the
economy is from the golden rule, the more it has to invest. At the end, unequal
weights put on regions and on generations were considered. I came to two con-
clusions. (i) Discounting cannot be advocated on the sole basis of the willingness
to limit sacrifices. (ii) Intratemporal weights do not play a fundamental role in
the relative regional growth rates.
The main conclusion of this model, based on the most efficient way to share
sacrifice in order to grow toward the golden rule, can be difficult to hear in the
real world. Both from an ethical and a pragmatic view, such a policy can only
be implemented with transfers from the North to the South. This is subject of
the next chapter. The current and the next chapters together will echo results
from the literature on growth and inequality. Especially, Aghion et al. (1999, p.
1616) stated that “redistribution can foster growth. However, the growth process
is unlikely to leave inequality unchanged”.
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A.1 Stability of the steady state
Let me sum up the necessary conditions into three main equations to get the
following dynamic system, with Y ≡ ln
(
cS
cN
)
;

X˙N = FN(XN)− cN ;
X˙S = FS(XS)− cS ;
Y˙ = κ
(
F ′S(XS)−F ′N(XN)
)
.
(A.36)
Steady states are characterized by (using the transversality condition)
cGRN = FN
(
XGRN
)
;
cGRS = FS
(
XGRS
)
;
F ′N
(
XGRN
)
= F ′S
(
XGRS
)
.
(A.37)
Consider the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system, evaluated at the steady
states27
J? =
 F
′
N 0 αN
0 F ′N −αS
−κF ′′N κF ′′S 0
 ; (A.38)
with αN ≡−∂cN∂Y
∣∣∣∣
cGRN ,c
GR
S
=
(cGRS )
2
cGRN
> 0 and αS ≡ ∂cS∂Y
∣∣∣∣
cGRN ,c
GR
S
= cGRS > 0.
Let us compute the roots of the characteristic polynomialP(λ )= det
(
JGR−λ I3
)
:
(
F ′N−λ
)(−(F ′N−λ)λ +καNF ′′N +καSF ′′S )= 0 . (A.39)
The first eigenvalue is λN = F ′N . Let Γ≡−κ
(
αNF ′′N +αSF ′′S
)
> 0. I can reduce
the eq. (A.39) to λ 2−F ′Nλ −Γ = 0. Eigenvalues are then λN = F ′N > 0, λS =
F ′N−
√
(F ′N)2+4Γ
2 < 0, and λ3 =
F ′N+
√
(F ′N)2+4Γ
2 > 0.
28 The steady state is a (classic)
saddle-point.
27We use the equality F ′N = F ′S and express the Jacobian with respect to F
′
N only.
28Notice that strict concavity of production functions rule out nil eigenvalues.
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Chapter 3
Transfers of resources for a
sustainable development
Abstract
The first chapter highlighted a significant disparity during a sustainable de-
velopment path: North shall over-consume while South shall under-consume.
The second chapter highlighted a similar, but less significant, disparity during a
growing path: South shall relatively save more because its stock allows a better
return. They came to the same conclusion: implementing transfers for ethical
and practical reasons. Then this chapter studies the stylized case where North
has a free access to its stock while South has a limited access to its stock. It
does not solve an intertemporal problem but rather concentrates on policy impli-
cations of mechanisms of transfers. It turns out that either a tax has to be used to
reduce the consumption of North, or a lump-sum to increase it, according to the
sacrifice asked to North.
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3.1 Introduction
Emphasis has been put on futurity in the sustainability debate. Economists
translated this question on how weighting the future compared to the present in
the evaluation of different development paths. Among these paths, some can be
considered as fair if generations that arise at different dates count equally. This
view is often summarized under the vocable intergenerational equity. But if so-
ciety cares about the ‘difference of well-being’ between two generations, it cares
also about that of two individuals from the same generation. When they count
equally, one can talk about intragenerational equity1. The economics literature
has generally separated these two equity dimensions, but there are several ar-
guments for dealing with them together. First, it can be argued that an unjust
society is likely to be unsustainable, either on the political side, with revolution,
or on the environmental side, through degradation (World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development, 1987, ch. 2. § 4; Haughton, 1999). Second, it seems
curious to attach more importance to future generations, thus unborn, than to the
current one (Solow, 1991; Schelling, 1995; Anand and Sen, 2000). Finally, from
a policy view, one may wonder if intra and intergenerational concerns can be
designed independently. On the contrary, one should be interested in how they
interact to formulate consistent policies.
The interactions between these two dimensions are actually ever-present in
economics. An example can be that of a fiscal policy that aims to reduce the
public debt. But alongside that debt there is environmental debt, which can re-
duce the possibility of development for future generations. In this respect, three
major dimensions can be taken into account: the climate change (with the ques-
tion of burden-sharing between generations and into each one of them, between
expected losers and winers), the exhaustion of non-renewable resources (but it
requires an understanding of the industrial processes, especially to what extend
these resources can be substitutes for manufactured capital) and the management
1There is not a unique accepted definition of the word ‘equity’. I take here the require-
ment of equal weights in decision making. Which is in line with a common definition: “Equity
is the quality of being fair and reasonable in a way that gives equal treatment to everyone”.
(source: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/equity, visited
on May 2018).
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of renewable resource stocks. I am interested here in renewable resources.
The linkages between the two equity dimensions seem not to have been ex-
tensively studied in the economics literature, and in the environmental and re-
sources economics literature in particular. Nonetheless, some authors have high-
lighted this question in the climate change debate for some time. For exam-
ple, Schelling (1992) argued that the best way for developing countries to fight
against the negative effects of climate change is to continue to develop. Heal
(2009), on the opposite, explains that a preference for equality between genera-
tions and the preference for equality within each one of them may be opposed.
If one expects consumption to grow, one can further discount the future, but
that does not incite us to take preventive measures against the negative effects of
climate change. Conversely, as developing countries are more vulnerable, more
concerns about them would incite us to act more quickly. Kverndokk et al. (2014)
proposed a model to analyze the burden-sharing between North and South in
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through clean and dirty investments.
These two dimensions are also present in the explanation of climate negotiations
(e.g. Lecocq and Hourcade, 2012). Baumgärtner et al. (2012) proposed a frame-
work to summarize the possible links between the two equity dimensions: inde-
pendence, facilitation and/or rivalry. Those features are detailed in the context of
ecosystem services by Glotzbach and Baumgärtner (2012).
As renewable resources are not produced, the choice of the welfare criterion
is of all importance. More precisely this may allow for expressing the implicit
values of stocks of natural resources. Associated shadow-prices are essential to
compute genuine savings (Hamilton, 1994; Pearce et al., 1996; Asheim, 2007).
Expenditures that enhance the environment are seen as savings and depletion
of natural resources and environmental degradations as dissavings. It general-
izes the traditional concept of savings, and its positivity indicates that welfare,
however defined, is currently non-declining. Renewable resources have to be
managed on the long run, but compared to non-renewable ones: they are gen-
erally directly consumed, they may have amenities and one can have ‘win-win’
solutions. Further, some can be ‘essential’ for life. For all of these reasons, the
regulation can be justified. Here, renewable resources are viewed as a parable to
link the two dimensions. Some current redistributions can be decided, but they
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will inevitably have consequences on redistribution between now and the future.
I am not aware of any work that builds analytically the welfare possibility
between heterogeneous agents that depends on a renewable resource and has
consequences on future generations. The purpose of this study is to analyze
the intragenerational and the intergenerational equity trade-off with a renewable
resource. The question I am asking is what are the consequences of equity con-
cerns on current and future welfares, when some individuals are authorized to
have a full access to their renewable resource, while other individuals have only
a limited access to their stock, to let it grow. And when the social planner orders
a redistribution. And does the type of redistribution matters in such a context?
More precisely, I showed in Chapter 1 that the intertemporal maximin criterion
leads the region with the scarce resource – South – to under-consume (to let its
stock grow) and the region with the relative abundant resource – North – to over-
consume (to compensate the under-consumption of South in the global welfare).
This may even be more radical in the case of a nil intragenerational inequality
aversion: South consumes nothing. I showed in Chapter 2 that this feature is still
present, in some sense, when one wants to grow toward the golden rule. Both
North and South have to make a sacrifice, but the South has to make a relatively
higher sacrifice (for the same above-mentioned reason). In this context, it ap-
pears natural to study a transfer from North to South both for ethical reasons and
for a plausible implementation of development paths suggested. In this chapter
I deviate from a pure optimal trajectory framework (as analyzed in the first two
chapters). The present purpose is to study qualitative policies and possible im-
plementations. The intergenerational equity may be represented in several ways
(for a short review, see Asheim, 2010). But to be consistent with my previously
mentioned definition of equity, I shall adopt the anonymity axiom: the outcome
is invariant to (finite) permutations in the date of appearance of generations. This
still leaves the door open for different criteria such as maximin (Solow, 1974) or
the Ramsey (1928) criterion. Here, I will only adopt a minimalist view: the
intertemporal value function is non-decreasing with respect to the stock. More
precisely, the benchmark objective for the North will be to reach the golden rule.
The intragenerational equity may also be expressed in different ways. The
main theories of distributive justice at a society scale are: utilitarianism, liberal
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egalitarianism, libertarianism and Marxism (Arnsperger and Van Parijs, 2003). I
assume here a welfarist view: a state is only assessed through utilities of indi-
viduals. Society is assumed to have an inequality aversion (possibly nil). That
is to say, it restrains the substitution of the well-being of one agent for the well-
being of another. This approach is not as restrictive as it could seem since it
allows to deal with different theories of justice as special cases. Indeed, the
utilitarianism assumes a nil inequality aversion, only the total of utility matters
(Vickrey, 1945; Harsanyi, 1953, 1955, 1977). The liberal egalitarianism can take
a maximin form, popularized by Rawls (1971), if utility are considered as “pri-
mary goods”. Here, inequality aversion is infinite, no substitution is possible be-
tween the individual utility. ‘Right-libertarians’ would promote no transfer and
‘left-libertarians’ would promote a transfer such as to perfectly equalize utility.
The Marxist approach would determine thresholds of utility representing ‘needs’.
According to the intergenerational view, the intragenerational fulfillment may be
constrained. Studying both together allows for determining all possible choices
of policy and to estimate opportunity costs.
I use a social objective that allows to deal with the two main doctrines (util-
itarianism and maximin) as well as all intermediary cases. Besides, I build sets
of possibilities for the utilities. They indicate to what extend one can take from
one agent to give to another agent. Then, efficient allocations will be represented
by Pareto frontiers. From an allocation situated on such a frontier, one cannot
increase any more the utility of one agent without decreasing that of another.
Afterward, I will be able to choose between those efficient allocations using the
social criterion. To respond to my issue I need, as said, two different regions,
North and South. The North has access to a resource and works to extract a part
of it. On the contrary, the South has also access to a resource, but shall extract
less than what it originally would want. I introduce a redistribution mechanism
from North to South. Compared to previous chapter, it is necessary here to in-
troduce labor in order to explicitly take into account effort and to analyze if a
transfer is a disincentive to harvest. Again, the present purpose is more quali-
tative and ‘policy-oriented’. The utility of North depends on individual leisure
time and on available consumption. The net utility of South depends only on
the amount received. I analyze the utility allocation possibilities offered by two
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redistribution mechanisms. The first one is a lump-sum transfer: whatever the
effort of North, South obtains the same amount of the resource caught. The sec-
ond one is a proportional tax. Whatever the effort of North, South obtains a given
proportion of the resource caught. I introduce a renewable resource which varies
according to the catch. As the resource may affect the potential catch, it impacts
the utility possibility sets. First, I will see how the optimal transfer (lump-sum
and tax) evolves according to a change in the inequality aversion. Second, I will
analyze the consequences of the evolution of the resource on the welfare of the
regions in an intergenerational perspective.
My contribution is to have stated the conditions underlying the construction
of well-known utility possibility frontiers in the context of two heterogeneous
agents. When the transfer is absolute (through a lump-sum), this does not pose
any particular difficulties as long as leisure and consumption are normal goods.
When the transfer is relative (proportional tax), it depends on the labor supply
of the North in reaction to the tax, which is given by its disposition to substitute
leisure for consumption. In particular, if the effort decreases when taxed, the util-
ity possibility set is bounded by a ‘Laffer-like curve’: the amount received from
a proportional tax is first increasing, then decreasing, with respect to its rate
(see Laffer, 2004). In any case, the higher the inequality aversion the higher the
transfer. But regarding the redistribution of a renewable resource over time, an
increasing of the intragenerational inequality aversion does not ‘worsen’ the in-
tergenerational dimension in two situations. If the consumption has to decrease,
it has to be through a tax: discouragement effect. While if it has to increase, it
has to be through a lump-sum: North gets less while harvesting more.
The intragenerational dimension is built upon a framework proposed by Mas-
Collel et al. (1995, pp. 823-4), borrowed itself from Atkinson (1973). I extend
their example in two dimensions. First, I state clearly the conditions under their
results, especially the construction of utility possibility frontiers. And second,
I introduce a resource to take into account the intergenerational concern in a
Gordon-Schaefer model (Clark, 1990). The welfare analysis is based upon social
welfare functions, in the spirit of Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947), where
the elasticity of substitution is interpreted as a measure of the relative inequality
aversion (Atkinson, 1970).
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The next Section presents the model. I solve it and I present some welfare
analyses. Section 3.3 exhibits the links between the two equity dimensions. Sec-
tion 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Two regions, one harvestable resource
3.2.1 Framework
I consider an economy with two heterogeneous regions, North and South.
Each representative agent from each region lives one instant in that continuous
framework. But as I will not solve a dynamic program, I will only study the
potential consequences of current decisions on the future. I assume the follow-
ing policy in order to implement a ‘sustainable’ development. North can access
freely to its stock, but South is constrained to let its stock grow. A social planner
implements a mechanism of transfer from the North to the South. I consider two
options: the first one is a lump-sum transfer and the second one a distorting tax.
To make the problem interesting, I explicitly formalize effort.
As only the stock of North matters here, I simply note XN(t)≡ X(t). Its law
of evolution is given by the gap between renewal F(Xt) and harvesting H(lN ,Xt),
with li the leisure time of the region i = N,S (available times are normalized to
unity). Formally, the dynamics reads: (the time index will be dropped since no
confusion may arise)
X˙(t)≡ dXt
dt
= F(Xt)−H(lN ,Xt) (3.1)
The function F describes a “bell curve” (F(0) = 0 = F(X¯) and reaches a max-
imum for XGR, the golden-rule stock. This formulation can represent resource
issues as well as capital accumulation (Asheim and Ekeland, 2016). H (lN ,X)
is the production (catch-effort) function of the North. I assume it depends lin-
early on labor (or leisure), and it is (weakly) convex with respect to the resource:
H (lN ,X) = (1− lN)h(X), where h(X) represents the catchability.2 The produc-
tion is bounded between zero (no work) and h(X) (no leisure). The utilities
2I assume limX→0 F ′(X)> limX→0
∂H(·)
∂X . Otherwise, the stock is asymptotically exhausted.
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depend on the leisure time and the effective consumption: ui (li,ci). The utility
functions are assumed to be interpersonally comparable, strictly concave and ho-
mothetic3. The assumption of interpersonal comparison may need comments. To
explain it, I think that the utility function has to be differently understood. Here,
it is not only an individualistic measure of well-being, but an objective evaluation
of ‘legitimate requests’. It can be obtained by revealed preferences for example.
Further, I think that society is able to say whom is worse-off between to types of
individuals (regions here). Here, it can be justifiable since natural resources may
be inclusive of “primary goods”. The assumption of comparison allows also for
comparing utilitarianism and maximin (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 1977).
As one needs to reduce the ‘original’ consumption of South, I impose its
consumption to be lower than c#S. Then its work time has to be lower than 1− l#S .
Suppose that individually the South works 1− l?S hours. To make the problem
interesting, let us assume that South shall work less that what it would want, then
l?S < l
#
S . Without transfer, the South has therefore the utility level u
#
S = uS(l
#
S ,c
#
S).
Let us note T the transfer. The utilities read:
uN (lN ,cN) and uS (T ) = uS
(
l#S ,c
#
S+T
)
. (3.2)
Besides, each good is assumed to be essential4. Let us note the global con-
sumption c ≡ cN + cS. I assume no loss, so that the whole production is con-
sumed: c = H (lN ,X). By construction, the transfer amounts to T = c− cN ≥ 0.
To represent the inequality aversion in a simple way, I use an ordinal social
welfare function (SWF) with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between
regional consumptions. It is given by
W (uN ,uS) =
(
aN ·uηN +aS ·uηS
) 1
η , with aN +aS = 1. (3.3)
Consider only the case aN = aS = 12 for now. The elasticity of substitution is
given by θ ≡ 11−η (η inferior to unity but non-zero). A decrease of the elastic-
3Formally, homothecy means dcidli
∣∣∣∣
u(ci,li)
= dcidli
∣∣∣∣
u(βci,β li)
, with β > 0.
4Formally, limci→0
∂ui(·)
∂ci
∣∣∣∣
ui
= limli→0
∂ui(·)
∂ li
∣∣∣∣
ui
= ∞, i = N,S.
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ity of substitution represents an increase of the inequality aversion.5 It is non-
paternalist (only utility matters), paretian, symmetric and concave. It is also
homothetic, which satisfies the relative invariance with respect to proportional
shifts (see Atkinson, 1970).
The intergenerational dimension is dealt with through an intertemporal SWF
f (W (uN1,uS1),W (uN2,uS2), . . .). I do not solve an intertemporal problem here,
I simply assume the intertemporal welfare to be increasing with respect to the
intratemporal welfare.
3.2.2 Utility possibility frontier with lump-sum transfer
The North has a free access to its resource while the South has a limited
access to its resource. If one wants to implement a mechanism of transfer, a
first step can be to determine the constraint set of the social planner.6 In this
perspective, the social planner can virtually take an amount from what the North
harvests, to give it to the South. For each amount of what would be transfered,
one can determine the optimal utility of each region. By continuity, one can
construct a frontier, which gives the maximum of utility of the North, given
that of the South (or vice versa). That frontier bounds the utility possibility set
(UPS).7 From any state inside the set, one could make every region better-off, but
once one is on the boundary, one cannot increase the utility of a region without
decreasing the utility of the other one. This is so called ‘first-best Pareto frontier’.
max
lN ,cN
uN (lN ,cN) ; (3.4)
subject to cN = c−T . (3.5)
As leisure time of the North lN is the only decision variable, I will express,
for simplicity, the problem and solve it with respect to leisure time. The transfer
being absolute, the North can consume what it harvests minus a constant transfer:
5The cases of symmetric minimum and pure utilitarianism (mean) are obtained in the limit
when, respectively, θ tends to zero or to infinity (a proof is retranscribed in the Appendix A.1).
6Non-welfarist approaches might not need such sets, but as they necessary lie in such sets,
there is no loss of generality.
7I ignore special cases of linear bounds, for which Pareto frontier and bounds may differ.
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cN = c− T . The budget constraint can thus be rewritten as the consumption
minus the transfer: cN = (1− lN)h(X)−T .
For a given utility of South (i.e. a given transfer), North makes a labor-leisure
trade-off so as to maximize its utility. As the utility function of North is assumed
to be homothetic, for a given consumption per leisure time, the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) is constant. It will be convenient to express this ratio as a
function of the optimal MRS. Let Ω be such a function. It is an increasing func-
tion due to the strict convexity of indifference curves. The following Proposition
characterizes the first-best frontier.
Proposition 5 (First-best frontier). The maximal utility uN (lN ,cN) subject to a
constant transfer T represents a frontier in the (uN ,uS) map, on which the fol-
lowing holds:
• u?N = uN
(
h(X)−T
h(X)+Ω(h(X)) ,
Ω(h(X))(h(X)−T )
h(X)+Ω(h(X))
)
and u?S = uS(T )
• du?NdT < 0 and
du?S
dT > 0
Proof of Proposition 5. Let me substitute the budget constraint with the avail-
able consumption in the utility, so as to maximize it in lN .
max
lN
uN (lN ,(1− lN)h(X)−T ) (3.6)
A necessary condition to maximize the utility is that the marginal productivity
of labor is equal to the MRS of leisure for consumption: h(X) = ∂uN(·)/∂ lN∂uN(·)/∂cN .
As the utility function is homothetic, I can explicit the optimal consumption
of North as a function of the leisure time, so as to obtain the expansion path.
cN
lN
=Ω(h(X)) ⇔ cN = lN ·Ω(h(X)) . (3.7)
Substituting it into the budget constraint to get l?N , and substituting l
?
N into the
expansion path to get c?N .
l?N =
h(X)−T
h(X)+Ω(·) and c
?
N =
Ω(·)(h(X)−T )
h(X)+Ω(·) . (3.8)
Trivially c?S = T .
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For the shape, one can directly see that l?N and c
?
N are decreasing with respect
to T . Therefore: du
?
N
dT < 0. Trivially:
du?S
dT > 0. Hence
du?S
du?N
< 0.
The frontier is parametrized by the amount transfered T . Without surprise,
the higher the transfer the lower the utility of North and the higher the utility of
South. At the limits, u?N tends to zero when the transfer tends to its highest level
h(X). And u?N is maximal if there is no transfer. Hence, the first-best possibility
frontier is strictly downward-sloping in (uN ,uS). Let me give an example of such
a frontier.
Example Consider the following functional forms:
• F(X) = rX (1− XX¯ ) and h(X) = qX , thus X˙ = rX (1− XX¯ )− q(1− lN)X .
With r > 0 the rate of intrinsic growth of the resource, X¯ its carrying ca-
pacity and q > 0 a parameter of efficiency.
• uN = (αlNρ +(1−α)cNρ)
1
ρ and uS = cSγ . 0<α < 1, 0< γ ≤ 1, ρ < 1,
ρ 6= 0. ξ ≡ 11−ρ .
The optimal utilities are:
u?N =
α
 qX−T
qX +
(1−α
α qX
)ξ
ρ +(1−α)
 qX−T
1+
(1−α
α
)−ξ
(qX)1−ξ
ρ
1
ρ
;
and u?S = T
γ . (3.9)
In this framework, an explicit first-best frontier is easy to obtain taking the in-
verse function of u?S(T ) and substituting it into u
?
N(T ). A graphical illustration
in the (lN ,cN) map is plotted in Fig. 3.1.8 An illustration of the same frontier in
the (uN ,uS) will be given in the subsection 3.2.4. Three levels of transfers are
plotted in Fig. 3.1. First, a situation with no transfer is represented at M. The
consumption of South is nil, c?1S = 0, and the consumption of North is maximal
and is equal to the global consumption c?N = c
?1. Then, the higher the tax rate, the
higher the consumption of South, c?1S < c
?2
S < c
?3
S , and the lower the consumption
8Unless otherwise stated, all the numerical values used are: α = 0.5; ρ = 0.5; γ = 0.5; r = 1;
q = 0.8; X = 5. Values of the transfer are successively T = 0;1.5;3.
111
CHAPTER 3. TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES FOR A SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
uN3
uN1
M
0
cS⋆3
cN⋆3
c⋆3
c⋆1
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Figure 3.1: Construction of the utility possibility frontier with lump-sum trans-
fers
of North, c?1N > c
?2
N > c
?3
N . The straight line 0M depicts a ‘contraction path’. Note
that the global consumption rises with respect to the transfer, c?1 < c?2 < c?3.
3.2.3 Utility possibility frontier with tax
I study now the case where a social planner cannot transfer an absolute
amount from North to South. In climate change issues, agreeing on a carbon
tax is certainly easier than agreeing on transfers from developed to developing
countries for example. The transfer is decentralized through a proportional tax,
at the rate τ . This problem can be related to a second-best approach. This case is
comparable to the previous one, but relatively different in its implications since
the (implicit) relative prices change. Here, for each tax rate, one can determine
optimal utilities so as to construct the ‘second-best Pareto frontier’. This frontier
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bounds the utility possibility set as before.
max
lN ,cN
uN (lN ,cN) ; (3.10)
subject to cN = (1− τ)c . (3.11)
I will explicit every variable as a function of the tax rate to solve the problem
in that variable. The transfer being proportional, North can consume what it
harvests minus the taxed part: cN = (1− τ)c. The receiver obtains cS = τc. The
budget constraint can thus be rewritten as the maximal possible consumption net
of the tax: cN = (1− τ)(1− lN)h(X).
For a given tax rate, North works so as to maximize its utility. Let ξ ?? be the
elasticity of substitution of leisure for consumption of the North evaluated at the
second-best optimum. I state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Second-Best Frontier). The maximal utilities of the North and of
the South expressed as a function of a constant tax rate, 0≤ τ ≤ 1, represents a
frontier in the (uN ,uS) map, on which the following holds:
• u??N = uN
(
(1−τ)h(X)
(1−τ)h(X)+Ω((1−τ)h(X) ,
Ω((1−τ)h(X))(1−τ)h(X)
(1−τ)h(X)+Ω((1−τ)h(X))
)
and
u??S = uS
(
Ω((1−τ)h(X))τh(X)
(1−τ)h(X)+Ω((1−τ)h(X))
)
• du??Ndτ < 0 and
– if ξ ?? ≤ 1, du??Sdτ > 0 always
– if ξ ?? > 1, du
??
S
dτ > 0 if τ <
1
1+l??N (ξ ??−1) < 1 .
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a given tax rate τ ≥ 0. The North makes a
labor-leisure trade-off so as to maximize its utility. I substitute, here also, the
budget constraint with the consumption in the utility, so as to maximize it with
respect to the leisure time.
max
lN
uN (lN ,(1− τ)(1− lN)h(X)) . (3.12)
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A necessary condition to maximize the utility is that the net marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the MRS of leisure for consumption: (1− τ)h(X) =
∂uN/∂ lN
∂uN/∂cN
. As the utility function is homothetic, I can express the optimal con-
sumption as a function of leisure and of the tax rate.
cN
lN
=Ω((1− τ)h(X)) ⇔ cN = lN ·Ω((1− τ)h(X)) . (3.13)
Using the same stages than with the absolute transfer:
l??N =
(1− τ)h(X)
(1− τ)h(X)+Ω(·) and c
??
N =
Ω(·)(1− τ)h(X)
(1− τ)h(X)+Ω(·) . (3.14)
Recall that cS = τc and cN = (1− τ)c. Hence cS = τ1−τ cN . It comes
c??S =
Ω(·)τh(X)
(1− τ)h(X)+Ω(·) . (3.15)
Let me now study the shape. For the North, since its constraint set is dimin-
ishing with respect to the tax rate, the utility of the North mechanically reduces.
du??N
dτ
< 0 . (3.16)
For the South, with cS = τc,
du??S
dτ
=
∂u??S
∂cS
dc??S
dτ
=
∂u??S
∂cS︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 c︸︷︷︸
>0
−τh(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dl??N
dτ︸︷︷︸
?
 . (3.17)
It is straightforward to see that if dl
??
N
dτ ≤ 0 then
du??S
dτ > 0. But, otherwise, one
cannot directly conclude. Unfortunately, the analysis of the sign of dc
??
S
dτ is mean-
ingless.9 Rather, I study dcSdτ as a function of cN . One has cS =
τ
1−τ cN =
τ
1−τ lN ·
9 dc
??
S
dτ > 0 ⇔ τ < h(X)+Ω((1−τ)h(X))ξ ??h(X) . As ξ =
dΩ(·)
dMRS
MRS
Ω(·) , at the optimum ξ
?? = Ω
′(·)
Ω(·) (1−
τ)h(X).
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Ω((1− τ)h(X)). One obtains
dcS
dτ
> 0 ⇔ 1+(1− τ)dlN
dτ
τ
lN
− τξ > 0 . (3.18)
Let me now compute this inequality with the optimal leisure time l??N .
dcS
dτ
∣∣∣∣
l??N
> 0 ⇔ τ < 1
1+ l??N (ξ ??−1)
. (3.19)
It is always positive. It can directly be seen that the right-hand side (RHS) is
lower than one if and only if the elasticity of substitution is higher than one (the
case ξ = 1 is obtain at the limit). To summarize:
sign
(
du??S
dτ
)
RHS≥ 1 RHS < 1
ξ ?? ≤ 1 + Impossible
ξ ?? > 1 Impossible +/-
Here, the frontier is parametrized by the tax rate. Without surprise the tax is
always negative for the North. The tax reducing its budget set, the utility reached
is lower. But for the South the result is not straightforward. If North works more
when the tax rate increases, the amount received by South increases, because one
taxes more a higher basis. If North works less, the effect is a priori ambiguous,
because one taxes more a lower basis. Finally, if North is indifferent, South is
also better-off, because one taxes more a constant basis.
Intuitively, the reaction of North to the tax depends on its elasticity of sub-
stitution of leisure for consumption. In particular, if it considers leisure and
consumption as quite complementary (ξ ≤ 1), the more North is taxed, the more
it works (or does not react to), and then South is getting better and better as
the tax rate grows. On the opposite, if they are quite substitutable (ξ > 1), the
amount received by South increases if and only if the tax rate is not too high.
Unfortunately, an explicit value of the threshold cannot be obtained.10 Nonethe-
less, let me note τ¯ the threshold resulting of the inequality τ < 11+l??N (τ)(ξ ??(τ)−1) .
10As shown later, even with explicit functional forms.
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The right-hand side being given by the optimal leisure time and the elasticity of
substitution (evaluated at the optimum if not constant). Notice that this is close
to the concept of the Laffer curve (see Laffer, 2004), with South ‘playing role’
of the State. South takes advantage of a higher tax until a certain point (τ¯), from
which on, a higher rate reduces the amount perceived.
A non-common movement between the tax rate and and the labor supply is
conceivable. But it is hard to argue that for any level of the tax rate, the higher
the tax rate the higher (or constant) the labor supply (ξ ≤ 1). I will rather assume
in the next subsections that North always works less when the tax rate increases
(ξ > 1).11
To sum up, under the assumption of an increasing labor supply, the utility of
North is always decreasing with respect to the tax rate while the utility of South
increases until a threshold and decreases afterward. Thus, this describes a ‘bell
curve’ frontier. But actually only the decreasing part matters, since the increasing
one represents states from which both regions can be better-off. These states are
Pareto-dominated, and thus not of interest from a welfare point of view.12
Example Consider the same previous restrictions. The optimal utilities are:
u??N =
(
α
(
1
1+
(1−α
α
)ξ
((1− τ)qX)ξ−1
)ρ
+(1−α)
(
1
((1− τ)qX)−1+ (1−αα (1− τ)qX)−ξ
)ρ) 1ρ
;
and u??S =
 τ
(qX)−1+
(1−α
α qX
)−ξ
(1− τ)1−ξ
γ . (3.20)
Inequality of the threshold: 1−ξτ+
(
1−α
α
)ξ
(qX)ξ−1(1− τ)ξ > 0 . (3.21)
In this framework, an explicit second-best frontier is not easy to obtain. A
11Considering both cases is also unnecessary since, qualitatively, the second-best approach is
very close to the first-best one for ξ ≤ 1.
12Nonetheless, this could be used to fuel the debate on high-tax rate countries, but this is left
for future research.
116
CHAPTER 3. TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES FOR A SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
graphical illustration of the two cases is plotted in Fig. 3.2.13 As said, only the
case ξ > 1 will be consider afterward. The corresponding frontier in utility map
will be given in the subsection 3.2.4.
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Figure 3.2: Construction of the utility possibility frontier with tax
Three levels of tax rate are plotted in Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2b. First, a situation
with no transfer is represented at M. In the two cases, the consumption of South
is nil, c??1S = 0, and the consumption of North is maximal and is equal to the
global consumption, c??N = c
??1 = 0.14 When the tax rate rise, the cases diverge.
Fig. 3.2a plots a case similar to the first-best case. The higher the tax rate, the
higher the consumption of South and the lower the consumption of North. The
curve 0M depicts a ‘contraction path’. And the global consumption rises with
respect to the tax. On the opposite, Fig. 3.2b plots a situation very different than
the first-best case. The consumption of South is increasing with respect to the tax
rate for low rates, 0 = c??1S < c
??2
S , and decreasing for high rates, c
??2
S > c
??3
S .
15
Of course, the consumption of North decreases always with respect to the tax
13For the low and the high elasticity cases, values are respectively: ρ1 = −0.5 and ρ2 = 0.5.
Values of the tax rate are successively τ = 0;0.5;0,95.
14The two plots have the same normalization. The difference of c??1 in the two cases come
from the difference of elasticity of substitution ξ .
15In this example, the threshold is τ¯ = 5−
√
5
4 ≈ 0.7.
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rate. But in this case, the global consumption decreases with respect to the tax.
Let me now compare the different implications of the two instruments, lump-
sum transfer and tax.
3.2.4 Comparison of the two frontiers
Let me begin with the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Comparison of the frontiers). The second-best utility possibility
frontier lies below the first-best utility possibility frontier.
Proof of the Proposition 7. For a given utility of North, let us seek the highest
amounts one can transfer to South, whatever the mechanism used. Let c˜N(lN)
be the image of an indifference curve of North. And let us maximize the gap
between the production and that curve.
max
lN
cS = (1− lN)h(X)− c˜N(lN) . (3.22)
A necessary condition is the equalization of the MRS with the marginal produc-
tivity: MRS= h(X). As this is done with the lump-sum transfer, this mechanism
is then the most favorable for the South. For a given utility of the North, the
first-best frontier corresponds well to the highest utility for the South. Hence,
the utility possibility set with the lump-sum transfer contains the set with the tax.
When no transfer occurs, since net and gross productivity are equivalent, the two
frontiers coincide.
For a given utility of the North, the tax is always less favorable for the South
than the lump-sum transfer. Indeed, the tax on the production discourages the
North who works less and then harvests less. And if the tax rate is higher than
the threshold τ¯ , increasing its rate leads to worsen their both situations. As
these states are not of interest in my framework, I do not consider high tax rates.
Fig 3.3 plots the two frontiers.16
The difference between the two frontiers, depicted by the gray area in the
figure, represents the inefficiency of the tax. This illustrates a well-known fea-
16With the same previously mentioned numerical values. Especially ρ = 0.5.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the first-best and the second-best frontiers
ture. Tax impacting choices, the labor-leisure trade-off here, they impact the
effort and therefore the global quantity to share. From a social point of view,
lump-sum transfers seem preferable over taxes, as they allow more choices.
As the impact of the tax depends on the reaction of North, one may expect
the difference between the two frontiers to be dependent on preferences of North.
Let us verify this with an example.
Example I only need the restriction of CES utility function of the North here.
The function that links the MRS and the optimal consumption-leisure ra-
tio is of the form: Ω(z) =
(1−α
α z
)ξ
. The difference between the budget con-
straint (a straight line) and the indifference curve (strictly convex) is strictly con-
cave in (lN ,cN). We know that the optimum is reached at the first-best optimal
consumption-leisure ratio Ω(h(X)). So, for a given utility of the North, the
higher is the difference between the first-best and the second-best optimal ratios,
the higher is the distance between the two frontiers. Let the difference between
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the two optimal ratios be noted D:
D(ξ )≡Ω(h(X))−Ω((1− τ)(h(X)) =
(
1−α
α
h(X)
)ξ (
1− (1− τ)ξ
)
.
For 0 < τ < 1, it can easily be shown that dDdξ ≥ 0 as long as 1−αα qX ≥ 1.17 We
then may expect the previously mentioned intuitive feature to hold most of the
time, but not always. Besides, note that limξ→0 D(ξ ) = 0.
To summarize, the higher the (constant) elasticity of substitution, the higher
(generally) the gap between the two instruments. At the limit, if leisure and
consumption are perfectly complementary, the instrument used does no longer
matters since the two frontiers merge together.18 This latter result is not surpris-
ing since in this case the (implicit) relative prices do not matter for the choice of
the North. Only in this very specific case, lump-sum and tax are equivalent.
Those frontiers represent the efficient possible allocations. Let us now find
the optimal ones from a social welfare point of view.
3.2.5 Welfare analysis
I am now interested in finding the optimal allocation of utilities, which in-
dicates implicitly the optimal (absolute or proportional) transfer. For that let us
consider society changes its inequality aversion, for whatever reasons. In this
perspective, I will see the consequence of a change in the inequality aversion
(IA) on the optimal allocation. Let us recall that a higher IA corresponds to a
lower elasticity of substitution (dθ < 0). The welfare analysis is qualitatively the
same with both mechanisms. I present it only with the lump-sum.
In general terms, one has to seek the maximal welfare subject to the fact
that utilities are elements of the utility possibility set. Here, as maximization
problem has already been solved, we can maximize directly the welfare through
17If not, this holds only if τ is under a threshold implicitly given by (1− τ)2ln(r(1− τ)) <
ln(r). With my numerical values, the condition always holds since 1−αα h(X) = 4≥ 1.
18I exclude the perfect substitutability case to avoid unrealistic corner solutions (i.e. no work
or no leisure).
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the amount transfered. The economy will always be situated on the frontier.
max
T
W ? (T ) =
(
aN ·u?N (T )η +aS ·u?S (T )η
) 1
η . (3.23)
Let me define the marginal social rate of substitution (MSRS) as the will-
ingness of society to increase marginally the utility of the South taking from the
utility of the North, keeping its global welfare equal. In the same vein, let me
define the marginal social rate of ‘transformation’ (MSRT) the marginal utility
gain of South for an infinitesimal loss of North.19 Let λ := uSuN be the utility ratio.
Proposition 8 (Optimal allocation). An optimal allocation of the problem (3.23)
satisfies the property that the utility ratio is a function of the MSRT: λ ?=MSRT?θ .
It increases with respect to the inequality aversion if and only if it is lower than
one: dλ
?
−dθ ≥ 0 ⇔ λ ? ≤ 1.
Proof of the Proposition 8. The first-order condition gives:
∂W ?(T )
∂T
= 0 ⇔ u
?
S
u?N
=
(
aS
aN
)θ ( ∂u?S
∂T
−∂u?N∂T
)θ
. (3.24)
dλ ?
−dθ ≥ 0 ⇔ MSRT
?θ ln(MSRT?)≤ 0 ⇔ MSRT? ≤ 1 ⇔ λ ? ≤ 1 . (3.25)
The previous proposition depicts two interesting features. First, it links the
optimal utility ratio with two fundamental elements: one absolute, the intratem-
poral IA, and one relative to the situation, the MSRT. It shows in a simple way
how the optimal transfer depends upon both on will and on constraints. For ex-
ample, a pure equality situation (λ ?= 1) is possible only in two situations. Either
if the gain of South is locally the same than the loss of North (MSRT? = 1). Or
if the intratemporal IA is infinite (θ → 0). But note that in this last case, it holds
19Formally, MSRS :=
∣∣∣∣ duSduN
∣∣∣∣
W
∣∣∣∣ = ∂W∂uN∂W
∂uS
> 0. MSRT :=
∣∣∣ du?S(T )du?N(T ) ∣∣∣ = ∂u
?
S
∂T
− ∂u
?
N
∂T
> 0. At the optimum:
MSRS? = MSRT?.
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only at the limit. Which means that a perfect equality may never arise. I will
come back to this point later on. Second, the proposition tells us that a higher IA
benefit to South (higher λ ?) only if South is worse-off (λ ? < 1).20 That is to say,
if the South is better-off, a higher IA reduces the optimal transfer. This could
seem surprising: how does a higher IA can imply to less redistribute toward a
region that is constrained on its consumption? Actually, this is quite logical. For
example if one considers the South to have a higher utility compared to North
(for the same consumption and leisure levels), the original transfer (before the
variation of IA) may be too‘heavy’ for North. Augmenting the IA allow a higher
utility of North and a lower of South. Note that this feature is not possible in
the intertemporal dimension since the transfer is possible in only one dimension.
Fig. 3.4 represents the two situations: one where the South is originally better-
off (3.4a) and one where the North is originally better-off (3.4b).21 Each figure
plots a frontier with two social indifference curves, depending on IA. If South
O2
O1
θ2<θ1
W(θ2)
W(θ1)
0
uS
uN
(a) South is well-off
P2 P1
θ2<θ1
W(θ2)
W(θ1)
0
uS
uN
(b) North is well-off
Figure 3.4: Different inequality aversions with two types of frontier
is relatively better-off in the original situation, the higher the IA (the elasticity
of substitution pass from θ1 to θ2) the lower the utility ratio (from O1 to O2).
20In the very specific case where λ ? = 1, the IA has no influence on λ .
21It is a stylized feature, no meaningful numerical values are used here.
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This implies to decrease the optimal transfer. On the contrary, if North better-off
in the original situation, the higher the IA the higher the corresponding utility
ratio (from P1 to P2). This implies to increase the optimal transfer from North
to South. Whatever the initial situation, the higher the IA, the more one goes
toward an egalitarian situation. But depending on the shape of the frontier, a
perfect equality may never arise.22 To be consistent with my original issue –
where South is limited on its consumption – I will only consider the case where
North is originally better-off and has to make a transfer positively linked with
the IA (Fig. 3.4b). But the counter intuitive case (Fig. 3.4a) is actually useful for
shedding light on the measure of utility.23
Let me open a parenthesis before turning to future consequences of a varia-
tion of intratemporal inequality aversion. The eq. (3.24) shows clearly the role
played by individual weights. For example, the higher aS, the higher the utility
of South and the lower the utility of North. As argued in the previous chapter,
weights can offset undesired consequences (e.g. a too high transfer). But here
also, we see that better to address such issues through the inequality aversion pa-
rameter. Note that, like in the intertemporal dimension, when the IA is infinite,
weights do not matter (Appendix A.1).
3.3 Intra and intergenerational considerations
Sustainability can be measured through net investment, once one adopts a
value function (Asheim, 2007). Without a particular formulation of such a func-
tion, one can assume it to be non-declining with respect to the resource stock.
Formally, the evolution of the value function over time is (for an autonomous
problem)
V˙ (X) =
∂V (X)
∂X︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
X˙ . (3.26)
22Rawls (1974, p. 145) was perfectly aware of this feature when he wrote “historically [the
maximin criterion] has attracted little attention, and yet it is a natural focal point between strict
equality and the principle of average utility”.
23A figure illustrating the impact of utility of South on the frontiers is plotted in Fig. A.7,
p. 131.
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The value function is increasing over time if genuine savings is positive (shadow-
price µ times the evolution of the stock). But this is an indicator and cannot
directly be used to measure intergenerational equity. I will thus simply focus on
the instantaneous welfare, but verifying that the value function does not decline
along a path.24
I will analyze firstly how the inequality aversion impacts the current global
consumption. Secondly, I will see how the evolution of the resource, in turn,
transforms the welfare possibilities.
3.3.1 Inequality aversion and the current consumption
Let me recall that, with the previous restrictions, the higher the IA, the higher
the transfer. Then the utility of North decreases and the utility of South increases.
But the consequences of an higher IA on the current global consumption is not
the same according to the redistribution mechanism used.
With a lump-sum, North ‘compensate’ the transfer by working more. As
the harvesting increases with work, global consumption increases (as depicted
in Fig. 3.1). With a tax, on the opposite, North is ‘discourage’ to work. As the
harvesting decreases with leisure, global consumption decreases (as depicted in
Fig. 3.2b). In the specific case of equal utilities, the inequality aversion has no
influence on the redistribution, it has then no influence on the global consumption
too.
3.3.2 Evolution of the resource and the possibilities for futures
welfares
The redistribution influences the current consumption which has consequences
on the evolution of the resource stock. And reciprocally, the evolution of the re-
source stock has consequences on the possibilities of consumption and then on
possibilities of redistributions. If the resource stock varies, I have to determine
beforehand to whom will go that supplement (variations of X on λ ?). This should
24In the formulation of the Chapter 1: if the maximin would be pursued, the net-investments
rule would dictate that investment in South compensate the disinvestment in North: µSX˙S =
−µN X˙N .
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be done according to the social welfare function and the shape of the frontier.
But, to begin, let us study the deformation of the frontier due to the variation of
the resource stock.
Proposition 9 (Variations of the frontiers). For X ′ > X, the utility possibility
frontier associated with X lies strictly below the utility possibility frontiers asso-
ciated with X ′.
Proof of the Proposition 9. By construction, dcdX > 0. With lump-sum: cN = c−
T and cS = T . Everything else begin equal, the utility of the North increases with
respect to the stock and the utility of the South remains constant. With tax: cN =
(1− τ)c and cS = τc. Everything else begin equal, both utilities increases.
As expected, the frontiers shift outward with an increase of the resource
stock. An illustration in given in Fig. 3.5. First and second-best frontiers are
plotted with two values of the resource stock. Blue and solid line corresponds to
the benchmark. Red and dashed line corresponds to a higher stock level.25 As
0
uS
uN
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity of the frontiers to the resource stock
the constraint set is augmenting, the welfare is unambiguously increasing with
respect to the resource stock.26 I can then link the evolution of the welfare with
the evolution of the resource. Hence, a variation of the inequality aversion has
25Numerical values: X = 5 for the blue and solid line curves and X = 6 for the red and dashed
line ones.
26I have not been able to prove that the optimal utilities are effectively increasing. I suppose
they are.
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a direct effect on the current generation through the transfer and an indirect one
on future generations through the evolution of the stock.
3.3.3 Interactions between the two dimensions
Let us recall that an increasing inequality aversion implies a rising global
consumption with a lump-sum transfer, but a declining global consumption with
a proportional tax. The intergenerational concern should be based on the evolu-
tion of welfare along time. More precisely, we should analyze the modification
of the welfare path after a change in the inequality aversion. But as we know
that the welfare is positively linked with the resource stock (Proposition 9), we
can focus on the resources paths. Four cases have to be distinguished depending
on, on the one hand, whether the resource stock is rising or declining, and one
the other hand, whether the steady-state stock level is higher or lower than the
golden-rule one27. The steady-state stock level depends on the work productiv-
ity of the North. I consider a work productivity as being relatively low if the
steady-state stock level if superior to XGR, and vice versa.
Fig. 3.6 plots the different situations, with a logistic growth and a linear
catch-effort curve.28 Blue and solid line curves plot a benchmark situation.
Green and dashed line ones plot a situation with a lower consumption. I plot-
ted a high productivity situation (a), and corresponding paths with a rising stock
(b) and a decreasing one (c). Symmetrically, I plotted a low productivity situa-
tion (d), with a rising stock (e) and a decreasing one (f). In all the situations, a
higher consumption (from green to blue) impacts negatively the resource – ei-
ther the growth is lower or the decreasing is higher – and it converges to a lower
steady state.
Interestingly, Fig. 3.6b can be related to Chapter 2 and Fig. 3.6c can be related
to Chapter 1. In Fig. 3.6b, passing from blue to green represents a higher sacrifice
in the North, the stock grows faster and toward a higher steady state. In Fig. 3.6c,
passing from blue to green represents a lower disinvestment in the North – to
compensate a lower need of investment in the South, – the stock declines slower
27By definition, a steady state X ss > 0 satisfies X˙ = 0⇔ F(X ss) = (1− l?N)h(X ss).
28It is a stylized feature, no meaningful numerical values are used here.
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Figure 3.6: Resource paths as indicators of intergenerational welfare
and toward a higher steady state. In this last case, an increasing consumption in
the North may be sustainable (from green to blue in Fig. 3.6c) if the supplement
is transfered to the South, to grow out from poverty for example.
Which instrument the social planer of this economy shall use when the IA
comes to increase? Let us take the golden rule as a reference target for the
North. If the North has a relatively high productivity, the social planer shall seek
to decrease its consumption. This is made possible by a tax proportional to its
production. The tax, reducing the effort, reduces the harvesting and then makes
the resource stock grow toward a higher level. On the contrary, if the North has a
relatively low productivity, the social planer shall seek to increase its consump-
tion. This is made possible by a lump-sum transfer. The transfer encourages
work to compensate the withdrawn amount. More effort means more harvesting,
and thus the resource stock grow toward a lower level. A last feature is that a
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huge decreasing of consumption may be such that one passes from a high-work
productivity case to a low-work productivity case, i.e. the steady-state stock
passes from below to above the golden-rule one. In that case, intragenerational
decisions can be seen as being too ‘generous’ toward the future and lead to over-
accumulation.
These results illustrate, in a sense, the independence, facilitations and rival-
ries between the two dimensions guessed by Baumgärtner et al. (2012). Here,
except in a very specific case of perfect equality, either the two dimensions fa-
cilitate each other – using the right mechanism – or trade-offs have to me made
– when using the right mechanism is not possible.
3.4 Conclusion
I depicted a world where one region – North – has a free access to its resource
while another – South – has a limited access to its resource. This is a parable of
a relative higher sacrifice asked to the South since its lower stock is marginally
more productive. In such a world, society wants to implement a transfer of a part
of the harvest from the North to the South. I studied the effects of an absolute
transfer and of a relative one based on the resource caught. I constructed utility
possibility frontiers in each case. They represent the necessary trade-offs a so-
ciety has to make when it wants to enhance the well-being of one region at the
expense of another. Not surprisingly, the utility possibility set with a tax is lower
than the one with a lump-sum transfer. The inefficiency of the tax depends on
the preferences of the North. Besides, the social criterion allowed for find the
social optimum, and I was particularly interested in its variation due to a change
in the intratemporal inequality aversion. This depends on the initial situation and
on the mechanism of transfers used. In particular, I found that society may af-
ford a higher inequality aversion ‘without worsening’ the future only using the
right mechanism. If the North is relatively productive, the transfer shall be made
through a tax. And if the North is relatively unproductive, the transfer shall be
made through a lump-sum. In any case, the higher intratemporal inequality aver-
sion leads to a convergence between the welfare of the North and the welfare of
the South.
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A.1 Special cases of CES functions
It could seem to be a pointless exercise to demonstrate a very well-known
result. But, to my knowledge, a rigorous demonstration of the minimum is not
present in the literature.
Proof. Let me consider a continuously differentiable function with a constant
elasticity of substitution 11−ρ such that: f (xN , . . . ,xn) =
(
αNx
ρ
N + · · ·+αnxρn
) 1
ρ .
With ∑i=ni=1αi = 1, αi > 0 ∀i and ρ < 1,ρ 6= 0.
• Case 1: the elasticity tends to positive infinity. Trivially, if θ →∞ (ρ→ 1),
the CES function tends to the perfect substitutes function.
lim
ρ→1
f (xN , . . . ,xn) = αNxN + · · ·+αnxn . (A.27)
• Case 2: the elasticity tends to zero.29 Let me rewrite the CES function as:
f (xN , . . . ,xn) = xk
(
αN
(
xN
xk
)ρ
+ · · ·+αk + · · ·+αn
(
xn
xk
)ρ) 1ρ
.
(A.28)
Let min{xN , . . . ,xn}= xk. Then
lim
ρ→−∞
(
xi
xk
)ρ
= 0, ∀i 6= k . (A.29)
Thus
lim
ρ→−∞xk
(
αN
(
xN
xk
)ρ
+ · · ·+αk + · · ·+αn
(
xn
xk
)ρ) 1ρ
= xk . (A.30)
As xk can be any good,
lim
ρ→−∞ f (xN , . . . ,xn) = min{xN , . . . ,xn} . (A.31)
29I am grateful to Jean-Baptiste Michau for having provided to me this proof. I also thank
Théo Benonnier for having informed me of its existence.
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• Case 3: for exhaustiveness, let the elasticity tend to one. Let me take the
logarithm of f (·):
ln( f (xN , . . . ,xn)) =
ln
(
αNx
ρ
N + · · ·+αnxρn
)
ρ
. (A.32)
Let gN(ρ) and gS(ρ) be equivalent, respectively, to the numerator and to
the denominator. As limρ→0 gN(ρ)= limρ→0 gS(ρ)= 0, by the Hospital’s
rule:
lim
ρ→0
gN(ρ)
gS(ρ)
= lim
ρ→0
g′N(ρ)
g′S(ρ)
, (A.33)
and as
g′N(ρ)
g′S(ρ)
=
αNx
ρ
N ln(xN)+ · · ·+αnxρn ln(xn)
αNx
ρ
N + · · ·+αnxρn
, (A.34)
one gets
lim
ρ→0
ln( f (xN , . . . ,xn)) = αN ln(xN)+ · · ·+αn ln(xn) . (A.35)
Finally,
lim
ρ→0
f (xN , . . . ,xn) = x
αN
N . . .x
αn
n . (A.36)
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A.2 Illustration: Sensitivity to the utility of the South
Let me keep all the numerical values used in the examples until now, and
make γ passing from 0.5 to 0.2. Fig. A.7 represent in an orthonormal plot the
first-best and the second-best frontiers for those two values of gamma. The blue
and solid line ones with γ = 0.5. The red and dashed line ones with γ = 0.2.
uS
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
uN0 0,5 1 1,5
Figure A.7: Sensitivity of the frontiers to the utility of the South
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General conclusion
Although universal, we saw that the notion of equity remains plural. This
dissertation focused on studying how interact freedom of choice between shar-
ing resources among different individuals and sharing it among different gener-
ations. The interactions depend both on ethical considerations and on physical
constraints. Mathematical modeling choices play also, necessarily, a determinant
role in this relationship. Let me summarize the results before analyzing limits
and prospects of the dissertation.
3.2.1 Summary
Throughout the dissertation, I considered a world composed of two regions,
North and South. Each one is endowed with a stock of a renewable resource. But
it was assumed that the one of the South was less abundant than the one of North,
and thus grow marginally more rapidly. Over an infinite horizon, a welfarist
social planner ‘embodied’ social ethical considerations. In particular, I gave the
same weight to each individual as well as to each generation. The difficult issue
of measuring utility was handled in three stages, with an aim to obtain exploitable
conclusions. In the first chapter, utility functions were assumed to be identical
and linear. In the second chapter, they were assumed to be identical and strictly
concave. And in the third chapter, they were assumed to be different and strictly
concave.
I began, in Chapter 1, by studying the objective of sustaining the highest
level of welfare over time. This is made possible by a well-known criterion,
the maximin. As its name suggests, it seeks to maximize the welfare of the
worst-off generation. This leads, most of the time, to a constant intertemporal
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welfare. As each generation has the ability to benefit of this level of welfare, it
has been argued that it has strong resonance with sustainability objective. But
even though the welfare remains constant, regional consumption levels do not
stay still. North over-consumes (compared to the individual maximin consump-
tion), then its stock becomes marginally more and more productive. On the
contrary, South under-consumes, then its stock becomes marginally less and less
productive. This illustrates a convergence between North and South until stocks
become equally productive. Hence, inequalities reduce over time, but it requires
to worsen them during the transition (compared to a situation where each region
is considered in isolation). The inequality aversion plays, reciprocally, a role on
the optimal welfare. Generally, the higher the inequality aversion, the lower the
sustainable welfare level. This comes from the fact that when inequalities are
less tolerated, the economy can less ‘take advantage’ of unequal productivities.
Two limiting cases of intratemporal social welfare function were studied. The
first one is the intratemporal maximin, with an infinite inequality aversion. In
this case, the sustainable welfare is at its lowest level, given by the production
of the absolutely less productive stock (the one of the South). The second one
is the utilitarianism, with a nil inequality aversion. In this case, the sustainable
welfare is only supported by the consumption of North. Substitution between
consumption of the North and of the South is complete, and the South shall
consume nothing during the transition. In this last case, transfers become vital.
But maximin has been criticized because an economy may be locked to a low
welfare level. Decisions that would lead to an increase of the maximin welfare
were also considered. They imply savings from the current generation. But it
was showed that such ‘sacrifices’ have to be coordinated to lead effectively to an
improvement of the welfare level.
Chapter 2 studied more directly such an objective, through the Ramsey cri-
terion. The social planner maximizes the intertemporal social welfare in order
to reach the highest sustainable level of welfare, the golden rule. In a world of
scarcity, growth requires savings. Here both North and South under-consume,
and their stocks become marginally less and less productive to be equal to zero
at the steady state. In a sense, North and South converge, but the relative sacrifice
is generally not evenly shared. The difference in consumption growth rates (indi-
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cating a high savings rate) depends on three elements. The marginal productivity
gap (physical constraint) and the intra and intergenerational inequality aversions
(ethical considerations). The relationship in not always unambiguous. But we
can retain that the more the stock of the South is productive and the lower are
the inequality aversions, the higher will be the relative sacrifice of South. The
sacrifice is negatively related to each inequality aversion for different reasons.
The less intratemporal inequalities are tolerated, the less the economy can ‘take
advantage’ of the unequal productivities (as in the first chapter). But the less in-
tertemporal inequalities are tolerated, the less we can substitute current for future
welfares, and then the less we make sacrifices. Of course, sacrifices are evenly
shared if marginal productivities are, at each time, equal. Unequal weights were
eventually considered to study their consequences on allocations. Neither intra
nor intertemporal (discounting) weights impact determinately the results. They
impact the evolution of consumptions, but not their relative growth. That said,
introducing a discount rate reduces the sacrifice asked to each generation. Con-
sequently, the economy grows toward a lower steady state, the modified golden
rule. This allowed me to discuss discount rate as a tool to limit sacrifice. I
came globally to two conclusions. Firstly, in a productive economy the discount
rate cannot be advocated on the sole basis of (intertemporal) inequality aver-
sion. Secondly, giving an equal weight to South and North turned out to be not
enough. Transfers from North to South have to be implemented both for ethical
and pragmatic reasons.
Chapter 3 dealt with transfers. The North is assumed to have a free access
to its stock while the South has a limited access to its stock. More precisely,
a constraint is imposed on the harvesting of the South, which has a benchmark
utility level. Transfers from North to South are implemented to compensate the
lower utility level due to the constraint. Two mechanisms were studied. The
first one is a lump-sum: a given amount of available consumption in North is
transfered. The second one is a tax: a given proportion of available consump-
tion in North is transfered. This leaded to two different utility possibility sets,
bonded respectively by a ‘first-best’ and a ‘second-best’ frontiers. The first-best
one exhibits an intuitive feature: making South better-off makes North worse-
off. The second one exhibits a counter-intuitive but well-known feature, called
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‘Laffer effect’. The higher the tax rate the higher the utility of South, until a
threshold from which on the utility decreases. It corresponds to the point where
discouragement of effort of the North, consequentially to a rising of the tax rate,
outweighs the gain from the tax. The second-best frontier lies below the first-
best one, which represents the well-known ‘inefficiency’ of a tax. Maximizing
a social welfare function allows to choose the optimal allocation of utility, and
implicitly the optimal (absolute or proportional) transfer. In particular, the higher
the inequality aversion, the higher the transfer. Besides, and without surprise, I
showed that frontiers are shifting outward with an increasing resource. This al-
lowed me to study the evolution of welfare through the evolution of the resource.
I took the golden rule as a benchmark target. If the current steady-state stock
level is higher than the golden-rule one, I argued that a higher inequality aver-
sion has to be implemented through a higher lump-sum. The intuition is that the
effort being positively linked with the transfered amount, the North compensates
by working more. On the opposite, if the current steady-state stock level is lower
than the golden-rule one, I argued that a higher inequality aversion has to be im-
plemented through a higher tax. The intuition is that the effort being negatively
linked with the transfered amount, the North is discouraged and works less. In
any case, one gets closer to the ‘benchmark sacrifice’ leading to the golden rule.
The main message of the dissertation is that intragenerational and intergenera-
tional equity considerations may, ethically, be independent. But accounting for
real-world constraints conditions the relationship. In particular growing, or sus-
taining, welfare over generations in a productive economy implies to constrain
countries with relatively scarce resources, which shall be compensated by coun-
tries with relatively abundant ones.
3.2.2 Limits and prospects
This work has of course its limitations. Both by the choices made to repre-
sent the issue and by the voluntary omissions of some elements for the sake of
parsimony.
On choices, I want to raise three potentially controversial points. First, I
used a welfarist approach, with a constant elasticity of substitution to represent
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inequality aversion. As results suggest, it is a fairly malleable approach. But
I shall acknowledge that some results might strongly depend on those assump-
tions. Second, I only considered an infinite horizon. This is in line with most
of the approaches in the sustainable development literature. Considering a fi-
nite horizon allows to escape from the classic equity-efficiency dilemma. But
it solves a problem and creates another one, the date of the horizon. That said,
I acknowledge that it is more consistent to study a finite horizon than justify-
ing discounting in an infinite-horizon framework on the basis of ‘myopia’ of the
social planer. Third, I concentrate more on procedural justice than on outcome
justice. My restriction was indeed to treat everyone equally. But the welfarist ap-
proach is in essence interested in consequences of decisions on actual well-being.
Actually, the welfarist approach is sufficiently malleable to encompass both con-
siderations. The true question being what and how individual welfare index are
measured. I tried to show how some results are sensitive to the functional form of
the utility chosen. I propose to argue that focusing only on deontological aspects
without looking at consequences can turn into ‘monomania’. But at the opposite,
focusing only on consequences can turn into ‘arbitrariness’.
On omissions, I want to raise seven important elements that could have been
relevant. First, the non-renewable resources. As we know, they have attracted
most of the attention in sustainability issues. But their finiteness became recently
less problematic than greenhouse gases they release during production and con-
sumption. Whatever, the ultimate aim is to find a substitute, which is a techno-
logical issue (e.g. solar energy and breeder reactors). Second, climate change.
It is maybe the more determinant environmental issue. But as renewable assets
(e.g. wetlands) play also a role in the carbon cycle, I hope the present frame-
work give also some insights in this literature. I recommend also North-South
transfers, but for another reason. While the climate change literature has focused
on inequality in responsibility and vulnerability, the present work has focused
on inequality in endowment of natural assets. Third, technological progress. As
progress makes constraints less binding, it impacts outcomes of distributional
choices. It also played a role on justification of discounting.30 Fourth, I omitted
30“Sustainability is not always compatible with discounting the well-being of future genera-
tions if there is no continuing technological progress. But I will slide over this potential contra-
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uncertainty. As most of environmental issues are inherently uncertain, a deter-
ministic framework can only be seen as a benchmark. This also applies to the
fifth point, population growth. It is surely one of the main issues the world will
have to address in the near future. But it deserves a work apart. Sixth, I also did
not deal with within-country inequalities. Those seem to be of all importance,
especially for vulnerability and resilience issues. Seventh, and lastly, I also omit-
ted altruism. Knowing if altruist preferences shall be considered in equity issues
is a problem in itself. Here, as I considered symmetrically the two dimensions, I
then did not take into account non-egoistic individual preferences.
This work, as many others in the field, is not normative. I rather tried to
formulate conditional recommendations. A criterion of social evaluation can
never be universal. But shedding light on the underlying inequality aversion is
maybe the best way to promote informed discussions, both on ethical premises
and on formulation of quantifiable policy objectives.
diction because discount rates should be small and, after all, there is technological progress”
(Solow, 1993, p. 168).
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